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This study of the biblical Book of Amos from Marxist and Freudian perspectives demonstrates 
that the critical approaches so designated complement one another well enough to be adapted and 
employed constructively in the study of literature and literary production.  From the Marxist per-
spective, the method employed assumes that the literary Amos the text embodies (AmosL) has 
been derived from an incarnate original (AmosI) reshaped in the process of literary production to 
serve certain sociopolitcal interests.  Following Marx’s thesis that humans must be comprehen-
ded materially in “the ensemble of the social relations,” the social location of AmosI is theorized 
according to the claim that he is not a prophet but a shepherd or, as Norman Gottwald states it 
sociologically, a transhumant pastoral nomad.  Louis Althusser’s concept of the idealizing func-
tion of ideology is used to argue that Amos the prophet as opposed to Amos the shepherd is a 
literary production of the scribes who compiled the Bible.  Amos remains, however, a profound 
literature of alienation manifesting the high degree of hegemony that the emerging monarchical 
ruling class in Israel had already achieved by Amos’s time.
From the Freudian or psychoanalytic perspective, the text exemplifies a consciousness 
suffering the traumatic effects of an earthquake—effects reflected in the text’s imagery, intensity 
of voice, incoherence, anxiety, threat of exile, and non-representability.  Frank Kermode’s treat-
ment of the mythic extends the concept of the compulsion to repeat characteristic of trauma to 
suggest that Amos is regressively fixated upon the myth of a tribal, premonarchical Israel as a 
sort of golden age along the lines developed by Raymond Williams in The Country and The City. 
Georges Bataille’s concept of sacred violence in its turn underscores the potential of Amos itself 
to fuel fantasies and acts of violence and raises disturbing questions about the ongoing effects of 




To an unusual degree, I suspect, this study is the product of my individual and solitary reflection 
upon the issues addressed.  This absolves anyone other than myself from any shortcomings and 
idiosyncrasies it may contain.  Particularly, however, I thank my supervisor, Hilary Clark, for her 
perceptive comments and assiduous editing, and the Cancer and Aging Research Group at the 
University of Saskatchewan, which, for the last two years, has provided me my principal forum 




This study was undertaken to gain some insight into the nature and sources of violence.  It is 
dedicated to Jeanne Taylor and to the communities to which I belong that promote living in 
peace, principally the Saskatoon Monthly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) 
and the Saskatoon Ch’an Community.
Imagine there’s no countries
It isn’t hard to do
Nothing to kill or die for
And no religion too
Imagine all the people
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In the spring and summer of 1999, I went in search of the historical Amos.1  Such a 
search was a new departure for me.  Typically, I have not pursued historical criticism, but some-
thing about Amos intrigued me.  At first, I was convinced I could see through the text that bears 
his name to a person who lived in ancient Israel.2  Not that I could see him physically in a way 
that would allow me to recognize him a crowd.  But I thought I understood his life and his world 
view well enough that he became for me a coherent type.
Over the ensuing years I have become more interested in Amos as a literary rather than as 
an historical character.  The present study reflects that shift in interest.  If there were a living, 
breathing Amos of whom the book of Amos preserves a trace, I have come to doubt that those 
among whom he lived and breathed would have said to one another when they saw him on the 
road, “O, look, here comes the prophet Amos!”  I have come to suspect, rather, that the designa-
tion prophet was applied to Amos only in his literary afterlife.  Much of this study focuses upon 
that afterlife.  Nevertheless, I have not altogether abandoned my search for the living, breathing 
man.  Indeed, I cannot.  I have not because, to some extent, I continue to be governed by the his-
torical imperative that motivates much biblical study.  I cannot because this dissertation is 
undertaken as a Marxist as well as a psychoanalytic study of Amos.3  As I go on to elaborate, 
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1 To distinguish Amos the text from Amos the man, I have adopted what in biblical 
studies is the unconventional expedient of italicizing the former.
2 In this study Israel refers to the ancient northern kingdom that disappeared in 722 BCE. 
The issue is complicated by the practice of using the name to refer to the larger area in which the 
god worshipped in Israel was also worshipped, e.g., the ancient southern kingdom of Judah. 
When possible, I use the names proper to each.  When speaking of them collectively, I use the 
term greater Israel.  Henceforth, unless otherwise noted, all biblical dates are understood to be 
BCE.
3 I use the adjective Marxist in keeping with Umberto Eco’s distinction between Marxian 
and Marxist: “If Marx is alive and well around the world, it is not due so much to those who have 
studied him historically (the ‘Marxians’) as to those who have reformulated his thought accord-
ing to new situations (the ‘Marxists’)” (“Peirce’s” 1460).  Marxian applies to the historical body 
of Marx’s work, Marxist to its extension by those who followed.  In this study Marxist refers 
primarily to Marx’s thought as distilled, interpreted, and extended by the French philosopher 
Louis Althusser, whose work on ideology has particularly stimulated my thinking about literary 
production.  At appropriate points I identify other Marxists who have also stimulated my think-
ing.
Marxism is a theory of production.  It seeks to understand the specific conditions that permit 
whatever a society produces at a given time and place to be produced.  In line with this broad 
conception, the Marxist aspect of this study focuses more specifically upon the function of ideol-
ogy in the production of literary art.4  As will be seen, the analytic method I employ assumes that 
the literary Amos the text embodies has been shaped to serve certain sociopolitcal interests.  To 
illuminate the forces at play in this shaping process, the method requires that an incarnate5 
original (AmosI) be theorized from which the literary Amos (AmosL) derives.6  I intend to reveal 
that a dialectic tension exists between the two.  In Marxist theory, dialectic tension is the main-
spring, as it were, in the production of the historical consciousness necessary to the creation and 
maintenance of our sense of the society in which we live and to which we belong.  More specifi-
cally, I go on to argue that—occupationally—AmosI was not anything but the shepherd he claims 
to be (7.14), and I demonstrate the remarkable extent to which the complaint in Amos can be read 
as that of a shepherd.  But I speculate that it served the sociopolitical—and, perhaps, 
psychological—needs of the scribes who eventually produced the biblical literature centuries 
later to enhance their status as subjects of the Persian empire by glorifying their history.  In the 
process, the shepherd Amos (AmosI) came to be ennobled as the prophet Amos (AmosL).  To use 
Benedict Anderson’s concept, this literary recasting of Amos was part and parcel of the 
extraordinary scribal project of imagining a community—the biblical Israel from which the 
scribes involved had descended—as one that had lived in a uniquely meaningful relationship to 
the divine.  They imagined this community in so compelling a manner that the idea of such a 
place has continued to grip the western psyche ever since.  
 No less than Marxism, psychoanalysis is also a theory of production—the production of 
subjectivity more generally conceived, which I designate psychic consciousness to distinguish it 
from historical consciousness.  Like Marxism, it assumes that its object of study has been shaped 
to meet certain ends, and it seeks to illuminate the concealed forces at play in this process.  In the 
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4 As I acknowledge in detail in Chapter 2, this focus reveals my indebtedness to Louis 
Althusser.  It is not the only way that Marxist theory can be and has been applied to literary anal-
ysis.  For instance, David Jobling points out that for Ernst Bloch the principal object of Marxist 
criticism is to identify the utopian moments in the works under consideration (“‘Seduction’”).
5 Amos as he was in his historical flesh.
6 Continuing to call AmosI the historical Amos would be misleading, for, as I go on to 
argue (11 below), AmosL is the historical Amos.  In the ensuing text, I use the rather ungainly 
notations AmosI and AmosL sparingly.  Although a fair deal of what I say is applicable to both, 
the reader should bear in mind that the name Amos comprehends both possibilities.
ensuing pages, I focus upon Freud’s work on trauma to argue that the psychic consciousness 
manifest in Amos is suffering the effects of trauma.  Reference to an earthquake in the first verse 
of Amos, in fact, provides the background for just such a reading. 
My contention that (a) AmosI was not anything but a shepherd and that (b) he was a 
traumatized shepherd to boot marks a new approach to Amos.  I use Marxist and Freudian theory 
respectively to illustrate these points, but I do not utilize them in isolation from one another.  I 
employ them in tandem to argue my thesis that Marxist and psychoanalytic critical approaches 
complement one another—not perfectly, to be sure, for they focus upon different objects of 
knowledge—but well enough that they can be adapted and employed constructively to illuminate 
forces at work in literature and literary production.  In particular, this study of Amos demonstrates 
that the regressive fixation underlying the text is overdetermined: it is an effect both of the 
idealizing function of ideology that Marixst theory highlights and of the traumatic experience 
that Freudian theory elucidates. 
 In the remainder of this introduction I provide (1) some background about Amos; (2) 
some general observations upon the aims, challenges, and general tenor of biblical criticism; (3) 
an argument that the fragmented quality of Amos sets it up to be read as literature of madness; (4) 
reflections upon some of the challenges of utilizing Marxist and Freudian theory in literary criti-
cism; and (5) some concluding remarks about the nature of this study.
1. Amos: The Man and the Text
Amos the text as opposed to Amos the man is a book of the Jewish Bible.7   It appears in 
the second of its three major sections: the Law (הרות, tor&h), the Prophets (םיאיבנ, nOvi’im), and 
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7 To avoid needless repetition, unless otherwise noted the word Bible in this study hence-
forth refers to the Jewish Bible.  Although the practice is not problem free, I use the term Jewish 
Bible rather than Old Testament to refer to the collection of texts in which Amos appears. The 
two are not equivalent.  To support their version of divine history, early Christians chopped some 
books up, added others, and rearranged their sequence.  Reformation Protestants deleted the 
books that had been added, thereby creating a slimmed down Protestant Old Testament distinct 
from the Catholic version.  Because the ideological implications of the adjective Old are dis-
paraging to many who study the text, the term Old Testament has largely disappeared from aca-
demia in favour of other terms deemed more neutral theologically.  Hebrew Bible is the choice of 
many, its drawback being that parts of the books of Ezra and Daniel are written in Aramaic rather 
than Hebrew.  My use of the term Jewish simply refers to the compilation—the books and the 
sequence—as maintained in Judaism.  It does not reflect a belief that the compilation in whatever 
configuration one studies it is more central to one religion than another.  The Bible has been aug-
the Writings (םיבותכ, kOθuvim).8  Traditionally, the prophetic books were subject to finer distinc-
tions.  The Former Prophets (Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings), texts that contain some stories 
about prophets, were distinguished from the Latter Prophets, texts whose authorship was 
attributed to the persons whose names they bear.  The Latter Prophets were divided further into 
Major Prophets (Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel), texts of considerable length, and Minor Pro-
phets, texts so short they originally comprised a single book: the Book of the Twelve.  Nine 
chapters long, Amos is the third of these.  However that position came to be decided upon, it is, 
nevertheless, generally considered to be the oldest text among the Latter Prophets, the so-called 
writing prophets.  An introductory superscription declares that it contains “The words of Amos, 
who was among the shepherds of Teko’a,9 which he saw concerning Israel in the days of Uzzi’ah 
king of Judah and in the days of Jerobo’am the son of Jo’ash, king of Israel, two years before the 
earthquake” ( םָעְבָרָי יֵמיִבּו הָדּוהְי־ְךֶלֶמ הָּיִּזֻע יֵמיִּב לֵאָרְׂשִי־לַע הָזָח רֶׁשֲא ַעֹוקְּתִמ םיִדְקּׁנַב הָזָה־רֶׁשֲא סֹומָע יֵרְבִּד
(ׁשַעָרָה יֵנְפִל םִיַתָנְׁש לֵאָרְׂשִי ְךֶלֶמ ׁשָאֹוי־ןֶּב (1.1).10  What he saw concerning Israel, which he interpreted 




mented and interpreted in various ways in the development of the three major, western, 
monotheistic religions.  The religion(s) practiced in biblical societies have disappeared except in 
these augmented forms.
8 Unless otherwise noted, the Hebrew philology in this work is based upon the standard 
Brown, Driver, Briggs (BDB) edition of the Gesenius Lexicon.  Unless necessary to make some 
distinction, I drop the vowel points from isolated Hebrew words or phrases under discussion. 
Short, perfunctory translations are italicized.  To save space, biblical quotations longer than a line 
or two are given in English only.
9 Teko’a is place about 14 miles from Jerusalem in the ancient southern kingdom of 
Judah.  Despite the tradition’s connecting Amos to Teko’a, in my earlier paper I conclude that, 
based on philological and symbolic evidence, Amos the text and Amos the man were Israelite 
rather than Judahite.  The issue of their provenance, however, is outside the scope of this study.
10 Unless otherwise noted, the English is from the Revised Standard Version (RSV) and 
the Hebrew from the Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia (BHS).  Occasionally I refer to the 1985 
English translation by the Jewish Publication Society—Tanakh—that I will designate by JPS.  I 
tend to use the politically incorrect RSV because (1) I am most familiar with it, and (2), on the 
whole, it seems to me to be a more accurate translation than the more politically correct New 
Revised Standard Version (NRSV).  Despite the newer revisions by apologists who wish to make 
the text more palatable among progressives to whom it is proclaimed, the Jewish Bible remains a 
patriarchal text. 
and absorption into the Assyrian empire.  The information supplied in the superscription has led 
to a consensus that the man Amos to whom it refers flourished in greater Israel in the mid-eighth 
century.11  By this date the vexed question of the degree to which biblical characters are historical 
or legendary begins to recede.
2. The Historical Imperative in Biblical Studies: The Reliability of the Bible as an 
Historical Witness
It only begins to recede, however.  Despite my own fascination with AmosI, it remains an 
open question whether such a person existed.  Every book of the Latter Prophets has a super-
scription that attributes its words to someone.  Although we are not told his father’s name, the 
superscription for Amos is quite informative.  We are given the subject matter: the book contains 
“words…which he [Amos] saw concerning Israel.”  We are told when he saw them, not only 
generally, in terms of coinciding reigns of kings of Israel and Judah, but specifically: “two years 
before the earthquake.”  A vocation is suggested (“shepherd”) and a place name provided to 
which to associate him (“Teko’a”).  But it is abundantly clear that the superscription itself cannot 
be part of the words of Amos.  Someone—some scribe—added it.  We do not know when; 
estimates vary.  As one example, Hans Walter Wolff concludes that it was prefixed to the 
original compilation and then amended some 150 years later (108, 117–8).  Nor do we know why 
it was added.  It may, indeed, have been the work of an original compiler following some generic 
convention.  But R. P. Carroll seems closer to the mark in suggesting that “what the biblical 
writers were trying to do with the production of colophons [superscriptions] was a creative act of 
interpretation that aimed at bringing some order into quite disordered texts” (“Inventing” 34), 
i.e., the Latter Prophets as a whole.  With only a few exceptions, eliminating the superscriptions 
would render these texts anonymous.  Amos is one of those exceptions: he is named not only in 
the superscription (1.1) but again in 7.10, 7.11, 7.13, 7.14, and 8.2.  In theory, an editor could 
have derived his name from the body of the text, but only, as Carroll points out, if it had the form 
it now has when the superscription was added (27).  This is a formidable caveat, for every reoc-
currence of the name appears in a dialogue that some editor has also supplied.  More important, 
however, than the question of when and why such a superscription was added is that of the 
reliability of the information provided.  Did the scribe involved possess accurate information? 
Or was he speculating according to some chain of associations we have no way of recovering? 
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11 This consensus is based not only upon our current understanding of regal chronologies 
but also upon archaeological evidence of a great earthquake dated to around 760 (Wolff 124).
Ultimately, we have no way of knowing whether the persons to whom the books of the Latter 
Prophets are attributed were not simply made up in the editing process.  Carroll, at least, suspects 
they were.  “The achievement of these colophons [the superscriptions in the Latter Prophets],” he 
claims, “is the creation of ‘historical’ figures, better known as the prophets of ancient Israel.  In 
penning these prefaces to the biblical anthologies the writers helped to invent the ancient pro-
phets as biographical figures” (25, emphasis original).
I have devoted space to the question of prophetic superscriptions because it typifies a 
major issue with which many biblical scholars deal: the reliability of the texts as historical evi-
dence.  Of course, as artifacts all texts have historical dimensions open to analysis.  The Bible is 
a treasure trove of such artifacts.  As we now have it, it is a compendium of thirty-six books12 
comprising up to fifty-nine genres, forms, or types, including prophetic visions, oracles, laws, 
moral precepts, sermons, prayers, blessings and curses, cultic regulations, historical narratives, 
myths, fairy tales, legends, novellas, anecdotes, drinking songs, taunts, popular proverbs, and 
riddles (for a summary, see  Table 8 in Gottwald, The Hebrew Bible—A Socio-Literary Introduc-
tion 99–101).  As with artifacts generally, many of these texts reflect their time and place of com-
position and/or compilation, some in remarkable ways.  Most biblical scholars devote some 
attention to such historical dimensions, working, for instance, to specify probable horizons of 
meaning within the interpretive community for which a text was originally intended or analyzing 
the socioeconomic conditions under which it was originally produced.13  Critical theorists are no 
less concerned with such historical dimensions.  Louis Althusser, for instance, states that what he 
calls authentic art, i.e., “not works of an average or mediocre level,” while not giving “us a 
knowledge in the strict…modern sense [of] scientific knowledge,” nevertheless “makes us see, 
and therefore gives to us in the form of ‘seeing’, ‘perceiving’ and ‘feeling’ (which is not the form 
of knowing)…the ideology from which it is born, in which it bathes, from which it detaches itself 
as art, and to which it alludes” (“A Letter” 204, emphasis original).14  If Althusser is right, he has 
pointed out one of the many ways that texts may reflect their time and place of composition.
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12 As per the BHS.
13 The Husserlian concept of horizon significantly influenced hermeneutic theory in the 
20th century, particularly that of Hans-Georg Gadamer.  For a summary, see Hirsch 468–70. 
14 Althusser does not provide criteria for distinguishing authentic from average or 
mediocre art other than suggesting that the former manifests the ideology “from which it is born” 
in a way that the latter does not.  The extent to which any particular work of art may do this 
depends upon the judgment of an audience, a judgment that provides the fuel for criticism.
The analysis of texts as historical artifacts does not necessarily involve any verification of 
truth claims that the texts themselves might make.  In many cases, the critical issues revolve 
more around methodology and interpretive skill.  The Psalms, for instance, do not provide a 
diegetic account of the history of Judah.  But much has been inferred about that history by apply-
ing form criticism15 to determine their Sitzen im Leben (situations in life: the situations in daily 
life from which the texts in question ultimately derive).  Works that are deliberately histori-
ographical, on the other hand, pose additional challenges to critics.  The Bible is full of such 
texts.  The Deuteronomic History, for instance, itself comprises seven of its thirty-six books: 
Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, 1 Samuel, 2 Samuel, 1 Kings, and 2 Kings.  In addition to other 
critical problems they may present, these narrative histories also challenge critics to assess the 
accuracy of the accounts they provide about the past, i.e., to assess their reliability as histori-
ography.  In common with other prophetic books, however, Amos is not deliberately histori-
ographical.  It does contain some biographical scraps (the superscription (1.1) and Amos’s 
encounter with the priest Amaziah (7.10-17)), but it is generally studied as a commentary on con-
temporary events, i.e., as a primary rather than a secondary source for the history of the time and 
place to which it refers.  As such, it is generally conceived to be more candidly polemical than 
texts intended as deliberate historiography, so that the assessment of its historical reliability lies 
not so much in measuring the accuracy of what it depicts but the typicality of the conditions to 
which it alludes.
The task of assessing reliability is complicated by a dearth of information from other 
sources against which biblical accounts might be verified.  Very few other contemporary 
documents pertaining to greater biblical Israel have been uncovered, either from within its terri-
tory or from without.  There is some archaeological evidence, but it remains surprisingly scant 
and inconclusive given the influence the area has wielded over the western psyche.  For these 
reasons, the Bible remains the principal source of evidence for the civilization to which it attests. 
Accordingly, an historical imperative distinguishes much biblical scholarship from textual 
scholarship in general.  The Bible qua historical document has been the object of study for many 
scholars—mainly social scientists—whose interests have not been principally nor strictly literary. 
By necessity, it has focussed the attention of anyone interested in constructing some aspect of the 
history of its time and place of composition: historians, economists, anthropologists, sociologists, 
geographers, biologists, and so on.
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15 Criticism that aims “to isolate characteristic smaller units of tradition […] felt to be oral 
in their origin and highly conventional in their structure and language” (Gottwald, The Hebrew 
Bible—A Socio-Literary Introduction 11).
 Most doubts concerning the historical reliability of the biblical compendium have arisen 
from the highly redacted nature of its texts.  Since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, a grow-
ing number of biblical scholars have come to accept that most if not all the texts they study are 
products of prolonged and extensive editing, that their material was collected, written down, and 
revised over a thousand years, and that much of it derives from still older oral sources (songs, 
sagas, laws, treaties, hymns, laments, aphorisms, numerical sayings, folk tales, poems, mid-
rashes, and so forth).16  The scribes who laboured on the Bible for well-nigh a millennium did 
not do so to preserve their texts in some pristine form.  They did not entertain the high notion of 
their integrity that modern editors have: they reworked them either to make sense of subsequent 
developments or to serve the polemical purposes of their own times.  As for prophecy, Martti 
Nissinen asserts that scribal recasting of what was originally an oral medium “centuries after the 
prophets themselves were dead and buried” was viewed as an inspired “literary prolongation of 
the prophetic process” (160).17
For any given biblical text there is normally much debate among scholars about how 
many scribes were involved in the redaction process, who they were, when they edited the texts, 
and why.  The redaction history of Amos provides a case in point: it is not only complex but con-
tested.  Hans Walter Wolff identifies six stages of redaction ranging over some 250 years (106–
13).  Robert Coote reduces these to three.  Shalom Paul, on the other hand, insists that Amos 
comes from a single source.  The dating of many texts is also highly contentious and can vary by 
centuries, as it does with Amos.
The problem of historical reliability is further complicated by other factors.  No authorita-
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16 For an excellent summary of one such theory of the Bible’s process of composition, see 
Chart 3 in Norman Gottwald’s The Hebrew Bible: A Socio-Literary Introduction.
17 For instance, Isaiah is now commonly agreed to be a conflation of prophetic texts from 
three eras.  Isaiah 1 (Isaiah of Jerusalem, Isa 1-39) dates to Judah in the last half of the eighth 
century, Isaiah 2 (Isaiah of the Exile or Deutero-Isaiah, Isa 40-55) to Babylon in the mid-sixth 
century, and Isaiah 3 (Trito-Isaiah, Isa 56-66) to Judah in the last half of the sixth century. The 
recognition that the Jewish Bible is a composite work helped stimulate the development of the 
historical biblical criticism that emerged in the eighteenth century and preoccupied many biblical 
scholars in the nineteenth.  The four-source hypothesis for the Pentateuch—the “five scrolls” 
comprising the first five books of the Jewish Bible—worked out by Julius Wellhausen in the late 
nineteenth century, although it has been continually refined, has stood the test of time 
(Wellhausen passim).  For a succinct history of the emergence of modern biblical source criti-
cism, see Viviano 31–36.
tive texts can be established among the variants, which are corrupt at many points.18  In most 
cases, the oldest variants are still centuries younger than the manuscripts from which they 
ultimately derive.  Indeed, even after the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls, the oldest Hebrew 
texts available are still later than the Septuagint, a Greek translation.  Moreover, the grammatical 
structure of the language in which most of the texts are written, Biblical Hebrew, is now not 
clearly understood.19
Faced with these challenges, many of the scholars who analyze biblical texts in search of 
the history of greater biblical Israel find themselves functioning somewhat like archaeologists, 
separating various textual strata to which they apply methodological tests to refine the historical 
reality they are seeking from its literary dross.  In doing so, many are attempting, at least in part, 
to correct for and neutralize the literary dimension of the text, that is, the dimension in which the 
experience to be expressed is shaped or receives the impress of some pattern by the lexical, 
syntactical, and tropological choices of some persons—in biblical texts, we assume, anonymous 
scribes.
Wolff’s analysis of the redaction history of Amos into six strata exemplifies such 
archaeological work.  Through such analysis, he says, “we are able to distinguish with a high 
degree of probability three eighth-century literary strata, all of which for the most part derive 
from Amos himself and his contemporary disciples.”  “Three additional strata,” he goes on to 
say, “can be recognized as later interpretations by their distinctive language and different inten-
tions.  They derive from the following centuries” (107).  Several points about Wolff’s approach 
merit particular comment.  First, although he characterizes the three eighth-century strata as 
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18 Those reading translations may be unaware of the extent to which many of the textual 
problems posed by the Jewish Bible are typically resolved by the interpretive processes that all 
translation involves.  The critical apparatus in the BHS indicating variant readings and interpreta-
tions is much more extensive than the glosses in the RSV.
19 Biblical Hebrew passed from daily use before the beginning of the common era.  It was 
preserved for biblical study and religious observance much like Latin in the Roman Catholic 
church.  Its original speakers obviously conversed among themselves quite naturally, but they left 
no analysis of their grammatical structures to posterity.  The Masoretic scholars, who standard-
ized the biblical text between the 7th and 11th centuries CE, dedicated themselves to regularizing 
its pronunciation and intonation.  But, as Leslie McFall states, “their work shows no traces of 
grammatical categories” (1).  By their time, however, the rationale for the verbal system—how 
native speakers understood the language to be working when they spoke—had probably been 
lost.  Ever since, as the title of McFall’s book, The Enigma of the Hebrew Verbal System, sug-
gests, that rationale has been the subject of ongoing conjecture.
“literary,” he conceives the literary dimension of Amos as a problem that analysis must resolve. 
Paradoxically, one of the tests he applies to get to the truth of the matter concealed behind the 
literary is literary itself: the presence of “distinctive language.”  Second, despite suspicions such 
as Carroll’s (6 above), Wolff assumes the existence of AmosI.  Third, he further assumes the 
existence of a group or groups of “contemporary disciples” including an “Old School of Amos” 
which numbered among its adherents at least one contributor to Amos who “must have been an 
eyewitness [of AmosI], seeing and hearing what he reported” (108).  Fourth, and finally, he 
assumes that AmosI played the role of a recognizable intermediary,21 possibly that of a הזח 
(xozIh, seer), which an adversary of AmosL calls him (7.12), or of a איבנ (n&vi’, prophet), which 
AmosL strenuously denies that he is (7.14).
Although Wolff deals quite competently with Amos as an artifact (in Amos research, he is 
well known for arguing that a certain strain of language reflects a village wisdom tradition), on 
the whole he does not entertain the possibility of an AmosL worthy to be studied in its own right 
as a phenomenon distinct and different from the AmosI in which he so clearly believes.  The criti-
cal tests he applies to assess the text’s historical reliability are limited to distinguishing authentic 
from spurious texts, i.e., to distinguishing texts attributable to an AmosI and his immediate circle 
from those interpolated by later redactors.  Although Wolff can and does deal with these redac-
tions as artifacts by illustrating how they reflect the sociopolitical interests and theological views 
of various scribal parties of later times, he treats them primarily as accretions to be burnt off in 
the crucible of analysis.  His interest remains squarely focused upon recovering AmosI, whom he 
takes to be the book’s historical core. Wolff concentrates upon sifting the text to delineate AmosI 
ever more precisely.  He applies source and form criticism, for instance, better to understand the 
provenance of AmosI’s thought.
Wolff’s approach manifests a belief about history shared by many biblical scholars: the 
belief that beneath the interpretations the Bible presents of the comings and goings of ancient 
greater Israelites there lies an objective truth that is the proper goal and object of historical study. 
Some of the analysis to which biblical literature is subjected arises from the conviction that the 
deliberately historiographical texts are insufficiently objective and, in consequence, not up to par 
as history.  Some defend the scribes involved by maintaining that they did not intend to produce 
history as we understand it, nor could they in the light of modern standards of historiography.  In 
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21 I adopt Robert A.Wilson’s use of the word intermediary as a neutral, general term to 
refer to prophets, shamans, witch/sorcerers, mediums, diviners, priests, and mystics, each of 
whom, despite specialist functions, mediate in some way between the divine and human spheres 
(21–28).
recounting their own past, they intended, rather, to “justifie the wayes of God to men.”  Some of 
these apologies only thinly veil a contempt for these ancient historians.  In the hindsight of 
several millennia, the literary choices many did make to tell their stories do seem clearly inter-
ested.  Israel Finkelstein comments quite justly upon their lack of detachment.  Many biblical 
texts, he points out, are “highly ideological and adapted to the needs of the community during the 
time of their compilation.”  He goes on to say that these texts “provide us with far more historical 
information about the society and politics of the writers than about the times described in them” 
(Finkelstein and Mazar 15).22
Biblical scholars are quite right to share Finkelstein’s suspicions about the stories these 
ancient historians tell.  As Finkelstein correctly intuits, they represent ideological writing about 
the past, writing whose plot lines have been constructed to serve the sociopolitical aims of the 
factions whose interests the scribes involved served and shared.  Nevertheless, they remain the 
principal artifacts from which the history of greater biblical Israel must be inferred.  In Marxist 
theory, at least, their correct interpretation as historical evidence depends upon a proper under-
standing of the discipline of history.  “History,” Marx asserts in elaborating his materialist con-
ception of it to which I will return, “is not a person [or principle] apart, using man as a means for 
its own particular aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims” (qtd. in Got-
twald, “Hypothesis” 151, emphasis original).  Whoever writes ideologically, however deftly that 
ideology may or may not be concealed, is in that very act making history in Marx’s sense, for that 
person is pursuing his or her aims.  According to Marxist theory, the history that scholars should 
seek when they analyze biblical texts is not—as in Wolff— to be found solely in the stories they 
contain but also in the ideological conflicts they reflect.
It follows that scholars searching for the history of biblical Israel and Judah will be put 
off the scent if they assume some dichotomy exists between history on the one hand and our 
literary expression of it on the other.  That dichotomy is specious.  The theory of history based 
upon such a dichotomy is typically informed by the idealist assumption that there is something 
more fundamental to human experience than our conception and expression of it.  However, 
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22 The realization and conviction that many biblical texts are ideologically coloured has 
produced many ingenious arguments about the dating of texts based upon correlating this per-
ceived colouration to the zeitgeists of various eras.  For instance, in his study already cited, Coote 
sorts out three ideological strands that, he argues, exemplify successive stages in Israel’s history. 
The problem with this approach is that the nature of zeitgeists to which the texts are said to cor-
respond can only be theorized by reading the texts in question, resulting in arguments that are 
highly circular.
Hayden , in particular, has demonstrated that all historical writing has a literary dimension.23 
Borrowing a page from Northrop Frye, he shows, for instance, how four historians of the French 
Revolution construe the same set of historical events according to various plots to produce 
romance (Michelet), tragedy (Tocqueville), comedy (Marx), or irony (Burkhardt) (“Inter-
pretation” 61–62).  The literary and the historical are intimately intertwined.  The shape that the 
former gives the latter is ideological, for that shape reflects the historian’s most deeply held yet 
unexpressed convictions about the nature of the reality he or she is attempting to convey.
No less than their later counterparts in the guild of historical scholarship, the scribes who 
compiled the biblical narratives gave them a distinctive ideological shape, producing in con-
sequence a distinctive sense of the nature of reality.  Analyzing the social purposes served by 
such ideological practice is a special province of Marxist criticism.  In the light of Marxist 
theory, the approach of scholars such as Wolff, who assume that ideological shaping distorts or 
conceals the historical truth they seek, is an idealist mistake.  Yet such scholars are not mistaken 
in assuming that ideology distorts.  Indeed, as I shall show in Chapter 3, Althusser defines ideol-
ogy as distortion.  But they are mistaken in not appreciating the function of such distortions in 
the acquisition and maintenance of social power—and in not adequately recognizing the struggle 
for such power as the very stuff and engine of history.
3. The Historical Imperative: The Relevance of the Bible as the Word of God
 Another group for whom biblical study is frequently driven by an historical imperative 
consists of the many exegetes—including but not limited to theologians, homilists, catechists, 
pastors, and so forth—for whom the Bible is not just any text but a sacred one, one pored over 
for millennia by the devout seeking to make cosmic sense of human experience and to derive 
unchanging norms of human behavior.  With this group, reliability is less an issue than relevance. 
Its members aim to relate the historically-contingent world of the text to that of its current read-
ers,  principally by drawing analogies.  In this, they do not differ markedly from many literary 
scholars who engage in historical criticism.  An historical critic of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, 
for instance, might summarize nineteenth-century European imperialism to enable its  modern 
readers to draw parallels between the Victorian civilizing mission to Africa and the current west-
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23 All the essays collected in White’s Tropics of Discourse deal with the degree to which 
the writing of history approximates the writing of fiction.  Of particular interest are “Interpreta-
tion in History” (51-80), “The Historical Text as Literary Artifact” (81-100), “Historicism, His-
tory, and the Figurative Imagination” (101-20), and “The Fictions of Factual Representation” 
(121-34).
ern civilizing mission to the Middle East.  In this view, Conrad’s text remains relevant because it 
continues to illuminate contemporary experience, a relevance that each succeeding generation of 
historical scholars labours to make clear.24
For faith-based critics, the Bible’s eternal relevance is an ideological given.  The task for 
each succeeding generation of exegetes who read the texts theologically is to demonstrate this 
relevance anew in the face of the ever-changing vicissitudes of human experience.  Like those 
interested in the history of biblical times per se, they also embark on an archaeological truth pro-
ject aimed at refining the pure gold they are seeking—in their case, the text’s eternally relevant 
message—from its contextual dross.  Their work becomes part and parcel of the larger enterprise 
of biblical hermeneutics.  It identifies the merely contingent to help interpreters correct for 
whatever influence that contingency has had in shaping the message.  To be sure, for some critics 
the descriptive suffices.  But Paul de Man, I believe, correctly observes that whenever a clash 
occurs between poetics (which he defines as descriptive) and hermeneutics (which he defines as 
normative), the latter typically wins out.25
Whereas those with a primarily historical interest in the text attempt to neutralize the 
literary, those with a theological interest attempt to neutralize the historical.  In the latter case, the 
literary is not a problem.  The articulation is the outward manifestation of the inspiration: as the 
Word of God, the words themselves are divine.26  Because of its lofty subject matter, theology 
has proven to be a particularly effective ideological vehicle.  The pre-eminence of the “ways of 
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24   I am convinced that literary canons cannot be prescribed.  When texts cease to reflect 
current experience, they lose their relevance and most of their readership, a process that cannot 
be overturned by fiat or legislation.  Most books have little relevance even from their date of pub-
lication.  Over the eight years that I have worked in a theological library, I have come to realize 
that less than 1% of its books circulate.  Many are not read even by specialists or by historians for 
whom they could now be objects of study.  Indeed, I have found books published in the 1880s 
with uncut pages.  I suspect that most library collections are similarly irrelevant.
25  I cannot pinpoint the source of this opinion.  De Man distinguishes between “the des-
criptive discourse of poetics and the normative discourse of hermeneutics” in “Dialogue and 
Dialogism” (113–4). 
26 Although a tradition in the Jewish Bible does identify wisdom as a creative principle 
(cf. Pr 8.22-31) and God does create by speaking in the first creation account in Genesis (1.3-27), 
the Word of God as a theological concept is more prominent in the Christian testament than in 
the Jewish Bible (cf. Jn 1.1-18).  Nevertheless, the rabbinic tradition of biblical interpretation 
does manifest a reverence for the words themselves as divine.
God” being justified in the biblical text tends to mask the alignment of those involved in specify-
ing those ways with the interests of various political and social factions.27
Frequently the historical and the theological enterprises are intertwined.  In an essay on 
the history of Amos research, M. Daniel Carroll R. states that from the mid-1880s through the 
first decades of the twentieth century a principle objective of that research was to isolate the 
ipsissima verba of Amos (9–12).  Wolff’s first stratum, “The Words of Amos from Tekoa,” 
attempts to pinpoint these original words.  “We must […] reckon,” he states, “with the possibility 
that this collection may go back to Amos himself” (107).  Carroll R. points out that during the 
period in question some of this work was motivated by the conviction that “the chronologically 
earlier—that is, the original revelations—were inherently superior to the subsequent additions,” 
both poetically and, it seems, theologically (11–12).  Among other things, this opens the 
theological can of worms of relative degrees of inspiration.  If the entire canon is conceived to be 
the Word of God, we are forced to wonder how the Word given through those identified as pro-
phets can be more inspired than that given through scribal redactors.
4. The General Tenor of Biblical Criticism
The general tenor of much biblical criticism flows from (1) the historical imperative just 
discussed and (2) is an obvious corollary to the fact that the Bible remains the principal source of 
evidence for the civilization to which it attests: little in the Bible can be verified by anything out-
side the text itself.  As I have said, there is some archaeological evidence, but that evidence is not 
only sketchy but subject in its turn to considerable interpretive controversy.  Even if it were more 
ample and less ambiguous, the degree to which such evidence might verify a continually revised 
literary text is highly questionable.  Peter Laslett is doubtlessly correct in claiming, for instance, 
that “no excavation or analysis will ever authenticate the manner of the election of Saul to the 
kingship of Israel” (322).28  For those interested in such things, it follows that the validity of most 
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27 The premise of a course I have taught entitled The Canonical Formation of the Jewish 
Bible is that, theologically informed as it may be, the canon as we have it is clearly the product of 
political compromise.  Its arrangement reveals a dominant faction strong enough to gain pride of 
place but not to shut off divergent viewpoints.
28 For a current summary of the degree to which archaeology confirms the biblical 
account, see Finkelstein and Mazar passim.  Finkelstein states that “biblical archaeology has 
stalled relative to world archaeology in almost every field.” He surmises that “the great thinkers 
of modern world archaeology [avoided] the discipline of biblical archaeology” for the ideological 
reason that it was long relegated to the supportive role of confirming the biblical text (12).  My 
biblical criticism, at least in its historical assessments, must be largely internal to that criticism 
itself: it must hinge principally on the number of textual features for which it coherently 
accounts.
To highlight some general aspects of their work, I have elaborated upon some challenges 
biblical critics face.  First, as I have already stated, most biblical criticism attempts historically to 
elucidate the text in some way.  In this, it differs from other textual criticism principally in the 
degree of value with which many of its practitioners invest their undertakings, travelling, as they 
see themselves, on the high road to ultimate truth.  Second, it is highly speculative.  Given the 
lack of confirming evidence, it could hardly be otherwise.  Third, given its limitations, it is 
remarkably ingenious.  By necessity, sophisticated techniques have been devised to test the prob-
ability of its conclusions.  The work of Norman Gottwald, a pioneer in the sociological criticism 
of the Bible upon whom I rely extensively, provides a case in point.  In The Tribes of Yahweh: A 
Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 1250–1050 B.C., he constructs plausible accounts 
not only of the sociology of pre-monarchic Israel but also of the evolution of biblical texts as 
ideological supports for the civilization he believes was then forming in the highlands of Canaan. 
Theoretically grounded in Marxist theory though his work may be, the evidence he can adduce 
from biblical texts to support his argument must seem, to many not familiar with biblical criti-
cism, very slim indeed.  Moreover, his deductions about the evolution of the biblical texts depend 
upon a programmatic reading of the finished texts themselves, a process that must seem highly 
circular to many not attuned to the speculative nature of this criticism.  The sociological work of 
Gottwald and others has been complemented over the past forty years in equally ingenious and 
highly suggestive ways by cross-cultural anthropological research.  That conducted by Thomas 
Overholt on shamanism has been particularly fruitful for the study of biblical prophecy by sug-
gesting what the prophetic office during various biblical periods might have entailed.29
The highly speculative nature of biblical criticism can make for some pretty interesting 




own view is that the verifiable history of greater biblical Israel begins with the northern Omride 
dynasty of the ninth century and that much of the biblical account that precedes it, including a 
united monarchy under David and Solomon, is largely legendary material elaborated from much 
humbler historical bases than those suggested in the Jewish Bible. 
29 For instance, to shed light on biblical prophecy Overholt’s Prophecy in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective provides source texts on shamanism in the Americas, the Arctic, Africa, India, and 
the Pacific. 
solutions can lead.  By necessity, theorizing upon the Bible involves a lot of grasping at straws. 
In the enthusiasm born of an insight, some critics seem to forget what type of structures are likely 
to be built from the few straws they do grasp.  Pet theories come to be strenuously defended, but 
in elaborating them their proponents seem gradually to lose touch with the text or the realm of 
probability.
Karl Moller’s “‘Hear This Word Against You’: A Fresh Look at the Arrangement and the 
Rhetorical Strategy of the Book of Amos” provides an excellent example of this.  As the title 
suggests, Moller mounts an argument concerning the arrangement of Amos, the principle of 
which, he insists, has been a longstanding bone of academic contention despite general agree-
ment that Amos “consists of three major sections, i.e. the oracles against the nations in Am. i-ii, 
the so-called ‘words’ (Am. iii-vi) and the visions (Am. vii-ix)” (500).  In good, scholarly fashion, 
he reviews the recent literature supporting various points of view.  Finding none of these con-
vincing, he quotes James Mays to the effect that “there is no demonstrable scheme to the arrange-
ment, historical, geographical, or thematic” (501).  But he cannot rest content with this conclu-
sion.  Stating that “many recent redaction-critical studies have stressed that the prophetic books 
are to be understood as what Zenger calls ‘planvolle Kompositionen [methodical composition]’” 
(501), he adds a rhetorical log to the fire of speculation.
Moller’s argument depends upon an aspect of Amos that distinguishes it within the pro-
phetic corpus.  While most of those identified as prophets aim to turn their audience back to God, 
Amos, by and large, unsparingly announces doom.  He tells his audience that it is already too late 
for Israel.  Because of its people’s breach of their covenant obligations, Yahweh has already 
pulled the plug on it once and for all.  Although the final five verses do promise the restoration of 
a bountiful Israel,30 these seem to have been added at least 200 years after Amos began to evolve, 
thereby preserving its original pessimism intact.
Quite rightly, I think, Moller points out that the answer lies in determining the implied 
audience, not the audience whom AmosI might have addressed orally but the audience for whom 
the scrolls were compiled long after AmosI was dust.  “The book is best understood,” Moller 
claims, “as an attempt to persuade its hearers or readers to learn from the failure of the prophet’s 
audience to respond appropriately to his message.  The recipients are induced therefore not to 
repeat the stubborn attitude and self-assured behaviour of Amos’ original addressees” (511). 
However, with a few exceptions (such as Amos’s encounter with the priest Amaziah in 7.10-17), 
Amos, as the superscription states, contains only words attributed to Amos.  How, then, can we 
deduce the recalcitrance—“the stubborn attitude and self-assured behaviour”—of the original 
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30 Hans Walter Wolff characterizes them as a postexilic eschatology of salvation (113).
hearers that later readers are to avoid?  By the text’s structure, Moller insists.  What might at first 
appear to be a somewhat disjointed collection of sayings gains coherence if we interpolate 
naysaying into the joints.  Amos makes better sense as one half of a debate, the other half of 
which we ourselves must supply, just as we do, for instance, when listening to Shelley Berman or 
Bob Newhart comedy routines based on half a telephone conversation.
Moller’s interpolations are quite ingenious, and I must admit that they do make the text 
more coherent.  But a key question remains.  If the compilers were determined that their readers 
not repeat the mistakes of Amos’s original hearers, why did they not provide an example of those 
mistakes in the form of dialogue?  Why did they choose to convey them in a manner so obscure 
that it took over two millennia to deduce, this despite the fact that the Bible may well be Western 
history’s most analyzed text?  Granted, prophetic genres may have implied certain dynamics 
taken for granted by their initial readers that have eluded subsequent attempts to reconstruct 
ancient horizons of meaning, dynamics into which speculations such as Moller’s may provide 
some insight.  On the whole, however, I remain unconvinced.  Simply put, the principle Moller 
adduces is insufficiently substantiated in the text to bear the significance he assigns it.
I do not doubt Zenger’s contention that the biblical compilers were “planvolle” or meth-
odical in their work.  It is difficult to conceive that Amos was not organized according to some 
plan.  But many of its critics, Moller included, reject the most obvious one—oracles against the 
nations followed first by prophetic words and finally by visions—as insufficiently revelatory to 
satisfy an overarching quest for meaning.  The term revelatory is suggested to me by The 
Revelatory Text, Sandra Schneiders’s study of the Christian testament that explores the implica-
tions for interpretation of the theological claim that the Bible—the Jewish no less than the 
Christian—is the Word of God.  In common with the work of many biblical—and literary— 
scholars, Moller’s article is marked by an anxiety for a greater coherence and a deeper meaning 
than the text itself may support.  It demonstrates the fourth aspect about biblical criticism to be 
highlighted: much of it is driven by the widely-held assumption that the text is an inexhaustible 
treasure trove of eternally-relevant meaning.
Despite this conviction, much of the meaning the text is assumed to have is not and has 
never been immediately clear.  It must be uncovered and brought to light.  This necessity leads to 
the fifth aspect of biblical criticism to be highlighted: the Bible is a magnetic pole for hermeneu-
tics.  The interpretive enterprise, to use Roland Barthes’s terminology from S/Z, involves the 
reduction of a writerly text to a readerly one.  At some points, he implies that these are different 
types of texts.  More generally, however, he treats the writerly and the readerly as different 
aspects of the same text.  Kaja Silverman is certainly on the right track in identifying them as dif-
ferent approaches (242), but the term approach is too methodologically deliberate precisely to 
  
 17 
capture Barthes’s meaning.  Aspect is preferable in that the readerly and writerly refer to different 
modes of comprehending texts, modes traditionally expressed by tropes of seeing.  The readerly 
is the mode of comprehending or seeing texts as freighted with meaning—meaning derived from 
the culture into which the reader has been thrown.31  The readerly is a way of seeing texts that 
focuses upon the signified.  Readerly texts, Barthes tells us, “make up the enormous mass of our 
literature.”  “The writerly,” on the other hand, “is the novelistic without the novel, poetry without 
the poem, the essay without the dissertation, writing without style, production without product, 
structuration without structure” (5).  It focuses upon the signifier, which retains a surplus 
irreducible to meaning.
The readerly, then, is the text domesticated: the text reduced to meaning and made 
amenable to what Paul Ricoeur calls “interpretation as a recollection of meaning” (Freud 28–32). 
Since the advent of Christianity, theologians in particular have striven to achieve this reduction. 
The task has involved harmonizing what Pascal calls the god of the philosophers with the god of 
the Hebrews.  For those who started it, whose minds were informed by Greek thought, λο' γος 
(logos) not only meant word but speech, reason, and account.  In studying the words of the text, 
therefore, they were seeking the reason behind things.  The fly in this logocentric ointment has 
been detected by John Passmore.  “The [ancient] Jews,” he points out,
were not philosophers; they were quite devoid of that speculative curiosity which 
characterized the Greeks, their habit of asking how and why.  No Xenophanes 
arose amongst the Jews to rebuke them for ascribing to Jahweh acts which would 
be accounted a shame and a disgrace amongst men; no Socrates to ask them to 
define righteousness, or justice, or to explain why Noah and Job should be 
accounted perfect; no Parmenides, in particular, to inquire how God stood in rela-
tion to the world.  The Jews were innocent of systematic theology, of ethical 
theory, of cosmology.  Philo, writing in the first century [CE] in cosmopolitan 
Alexandria, was their first philosopher…and their last for a thousand years. 
Philo’s influence, certainly, Christianity was to feel.  But in the Old Testament 
writings as they stood, read literally, not allegorically as Philo read them, there 
were no philosophical theories to be found.  (77)
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31 I use the word thrown to indicate what Heidegger meant by verworfen, which thrown 
literally translates.  In being born we are, as it were, thrown into a culture, the characteristics of 
which soon become entirely natural to us as the only ones we have known. 
The scribes who laboured over the texts eventually compiled as the Bible could hardly have been 
aware that they were fashioning an ur-source for systematic theology.32  Given the miscellaneous 
nature of these texts and their lack of the philosophical articulation characterizing Greek religious 
thought, the god of the Hebrews they reveal has resisted systematization and harmonization. 
This god—a jealous, personal god who stands in dramatic tension to the human world he creates 
ex nihilo—was not likely to be conceived by rational processes.  For this reason, he has com-
monly been described as a god of revelation rather than speculation (Passmore 78–83).  In con-
sequence, the Bible has proven rocky soil indeed for those who would reduce it to logical con-
sistency.  It has challenged not only theological systematizers but, more particularly, theological 
harmonizers, the biblical theologians per se, who, as Mary Callaway states, have attempted  “to 
find the locus of biblical authority in a single, controlling theological construct of the scriptures” 
(122).33
Despite these challenges—or, more likely, because of them—the Bible continues to be an 
object of rationalization, not only for those for whom its relevance and theological consistency 
are ideological givens but also for those with more secular orientations.  It could hardly be other-
wise, for what is now called higher biblical criticism is a child of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment and continues to bear its optimism that there is a reasonable solution to all prob-
lems.  In pursuit of solutions, every type of critical approach applied to texts in general has also 
been applied to the Bible.34  Biblical criticism does not differ from other criticism in aiming at 
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32 In fact, I have read the suggestion that the Jewish Bible first coalesced as the result of 
Persian imperial policy.  The Persians were content to rule subject peoples through client kings 
according to indigenous laws, but they insisted that these laws be written down in an official 
form.
33 At the risk of overgeneralizing, I speculate that one respect in which early Christians 
distinguished themselves when they emerged from Judaism was in their tendency to focus less on 
morals and more on ethics.  Jews tended to ask what we should do given the presence of God, 
whereas Christians more and more tended to ask what we should think given that presence.  Early 
Protestants who rejected scholasticism bucked this trend by positing a God unknowable by virtue 
of existing above rather than than within the natural law.
34 However, due to time lags, critical approaches that biblical scholars may consider 
experimental may already be considered passé by their counterparts in other fields.  At the annual 
meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in Toronto in 2002, I remember the exhilaration of 
the participants in a panel entitled “Reading the Bible with a Page from Derrida” reading their 
own experiments in deconstructive criticism.  In a plenary session that evening, Derrida, who had 
attended the panel session in question, remarked that, when he launched deconstructive criticism, 
he wanted to do something entirely new.  His point seemed lost on most of his audience.
and typically achieving greater logical coherence than the texts it addresses.  The critical process, 
be it analytic or synthetic (i.e., logical or dialectic), is motivated by the desire to make sense of its 
object of knowledge in terms of an some existing explanatory model.  The disjunction between 
the rationality of criticism and the texts it analyzes may seem too obvious to merit comment.  But 
biblical critics, driven as many of them are by the anxiety for coherence already discussed, seem 
to put an extra premium upon the rationality of their solutions, so much so that their critical 
results tend to belie the extremely speculative nature of their undertakings.
Frequently, the coherence of texts is assumed rather than demonstrated by critics.  Some 
arguments of Andersen and Freedman about Amos provide a case in point.  They reject the theory 
that the text was frequently redacted over centuries, which in itself is one strategy for rationally 
overcoming the perceived problem of its incoherence.  They see “most if not all of the book as 
possibly, indeed probably (we can never say ‘certainly’) Amos’.”  To buttress this view, they 
assert, first, as if by fiat, that there has been a “cumulative demonstration of the literary 
coherence of all [the] diverse ingredients in the whole assemblage, which is more than an assem-
blage; it is a highly structured unity.”  It is difficult, however, to see how this has been 
demonstrated, for in the very next sentence they speak of the “diverse and divergent (even appar-
ently contradictory, sometimes) points of view” that Amos does contain.  The literary coherence 
of Amos is, rather, an assumption based upon the faith that its contradictions are more apparent 
than real.  Those contradictions are overcome by a new reading strategy that attributes them to 
multiple redactions not over centuries but over the lifetime of AmosI himself: they reflect “suc-
cessive phases in the prophet’s career, which underwent quite substantial changes in inner per-
ception and declared messages” (143–44, emphasis original).  Andersen and Freedman’s argu-
ment, quite clearly, is speculation based on the assumption—or faith, rather—that the text is 
coherent, and that someday the principle of this coherence will be found.  To those who hold 
such faith, the problem to be overcome is the literary practice of the compilers, which remains a 
problem whether they were many working over centuries or one revising his thoughts over a 
lifetime.  To get to the truth of things, it is believed, we need to sort out the muddle that these 
compilers have made of the history of greater Israel or the Word of God.  As we shall see in 
Chapter 2, the Marxist faith lies elsewhere: it is in the literary (and political) practice of the com-
pilers themselves that the truth of a text lies.
This rationalizing tendency generally characterizes not only the criticism of Amos but that 
of the Book of the Twelve.  Not that its texts are entirely irrational: patterns of meaning can be 
imposed upon them.  But they are highly incoherent, regardless of what various apologists may 
claim.  They are marked by abrupt shifts in theme, setting, and character if not in tone or mood. 
Many critics have reduced this incoherence to a problem of sources.  By employing one or more 
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sub-disciplines of biblical criticism, they have attempted to identify the (supposedly) coherent 
sources of the many fragments of which the texts are conceived to be composed.  Among others, 
these sources range from the oral traditions of the people (tradition criticism) to the texture of 
their daily lives (form criticism) to lexical, stylistic, and generic features (literary criticism).35 
But the question of the incoherence of the finished product is hardly answered by identifying its 
sources, for the texts remain as fragmented as ever.  When the problem has been addressed by 
redaction critics, they have tended to dismiss it by alluding to the confounded intractability of the 
materials with which the biblical editors had to work.  Canonical critics, who deal with collec-
tions of texts in their final form, address the problem by locating the key to meaning in the shape 
of the text finally adopted by a community of faith, a shape that determines the relative sig-
nificance of its various components.  Their work, however, frequently bears the marks of its 
origins in biblical theology, which accentuates a tendency  “to read texts as a unity and therefore 
to prefer harmonization to dissonance and uncertainty” (Callaway 131–2), thereby reflecting that 
anxiety for coherence that almost inevitably attends the identification of the Bible with the Word 
of God.
5. The Disintegration of Amos and The Genesis of a Different Approach
When I first read the Book of the Twelve, its incoherence struck me as its most salient 
feature—so much so, in fact, I became convinced that it is a literature of madness.  This convic-
tion has never left me.  In so characterizing the compilation, I am not using the term madness 
pejoratively.36  I choose it, rather, to convey my impression that the texts involved, like Humpty 
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35 Biblical scholars engaged in literary criticism per se proceed much as their secular 
counterparts do, analyzing texts in terms of diction, character, setting, theme, tone, mood, point 
of view, and so forth.  In doing so, however, most have engaged in the larger historical enterprise 
of discriminating textual sources.  For instance, this is certainly the case of Norman Habel’s 
Literary Criticism of the Old Testament, one of the introductory Guides to Biblical Scholarship 
published by Fortress Press in the 1970s, which focuses upon the isolation of sources as if this 
were the literary critic’s principal task.  The thorny question of literary form and its effect upon 
readers is rarely broached.  An outstanding exception to this is Gabriel Josipovici’s The Book of 
God, inspired in part by Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis, which examines the text according to cate-
gories such as elements of rhythm, aspects of speech, and configurations of character. 
36 Nor do I use it with diagnostic precision.  It is not a psychiatric but a literary term, one 
that I use because of its allusiveness to characters such as Lear.  As I elaborate in Chapter 4, I use 
the term to refer broadly to a consciousness whose capacity to invest experience with systematic 
meaning has been irreparably fractured.  In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that the mad can 
Dumpty, are fragmented beyond our capacity to put them together again.  Amos is a writerly text 
par excellence.  Although its oracles are grouped into the three major categories identified by 
Moller (16 above), its compilers did not feel constrained to supplement their collections with 
transitional interpretive material.  The oracles, rather, seem to have been cut out of various con-
texts and simply strung together.  Baldly presenting them to the world in this manner challenges 
the reader, as if the scribes were saying, “Here are the ‘words of Amos’: figure them out if you 
can!”  This editorial procedure has produced—for me, at least—an image of a rambling, dis-
jointed Amos incapable of synthesizing his thought.  Little wonder that commentators such as 
Moller have seemed anxious for coherence in their struggles to render Amos readerly.  Given this 
view of its origins, referring to “The Disintegration of Amos” as I have in the section heading 
above and evoking the image of Humpty Dumpty may seem to miss the mark.  After all, that 
unfortunate Egg was once whole.  Better, perhaps, to characterize Amos as unintegrated and leave 
it at that.  But I have chosen to retain disintegrated because I hope to show that, unintegrated 
though the text itself may have been since its inception, disintegration is a major theme that the 
form enacts.  Amos reflects the fracturing of a society once conceived as whole.  Its sense of a 
world coming apart may well have been the principal stimulus triggering its oracles.
In characterizing Amos as a literature of madness, however, I am responding to something 
other than the “fine madnes” that Drayton believes “rightly should possesse a Poets braine” (137, 
lines 20-21).  I am responding to my sense that Amos is possessed by things far more sinister.37 
He is possessed, for instance, by a violent hatred for building projects.  The disintegration of the 
social fabric Amos records and laments seems matched by Amos’s violent impulse to rain down 
physical destruction upon the tangible symbols of a new social order in the process of emerging. 
He puts me in mind of a raggedy character with whom I was once familiar who would invariably 
interrupt his daily hunt for bottles to yell curses at construction workers, myself included. 
Although we continually reassured one another that he was harmless, I was never absolutely con-
vinced of this.  I wonder if AmosI might have been something like this: a man whom an age ear-




never be healed.  But I do believe that traumatic neurosis (discussed in Chapter 4 as the source of 
Amos’s madness) is particularly resistant to any therapy based upon a doctrine of the reality of 
the self.
37 An early theory of madness attributed it to possession (by demons or others).  See 
Plato’s “Ion” for the notion that rhapsodes or singers of Greek poetry performed by virtue of 
divine possession (501-3).
rave in the light of the sun).  My initial impression that Amos is a literature of madness, which 
arose from its incoherent, disintegrated nature, has been augmented as I have come increasingly 
to hear the voice speaking as one from a spirit possessed.38  Although approaching Amos as such 
literature would not be an entirely new departure in the study of biblical prophecy, it would differ 
radically from most of the high-minded criticism about Amos already produced.39
Cognizant as I am that criticism is a rationalizing exercise, as I puzzled over how to pro-
duce a coherent account of a text that might be irresolvably incoherent, it struck me that Amos’s 
incoherence may be functional.  It may reflect a deliberate artistic or theological commitment by 
its compilers to produce a writerly text of unsynthesized fragments better to reflect the times in 
which they lived.  Perhaps, like Allen Ginsberg, they too had “seen the best minds of [their] gen-
eration destroyed by madness” and had arranged Amos’s words as if they emanated from a dis-
ordered mind better to express the consequences of living in an age irreducible to the readerliness 
of reason.  To my mind, this is the most intriguing and satisfying aesthetic resolution to the ques-
tion of Amos’s incoherence.  On the other hand, it may have served the interests of the scribes 
involved to portray anyone complaining about prevailing conditions as demented, a suspicion 
that provides a  more cynical, political resolution to the text’s incoherence.40  These options for 
accounting for the incoherence of Amos may seem to complicate its criticism as a literature of 
madness.  Does the madness I sense, for instance, reflect the mental state of an original Amos? 
Or can it be referred to an aesthetic or political choice to create a certain literary persona?  Of 
course, it may be objected that the original compilers had none of these issues in mind—that they 
were merely recording oracles, perhaps none too skillfully.  Wolff, however, has no problems 
attributing theological or political motives to his later redactors.  But he seems oblivious to any 
hidden agenda on the part his original compilers, whom he treats as babes in the woods.  He is 
not alone in this respect.  Although this may reflect a reverence for the ipsissima verba (see 14 
above), it also implies that the earlier the writer, the more primitive or naïve the output.  My 
study of biblical literature has taught me that it is anything but.  Any naïveté it may seem to exhi-
bit, I am convinced, is cultivated.  Its compilers were sophisticated, a point that many critics, 
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38 To the criticism that this may be overly subjective, I respond that much criticism is 
highly subjective, and I am comfortable with that conclusion.
39 One full-length psychoanalytic study of a biblical prophet that does exist is David J. 
Halperin’s Seeking Ezekiel: Text and Psychology. Halperin argues that, at the very least, Ezekiel 
was a victim of childhood trauma (218).
40 At this juncture I am reminded of Solzhenitsyn’s accounts of the Soviet police consign-
ing political dissidents to mental institutions. 
Wolff included, fail to appreciate.  It may well be the early compilers of Amos have taken Wolff 
among others in, an achievement testifying to their skill in literary practice.
As I think about Amos as a literature of madness, several things become clear.  First, the 
topic would be amenable not only to psychoanalytic but to Marxist criticism because, as I point 
out in the succeeding section, Freud and Marx are kindred spirits.  Second, neither of these 
approaches would require that I adjudicate among the various critical accounts of incoherence 
discussed above and argue for one in favour of others.  These approaches would necessitate, 
rather, that I analyze such accounts in dialectic tension with one another.  Third, such a study 
would highlight the complementary nature of psychoanalytic and Marxist criticism. Fourth, 
although as biblical criticism it would share many of the characteristics of biblical criticism 
generally, it would not be a standard exercise in such criticism, at least not as that term is 
understood by most academics involved in the discipline of biblical studies.
By discipline I mean more than "a department of learning or knowledge" (OED).  I refer, 
rather, to the training given disciples preparing to enter an academic guild.  I refer to the habits of 
mind thereby ingrained that guide a practice of scrupulous research, research that among biblical 
scholars frequently focuses on shedding light on some arcane, textual minutiae: historical, 
literary, sociological, or whatever.  This discipline enables each member of the guild to labour 
upon some aspect of the gigantic puzzle the text is seen to represent—in the unstated hope that 
someday all that remains uncertain or hidden will be revealed.
Although I have been academically trained in the discipline of biblical studies, it should 
already be clear that I am something of an infidel as far as its guild is concerned.  I lack faith in 
the eschaton—in the arrival of that day when all things will have become clear.  As with many 
academic establishments, the guild in question seems transfixed by the eighteenth-century notion 
of gradual progress toward enlightenment.  I doubt I ever subscribed much to such a truth project. 
I have never assumed, as many historically- or theologically-oriented biblical scholars seem to 
assume, that texts can be transparent windows upon meaning—that all we need to make them so 
is, by meticulous research, to clear away the “referential and ideological rubble” that otherwise 
blocks our view (de Man, “Hypogram and Inscription” 31).
I have always sensed that there are dimensions to texts beyond the cognitive, e.g., 
aesthetic and affective surpluses irreducible by analysis.  Moreover, in our post-modern age, the 
cognitive is not what it used to be.  Surface rationality has long since been challenged, most 
notoriously by that group of thinkers that Paul Ricoeur in Freud and Philosophy has identified as 
exemplars of a hermeneutics of suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, to which I would now 
add Derrida. I do not know enough about Nietzsche’s thought to include it in my own specula-
tions, and Derrida’s would take me too far afield.  But the theories of Marx and Freud, I am con-
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vinced, provide more than enough insight into the extra-cognitive dimensions of texts to write 
about Amos.
6. Kindred Spirits: Marx, Freud, and The Hermeneutics of Suspicion
Marx and Freud are kindred thinkers.  Simply put, both suspect that things are not as they 
seem.  Both seek to account for reality—social or psychic—in terms of dynamic processes that 
lie concealed.  For both, Ricoeur tells us, “the fundamental category of consciousness is the rela-
tion of hidden-shown or, if you prefer, simulated-manifested” (Freud 33–34).  Both write as 
scientists.41  In their respective spheres, both seek to develop “a mediate science of meaning, 
irreducible to the immediate consciousness of meaning” (34).  As opposed to Descartes and the 
type of speculation to which his name is now commonly attached, they are less interested in the 
manifest content of consciousness itself than in the latent processes of its formation.  Both 
attempt “in different ways […] to make their ‘conscious’ methods of deciphering coincide with 
the ‘unconscious’ work  of ciphering which they attribute […] to social being [and] to the uncon-
scious psychism respectively” (34, emphasis original).  Their interest in deciphering such hidden 
processes marks them both as historians: one of social and the other of psychic formations. 
As for social being and its effects, Hayden White points out that both Marx and Freud are 
intellectual heirs of Rousseau.  Like Nietzsche, both are secular thinkers who speculate about 
primitive42 humans, demonstrating ambivalence toward the putative advances of civilization, the 
problems of which they assess in economic terms.  Since White writes so cogently about their 
common vision, I quote him at some length:
[T]hought about the Wild Man has always centered upon the three great and abid-
ing human problems that society and civilization claim to solve: those of 
sustenance, sex, and salvation.  I think it is no accident that the three most revolu-
tionary thinkers of the nineteenth century—Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche, 
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41 Scientific aspiration fits Freud better than Marx.  Freud always thinks of himself as a 
scientist and psychoanalysis as a science of mind, although many have disputed this assessment 
(see, for instance, Crews, Memory Wars).  Marx’s scientific laurels are presented him by fol-
lowers, particularly Althusser, who sees him as having pioneered the science of history (see 
chapter 2).
42 In response to the objection that primitive is a problematic term, I use it because Marx 
and Freud use it, as the upcoming quotation from White attests.  Both conceive of society as 
evolving from the primitive to the complex, an attitude, I suspect, that was fairly widespread in 
the nineteenth century.
respectively—took these themes as their special subject matter.  Similarly, the 
radicalism of each is in part a function of a thoroughgoing atheism and, more spe-
cifically, hostility to Judeo-Christian religiosity.  For each of these great radicals, 
that problem of salvation is a human problem, having its solution solely in a 
reexamination of the creative forms of human vitality.  Each is therefore com-
pelled to recur to primitive times as best he can in order to imagine what primal 
man, precivilized man, the Wild Man who existed before history—i.e., outside the 
social state—might have been like.
Like Rousseau, each of these thinkers interprets primitive man as the pos-
sessor of an enviable freedom, but unlike those followers of Rousseau who mis-
read him and insisted on treating primitive man as an ideal, Marx, Freud, and 
Nietzsche recognized, as Rousseau did, that primitive man's existence must have 
been inherently flawed.  Each of them argues that man's "fall" into society was 
necessary, the result of a crucial scarcity (in goods, women, or power, as the case 
may have been).  And although each sees the fall as producing a uniquely human 
form of oppression, they all see it as an ultimately providential contribution to the 
construction of that whole humanity which it is history's purpose to realize.  In 
short, for them man had to transcend his inherent primitive wildness—which is 
both a relationship and a state—in order to win his kingdom.  Marx's primitive 
food gatherers, Freud's primal horde, and Nietzsche's barbarians are seen as solv-
ing the problem of scarcity in essentially the same way: through the alienation and 
oppression of other men.  And this process and alienation are seen by all of them 
to result in the creation of a false consciousness, or self-alienation, necessary to 
the myth that a fragment of mankind might incarnate the essence of all humanity.
All three viewed history as a struggle to liberate men from the oppression 
of a society originally created as a way of liberating man from nature.  It was the 
oppressed, exploited, alienated, or repressed part of humanity that kept on reap-
pearing in the imagination of Western man—as the Wild Man, as the monster, and 
as the devil—to haunt or entice him thereafter.  Sometimes this oppressed or 
repressed humanity appeared as a threat and a nightmare, at other times as a goal 
and a dream; sometimes as an abyss into which mankind might fall, and again as a 
summit to be scaled; but always as a criticism of whatever security and peace of 
mind one group of men in society had purchased at the cost of the suffering of 
another.  (“Forms” 179–80)
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Both Marx and Freud are dialecticians who see formations—social or psychic—as attempts to 
resolve conflict, attempts that inevitably involve various forms of oppression or repression 
because the conflicts in question are ultimately irresolvable, leaving human creatures caught in a 
never-ending tension or dialectic between individual desire (the pole of freedom) and social 
demand (the pole of compulsion).
I have now come to write about Amos within a Marxist-Freudian framework.  Although I 
address what the text presents as the immediate consciousness of a speaker—to whom I have 
been referring as Amos—I bear Ricoeur’s observation in mind that Marx and Freud each devel-
oped a mediate science of meaning, which I take to mean a science of the production of meaning, 
and I analyze Amos for evidence of the latent processes through which its meanings are pro-
duced.43  In common with biblical criticism generally, this work is highly speculative.  It could 
hardly be otherwise.  Among other things, it speculates upon the history of greater biblical Israel. 
As Marxist criticism somewhat in the tradition of Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious 
or Jean-Paul Sartre’s What is Literature?, it speculates upon how the text might reflect the con-
temporary relations of production that enabled it to be produced.   Jameson and Sartre, of course, 
can go outside the text for concrete information on the relations of production that interest them. 
To avoid circularity, however, biblical scholars must theorize such relations by studying similar 
societies and then demonstrate how the text could be read to support such theorization.
Psychologically, my interest centres upon how Amos comes to be so violent—and why so 
few biblical scholars seem to notice it.  The oracles against the nations comprising its first two 
chapters attract a lot of critical interest.  Daniel Carroll R. lists sixty-one studies dealing with this 
section published between 1950 and 2000, a list, he admits, that is not exhaustive (131–34). 
Among other things, these works deal with the provenance of such oracles (legal, ritual, and so 
forth), their formulaic  patterning, various lexical and referential uncertainties, and their fit with 
the succeeding chapters.  Their authors can become so absorbed in resolving such technical prob-
lems of origin, structure, and reference that they pay scant attention to the literary quality and 
effect of the images.  For instance, the condemnation of the Ammonites for ripping up pregnant 
women in Gilead becomes just another textual detail to be parsed, sourced, and classified.  In his 
exegesis of these oracles, John Barton coolly announces that the one against the Ammonites “re-
quires little comment […].  The crime denounced is mentioned a number of times in the Old 
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43 Michel Peteux insists that Marxism has no subject other than the formation of subjects: 
it is the science of those mediate or latent processes by which subjects, be they in the present case 
Amos as a text or Amos as a persona, assume a particular shape as they emerge into being (Hen-
nessy 76).  The same can be said for psychoanalysis.
Testament—e.g. II Kings 15.16, and see below, p. 57” (21).44  On the page to which he refers us, 
he notes that “ripping open pregnant women [falls] into the sphere of war crimes felt to be such 
only by particular nations” (57).  So ends Barton’s treatment of this atrocity.  No one seems 
curious about the type of imagination that would record and preserve such a detail, an imagina-
tion that—when all is said and done—is attributed to Amos.45  No one seems curious about the 
cumulative effect such violent images have had upon millennia of hearers and readers who have 
considered their source sacred.  If Amos is not also among the Texts of Terror, to use Phyllis 
Trible’s title for her feminist readings of biblical narratives, I do not know what is.
7. Resistance to Theory
Reading Amos, I detect undercurrents of oppression and repression that run beneath much 
of the biblical text, giving it a distinct tone.  Because they are undercurrents, they seem fit sub-
jects for Marxist and Freudian analyses.  I am aware of the type of issues that such analyses—
particularly psychoanalysis—are likely to raise.  Some arose in connection with my master’s 
thesis, a Lacanian reading of the story of Ahab in I Kings.  My program required that I participate 
in a thesis writing seminar, in which I presented a rather perfunctory account of the theoretical 
basis of my project, viz., Lacan’s theory of the emergence of the imaginary and symbolic psychic 
registers in early childhood and their function in the resolution of the Oedipus complex.
 The issue arose with a philosophy professor conducting the seminar.  She had already 
demonstrated no tolerance (or understanding) for continental philosophy and had made the rather 
sweeping declaration that Derrida had been debunked.46  Her reaction to psychoanalytic theory 
  
 28 
44 In a note Barton quotes an article by G. R. Driver from 1938 to the effect that “the 
atrocity against pregnant women…‘being an incident in all ancient campaigns, [it] was unlikely 
to be the subject of a special denunciation by the prophet’” (65). 
45 In reading an early version of this manuscript, Hilary Clark remarks that it might reflect 
“a sensitive, moral, & alert imagination—honest—the sort of imagination that’s needed now to 
record atrocities against women, e.g., in the Congo and elsewhere.  (Presumably Amos is not 
making up this material.)  Wouldn’t this be testimony rather than terror?”  I would like to think 
this is the sort of imagination that the preservation of the image reflects, and, if it does, I owe the 
compilers of Amos an apology.  I suspect, however, that it is recorded—at least in part—because 
they were sadistically relishing it.  As I will go on to show, Amos desires that similar terrors be 
visited upon the urbanites of Israel. 
46 Derrida had nothing to do with my project.  His name, rather, was a touchstone for the 
theoretical gibberish I was speaking.
followed suit: it is also bunk that she debunked by announcing that it did not ring true to her 
experience as a mother of four.  Upon leaving the room after my presentation and her denuncia-
tion of it, a fellow student remarked to me that he had found both aspects of this process fascinat-
ing.  How, he wondered, could a theory of unconscious development be refuted by an appeal to 
experience?  How, indeed?  Is not the unconscious, by definition, inaccessible to experience, at 
least to the conscious reflection upon it of the type to which my professor was appealing?47
She was manifesting what de Man calls resistance to theory.  Although E. P. Thompson 
does not privilege experience to the same extent, something of this resistance also marks his 
Poverty of Theory, in which he uses an orrery to ridicule Althusser’s brand of structural Mar-
xism.  According to the OED, an orrery is a “mechanical model, usually clockwork, devised to 
represent the motions of the earth and moon (and sometimes also the planets) around the sun.” 
To represent Althusser’s concept of the mechanics of history, Thompson transforms the orrery 
into a Rube Goldberg contraption with pulleys and wheels set in action by cranking the handle of 
theoretical practice.  For a more impressive display, Thompson suggests that the handle be 
hooked up to the motor of history, which, in its turn, demonstrates the mechanics of the class 
struggle.
Thompson’s conceit of Althusser cranking out his texts through a theoretical contraption 
reflects his conviction that they derive from “some very aetiolated notion of knowledge,” one that 
offers “us less an epistemology which takes into account the actual formative motions of con-
sciousness than a description of certain procedures of academic life” (8).  He proceeds to argue 
that the aetiolation of Althusser’s thought could be treated by fleshing it out with a finer feeling 
for  social experience.  In doing so, he evinces the pragmatism that has characterized British 
resistance to much continental philosophy.  But his trenchant attack on Althusser begs the same 
sort of question as that raised by my ill-starred seminar presentation: how can we take “into 
account the actual formative motions of consciousness,” as Thompson would have us do, if those 
motions are inaccessible to immediate consciousness?  Theory of this sort can never be fleshed 
out by experience, for it is experience itself for which such theory attempts to account—in terms 
of dynamic processes that lie concealed.  Freud seeks the hidden determinants of human con-
sciousness; Marx, of human society.  In pursuing these aims, both elaborate rather abstruse 
bodies of theory upon which their intellectual heirs self-consciously depend.  If those bodies of 
theory seem to reflect an aetiolated “notion of knowledge,” it may well be that this impression 
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47 Although the unconscious makes itself known through its conscious effects (symp-
toms), Freud’s theoretical account of life on the unconscious level nevertheless strikes many as 
highly improbable in terms of their daily experience.  
arises from confusing effects with causes.  Theorizing produces models of experience stripped 
down to essential processes, models that, at times, in their non-intuitive hyperreality, can seem 
surpassing strange.
8. The Work at Hand
By now it should be clear that this is a secular study.  It focuses upon Amos primarily as a 
piece of literature—and not at all as a piece of theology.  At the very least, any study purporting 
to be literary, regardless of its theoretical interests and the tangents it develops and pursues, 
should give some evidence that its author has read the text.  Much biblical study provides no such 
evidence.  The nub of the matter is that much of it does not purport to be literary study.  The text, 
as I have indicated above, is frequently taken to be an historical artifact, one to be mined with 
great perspicuity for all sorts of evidence, evidence used to construct and defend all sorts of 
extra-textual constructions.  But few biblical scholars who study biblical texts as artifacts also 
attend to features such as setting, character, plot, theme, tone and mood that constitute those texts 
as literature.  Too few consider how the texts they study may have been shaped in the process of 
literary production to serve certain ends.
Robert A. Wilson’s Prophecy and Society in Ancient Israel exemplifies the study of the 
biblical text as an artifact.  It merits attention here because it takes up issues central to prophetic 
studies that relate to the question of Amos’s occupation—a question to which I devote consider-
able attention in the ensuing chapters.  Wilson discusses ancient Near Eastern prophecy within a 
theoretical framework he derives from an analysis of prophecy in modern societies, particularly 
spirit possession cults in 20th-century Africa.  On the basis of this analysis he distinguishes 
between peripheral and central intermediaries in a way that may reflect upon the sociopolitical 
dynamics of Amos.
First, he discusses a type of possession viewed negatively but tolerated.  “Many 
societies,” he tells us, 
recognize a type of possession which begins as an unwanted and uncontrollable 
illness but which develops into a more or less controlled form of possession that is 
tolerated by the majority of the society.  While the deities involved in this type of 
possession are not demonic, neither are they usually the chief deities of the 
society.  Rather they tend to be minor spirits, perhaps originally foreign to the 
society, or “old gods” whose cults have been subordinated to the official cults of 
newer, more powerful deities.  Because of the nature of the possessing deities, and 
also because the people possessed tend to lack status and social power, 
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anthropologists usually refer to this type of possession as peripheral possession 
and refer to the possessed individuals as peripheral intermediaries.  (37–38, 
emphasis original)
Such intermediaries are peripheral in two respects: not only are they themselves peripheral in 
respect to status and social power, but the gods who possess them are peripheral as well—
peripheral within the pantheon of gods.  They may be old gods, gods who were powerful in ear-
lier times but have now been demoted or deposed in their dotage.
Moving on to discuss possession viewed positively,Wilson points out that this 
sometimes occurs as part of a society’s established religion.  In this case, posses-
sion has important functions within the central cult and must occur at the 
appropriate points in the ritual.  Societies carefully control possession within the 
central cult and have regular mechanisms for assuring an orderly supply of 
appropriately trained intermediaries.  Because this type of possession is an estab-
lished part of the central social structure, anthropologists usually refer to it as cen-
tral possession and refer to the possessed individuals as central intermediaries. 
(39–40, emphasis original)
Having established the categories of central and peripheral intermediaries, Wilson’s discussion of 
Amos centres upon which of the two he fits.  The superscriptural evidence associating Amos 
with Tekoa in Judah makes sense to Wilson.  He tentatively classifies Amos as a peripheral pro-
phet in Israel based upon his being a foreigner outside the power structure there.  But he also 
suspects that Amos is a central prophet in Judah: that he is, in fact, a member of the Judahite 
establishment.
Insightful though Wilson’s theoretical work may be, he gives no evidence of ever having 
considered whether Amos as represented in the text (AmosL) could differ in any respect from his 
assumed prototype outside the text (AmosI).  It would misrepresent Wilson to say that he con-
flates the two, for he never distinguishes them in the first place, but his speculation that Amos 
may have been a central prophet in Judah demonstrates that he conceives him in an extra-textual 
dimension.  However, it makes no difference to Wilson’s project whether he apprehends those 
identified as prophets as living, breathing people or as literary characters.  His object is to sort 
them into two predetermined categories, and his criteria for doing so apply equally well to either 
mode of conceiving them.
Wilson’s procedure begs the question of how Amos comes to be identified as a prophet in 
the first place and, more particularly, a member of a prophetic establishment.  He shares Wolff’s 
assumption (10 above) that AmosI played the role of a recognizable intermediary in greater bibli-
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cal Israel, and he takes no more account than Wolff does of AmosL’s strident denial of this claim. 
As I have already observed, Amos is one of the few prophetic texts whose putative author is 
named outside the superscription.  A substantial biographical fragment featuring Amos’s heated 
dispute with the priest Amaziah of Bethel (7.10-17) contains the denial in question:
10 Then Amazi’ah the priest [ןהכ] of Bethel sent to Jerobo’am king of Israel, 
saying, “Amos has conspired against you in the midst of the house of Israel; the 
land is not able to bear all his words.  11For thus Amos has said,
‘Jerobo’am shall die by the sword, and Israel must go into exile away from his 
land.’”
12 And Amazi’ah said to Amos, “O seer [הזח], go, flee away [חרב] to the land of 
Judah,  and eat bread there;  13 but never again prophesy [אבנהל] at Bethel, for it is 
the king’s sanctuary, and it is a temple of the kingdom.”
14 Then Amos answered Amazi’ah, “I am no prophet [איבנ], nor a prophet’s son 
[איבנ־ןב]; but I am a herdsman [רקוב], and a dresser of sycamore trees [םימקׁש סלוב], 
15 and the LORD48 took me from following the flock, and the LORD said to me, 
‘Go, prophesy to my people Israel.’
16 “Now therefore hear the word of the LORD.
You say, ‘Do not prophesy against Israel,
and do not preach against the house of Isaac.’
17 Therefore thus says the LORD:
‘Your wife shall be a harlot in the city,
and your sons and your daughters shall fall by the sword, 
and your land shall be parceled out by line;
you yourself shall die in an unclean land,
and Israel shall surely go into exile away from its land.’”
When I first read these lines, it seemed clear to me that Amos is not a member of any 
establishment—not, at least, a prophetic one.  He seems to deny it.  Negatively, he says that he is 
neither a איבנ (n&vi’: prophet) nor a איבנ־ןב (ben-n&vi’) (7.14).  Literally, the latter term means 
son of a prophet, but Wolff’s translation, prophet’s disciple, provides the idiomatic meaning 
(306).  Wilson himself says that the “expression ‘son of . . .’ or ‘sons of . . .’ is frequently used in 
Semitic to indicate membership in a group or guild, so there is little doubt that ‘sons of the pro-
phets’ was a designation applied to members of some sort of prophetic group” (141).  Positively, 
  
 32 
48 By convention the English word Lord translates the Hebrew הוהי (y&hweh), a proper 
name for the god at the heart of the Jewish Bible.  In my own text I use the word Yahweh.
he says he is something else: a רקוב  (boqer: herdsman) and a םימקׁש סלוב  (boles ¯Iqmim: dresser 
of sycomore trees).
Wilson’s suspicion that Amos is a member of the southern Judahite establishment, how-
ever, is not entirely groundless.  In calling him a הזח (xozIh, seer) (12), Amaziah seems to be 
conceding that he holds the office of an intermediary of some sort.  In The Roles of Israel’s Pro-
phets, David Petersen contends that הזח, which he renders as h.ōzeh, is a Judahite title.  He intro-
duces this text from Amos as part of the evidence for this argument.  We may observe, he says, 
that
Amaziah integrally links Amos’ status as h.ōzeh with Judah, “O h.ōzeh go, flee to 
the land of Judah.”  Amaziah seems to be saying, “Go away to the South, you 
southern prophet, you do not belong here in the North, especially not at a royal 
shrine of the northern kingdom, since a h.ōzeh is to be active in Judah.”  That is to 
say, Amaziah quite consciously uses h.ōzeh as a label to depict Amos as an inter-
loper, a prophet from Judah, a prophet of a sort not acceptable in Israel.  Given the 
prominence of this role label in prophetic books of Judahite origin, such an inter-
pretation is all the more probable. (56)
How, then, does Petersen deal with Amos’s apparent denial?  He responds to its negative aspect 
(“‘I am no prophet [איבנ], nor a prophet’s son [איבנ־ןב]’”) by focussing upon the typically biblical 
characteristic of its being a non sequitur.  Having been called a הזח (hozIh), Amos denies that he 
is a איבנ (n&vi’).  Petersen interprets this as agreement.  In his mind, the most likely explanatory 
construal of 7.14 is the paraphrase “‘I am not a nābî’ [איבנ],’ i.e., I am indeed a h.ōzeh as you, 
Amaziah, recognize” (58).49  Ergo, Amos belongs to the southern prophetic establishment.50  He 
does not respond at all to the positive aspect of the denial (‘“but I am a herdsman [רקוב], and a 
dresser of sycamore trees [םימקׁש סלוב]’”).  To his credit, Wilson does deal with this positive 
denial, but by a roundabout method adopted by many others.  Amos is not a simple herdsman, as 
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49 Petersen does not pick up on the possibility that, in denying that he is a prophet [איבנ] in 
7.14, Amos may not be responding to the noun הזח in 7.12 but to the infinitive אבנהל (lOhInn&ve’, 
to prophesy) in 7:13 that Amaziah uses to warn him away from Bethel.  איבנ and אבנהל have the 
same root: the verb derives from the noun.
50 Although Stanley Rosenbaum does think that Amos is a member of a prophetic esta-
blishment, he adduces other philological evidence from Amos’s exchange with Amaziah to con-
tend that he is not Judahite.  Focussing upon 7.12, he argues that “the verb חרב [here translated 
“flee away"] almost always means ‘to cross a border or boundary in order to escape jurisdiction 
to which one is normally subject’” (35).  If, as the superscription implies, Amos had anything to 
do with Judah, it was as a place of exile, not as a place of origin.
this passage seems to state, but, as the superscription (1.1) declares, he is among the םדקנ 
(noqOδim), which the RSV translates as shepherds but which numerous scholars insist connotes a 
man of substance, possibly with cultic functions within a ruling establishment.  I will return to 
this point later.
My present point is that neither Wilson nor Petersen study Amos as literature; thus, nei-
ther deal with or even seem aware of the vitriolic nature of Amos’s response or what may have 
provoked it.  In a literary study, one must also account for the effect of the dramatic dynamics 
between characters—which, among other things, are indicated by the tone in which things are 
said—on the overall meaning.  Amos’s response to Amaziah is so strident that it seems less than 
likely that they agree on anything.  At any rate, Amos does not seem the least bit mollified by 
what Petersen characterizes as Amaziah’s concession.  Is it, however, a concession, as Petersen 
supposes, or the very thing that sets Amos off?  In another work, I observe that “Evidence sug-
gests that, during its history, Israel normally wielded greater political power than the southern 
kingdom of Judah” (“Ahab” 111), evidence which also led me to surmise that, at times, Judah 
was Israel’s vassal (113).  If this be so, in calling Amos a הזח, Amaziah may not be expressing a 
fact as much as his contempt.  He may be using הזח as a term to ridicule someone seen as a pro-
vincial.  Consequently, when he says “‘O seer [הזח], go, flee away to the land of Judah, and eat 
bread there[,] but never again prophesy at Bethel, for it is the king’s sanctuary, and it is a temple 
of the kingdom’” (12-13), he may mean something like “Get the hell out of here and go home to 
where you came from, you second-rate imitator of the Mickey Mouse prophets they have in 
Judah; you have no business making a nuisance of yourself up here among the sophisticates in 
the true centre of power.”  In responding, Amos may himself use the prophetic titles Petersen is 
so interested in classifying as terms of contempt.  If, for instance, there were prophets or sons of 
prophets (prophetic guilds) in greater biblical Israel, it seems likely that some, at least, would 
serve as state functionaries (ritual and otherwise) in centres of religio-political power.  According 
to 2 Kgs 2.3, such sons did exist at the temple at Bethel in the time of Elisha.  Although Amaziah 
has called him a seer, Amos’s denying that he is neither a prophet nor the son of a prophet may 
not, indeed, be a non sequitur.  By using the titles for intermediaries current at Bethel—which 
would also include Amaziah’s title, ןהכ (kohen: priest)—Amos may be contemptuously denying 
that he is an officially constituted intermediary of the sort found there, i.e., a toady whose warrant 
to practice is certified by the state power.  Prophesy as he might, he is a lone ranger: his warrant 
to do so comes directly from upon high.
Both Wilson and Petersen make interesting contributions to prophetic studies, Wilson 
theorizing central and peripheral prophecy, Petersen the roles various types of intermediaries 
play.  Wilson’s concept of peripheral prophecy, in particular, applies to Amos, if not precisely as 
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he describes it.  But much of the work of both involves fitting the text to the theory rather than 
the theory to the text.  In dealing with Amos, each tries to fit him into one of their preconceived 
categories.  Given the vacuum in which historical critics such as Wilson and Petersen operate, 
the extent to which they follow any clue or theoretical construct that might illuminate the history 
of greater biblical Israel is quite understandable.  As I have already observed, theorizing about 
this history can be remarkably ingenious.  But if following a theoretical lead tempts a critic to 
discount or ignore the literary contours of a text, the result may seem too much like an attempt to 
force a square peg into a round hole.  Although theories such as Wilson’s may be suggestive, due 
to the scarcity of data by which to verify them, they can never be anything more than hypotheses. 
At times, the theoretical rigour with which some biblical scholars approach their work seems to 
manifest a resistance to acknowledging the highly speculative nature of their undertakings.
No such resistance marks this present study, which I acknowledge to be an eclectic and 
idiosyncratic reflection upon Amos.  Because it addresses a biblical text, what I have undertaken 
is not immune to most of the aspects (and contradictions) of the discipline described above.  As a 
deliberate tactic, however, I have aimed to produce a work less disciplined than most studies of 
Amos.  This reflects my enduring conviction that Amos cannot be reduced to the coherence that 
most who study it seek—that it remains irresolvably and perhaps deliberately fragmented.  I have 
chosen to call my reflections refractions because whatever light theoretical speculation might 
supply cannot illuminate the text evenly.  Ultimately, it cannot even penetrate it.  It bounces off 
of it in all sorts of unpredictable angles because, as the OED definition of refraction states, the 
medium (or text) that the light traverses is “not of uniform density.”
In such introductions it is customary to review current literature on, for instance, the cur-
rent state of some aspect of Amos research.  Although I do utilize research on Amos, I have dis-
pensed with the review because, essentially, there is little or nothing in Amos research that 
addresses the questions I put to the text.  I am unaware of any biblical study like this one, but, 
then again, I never conceived it as biblical study, not, at least, according to the avenues of 
approach and modes of thought in which that study is commonly undertaken.  I think much inter-
esting work is yet to be done explicating the sociology and history of greater biblical Israel in 
terms of Amos, but that has not been my principal object here, and I have had continually to resist 
the temptation to do so at the risk of not supplying sufficient background for this study. 
Although I am interested in the history of greater biblical Israel, any new insight that I might 
bring to bearing upon it or its sociology is tangential to my primary concern, which, to modify 
Nietzsche’s dictum slightly, has been to reflect upon “the past only by what is most powerful in 
the present” (Nietzsche 40).  I refer anyone interested in the current state of Amos research to a 
book like Daniel Carroll R.’s Amos—The Prophet & His Oracles: Research on The Book of 
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Amos.  Those consulting it, however, would discover a bibliography organized by such categories 
as “Amos and the Book of the Twelve,” “Use at Qumran and in Rabbinic Literature,” “Covenant 
and Law,” and “Contemporary Relevance and Pastoral Use.”  There is no category remotely close 
to “The Insanity of Amos” or “Sadistic Phantasy and the Sacral.”
This is not a sequential, close reading of Amos.  Good commentaries already abound, 
several of which, such as those by Wolff and Paul, I have already mentioned.  It has not been my 
intent to sift through them to present a comparative study of the exegesis of Amos in general or 
any of its passages in particular.  Readers interested in such things should look elsewhere. 
Ultimately, this work is as much about Marxist and psychoanalytic theory and contemporary 
issues upon which the Book of Amos has been used to reflect as it is about Amos.
9. Looking Ahead
In Chapters 2 and 3 I study Amos from a Marxist perspective.  In Chapter 2, I search for 
the social location of AmosI.  Relying principally upon Louis Althusser, I distinguish materialism 
from the idealism Marx rejects and seeks to supplant.  Following upon Marx’s thesis that humans 
must be comprehended materially in “the ensemble of the social relations,” I explore the implica-
tions of Amos’s claim that he is not a prophet but a shepherd by elaborating upon the lives and 
roles of shepherds in biblical Israel.  Pursuant to Marx’s dictum that social being determines con-
sciousness, I conclude by searching Amos for evidence reflecting the consciousness of a shepherd 
or, as Gottwald classifies the Israelite shepherd sociologically, a transhumant pastoral nomad.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the production of AmosL.  Using Althusser’s concept of the idealiz-
ing function of ideology, I theorize that Amos the prophet as opposed to Amos the shepherd is a 
literary production of the scribes who compiled the Bible.  Furthermore, I argue that Amos is a 
profound literature of alienation manifesting the high degree of hegemony that the emerging 
monarchical ruling class had already achieved in the Israel of Amos’s time.
In Chapter 4, I move from theorizing the production of Amos from a Marxist perspective 
to considering the text from a psychoanalytic one—more specifically, as manifesting a con-
sciousness suffering the effects of trauma.  After elaborating Freud’s theory of trauma by com-
paring it to an alternate theory of trauma espoused in the psychology of consciousness of Pierre 
Janet and his modern descendants,  I argue that Amos reflects traumatization in terms of imagery, 
intensity of voice, incoherence of text, production of anxiety, threat of exile, and non-
representability.
In Chapter 5, I use Frank Kermode’s concept of the mythic to extend the concept of the 
compulsion to repeat introduced in the discussion of trauma; I do so in order to argue that Amos 
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is regressively fixated upon the myth of tribal, premonarchical Israel as having been a golden age 
along the lines developed by Raymond Williams in The Country and The City.  Using Georges 
Bataille’s concept of sacred violence, I remark upon the potential of Amos to fuel fantasies and 
acts of violence.  I conclude by summing up my assessment of Amos and its readers in the light 




In Search of the Social Location of AmosI
As we saw in the previous chapter, the superscription to Amos declares that it contains 
“The words of Amos, who was among the shepherds of Teko’a, which he saw concerning Israel 
in the days of Uzzi’ah king of Judah and in the days of Jerobo’am the son of Jo’ash, king of 
Israel, two years before the earthquake” (1.1).  Royal chronologies are a bit uncertain, but I sub-
scribe to the general consensus that the information the superscription contains points to a mid-
eighth century provenance for Amos, both man and text.  Among other things, the text includes 
scathing indictments of monarchical Israel, the first of which appears among the oracles against 
the nations:
6  Thus says the LORD:
“For three transgressions of Israel,
and for four, I will not revoke the 
punishment;
because they sell the righteous for 
silver,
and the needy for a pair of shoes—
7  they that trample the head of the
poor into the dust of the earth,
and turn aside the way of the
afflicted;
a man and his father go in to the
 same maiden,
so that my holy name is profaned;
8  they lay themselves down beside
every altar
upon garments taken in pledge;
and in the house of their God they
drink
the wine of those who have been
fined.”  (2.6-8)
Although there has been much debate about the precise meaning of these allegations, it is gener-
ally agreed they involve domestic crimes against the poor.  Wolff summarizes them as 1. sale 
into debt slavery of the innocent and the needy, 2. oppression of the poor, 3. abuse of maidens, 
and 4. exploitation of debtors (165).
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This indictment against whomever they are did not emerge during a period of unrelieved  eco-
nomic doom and gloom.  In fact, James Mays points out that “under Jeroboam II [to whom the 
superscription refers], Israel knew her best years of prosperity and peace” (2).  However, thefruits 
of this prosperity appear not to have been evenly distributed.  Mays elaborates:
The older homogenous economic structure of Israel gave way to sharp distinctions 
of wealth and privilege.  The excavations at Tirzah (Tell el-Farah) uncovered evi-
dence of the social revolution that had occurred.  While the city’s houses in the 
tenth century had been of uniform size, in the eighth century by contrast there was 
a quarter of large, expensive houses, and one of small huddled structures.  The 
result was the stark contrast between the luxury of the rich and misery of the poor 
which Amos repeatedly indicts. (2–3)
I assume that just such a social revolution as Mays describes did occur, one in which socioecono-
mic classes emerged from an “older homogenous economic structure.”  The foregoing allegations 
not only reflect the existence of such classes but also a conflict between them.  But these words 
are presented as something more than mere allegations.  Although the superscription declares 
they are the words of Amos, the formula that immediately introduces them (“Thus says the 
LORD” (2.6α)) declares they are the words of Yahweh.
It may well be that AmosI did identify his words as messages from Yahweh.  If so, he 
would not have differed much from countless preachers who have succeeded him.  AmosL does 
declare that Yahweh called him to prophesy (7.15).  But in the same breath, he seems to deny that 
he is either a prophet [איבנ] or a member of a prophetic guild [איבנ־ןב] (7.14).  I say seems 
because this apparent denial can be construed in a way that could reverse its meaning.  7.14 is a 
notorious Amosian crux.  Mays declares that its interpretation “is the most controverted problem 
in the Book of Amos” (137).1  Since the controversy it has engendered bears directly upon the 
question of AmosI’s occupation—a question to which I devote considerable attention in this 
chapter—I take it up here by way of introduction.
One bone of contention involves an interpretation a translator must make.  As in classical 
Greek, biblical Hebrew does have a verb to be (היה h&y&h).  But neither language requires its use 
in predicate nominative constructions such as AmosL’s declaration to Amaziah in 7.14, which, in 
fact, is verb less: םיִמְקִׁש סֵלֹובּו יִכׁנָא רֵקֹוב־יִּכ יִכׁנָא איִבָנ־ןֶב ׁאלְו יִכׁנָא איִבָנ־ׁאל.  Translating the passage as 
literally as I can, it reads: “no prophet I and no son of prophet I for a herding one I and a dressing 
one of sycomores” (the last two occupational terms are present participles used nominatively).  In 
supplying the cupola that English requires, the RSV translators have put it in the present tense.  It 
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1 Carroll R. lists forty-two articles concerning it published since 1947 (156–58).
is one of eight translations that Jack Lewis has checked that does so.  However, he lists another 
eight that put it in the past tense (229, n. 2 and 3).  This changes the meaning considerably.  If 
Amos is saying “I was no prophet nor a prophet’s son,” he may be stressing that, since his call to 
prophesy, he certainly is one now.
The jury is still out on whether this particular verb less nominal construction should be 
read in the present or the past.  In reviewing the arguments thus far advanced, Åke Viberg, while 
observing that “most frequently, the nominal clause presupposes a present tense,”2 points out that 
“the standard view [in dealing with such cases] is that the various possible tenses are equally 
probable, but that they can be distinguished on the basis of the context.”  He regrets that this “is 
not a very satisfying solution” (97), a conclusion that the never-ending debate over this particular 
passage in Amos supports.
The debate centres upon whether Amos’s call to prophesy constitutes him as a prophet 
and, if so, what kind.  Cult prophets did exist in greater biblical Israel.  I have already noted, for 
instance, their presence at the temple at Bethel in the time of Elisha (34 above).   The titles in 
7.14 designate such intermediaries.  If we construe the verse in the present, it could mean, as I 
have suggested, that Amos is setting himself over against cultic intermediaries. If we construe it 
in the past, it could mean, on the other hand, that he is claiming his rightful place among them. 
In either case, however, he could also be redefining a term, declaring that he is a new type of pro-
phet or intermediary under the sun. 
My own view is that the jury deliberating upon the tense of Amos 7.14 will never return a 
verdict.  Amos’s statement is ambiguous.  The speaker did have a finite, conjugatable verb to be 
at his disposal that he could have used to indicate the tense.  But he chose the less temporally 
specific expression that appears in the text, an expression that can be read as either present or 
past.  Why he did so is beyond our powers to divine, but, unlike Viberg, I do not see the resulting 
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2 Viberg observes that
An important argument in favour of the present tense is the use of Amos 7:14 in 
Zechariah 13:5, where prophets in disguise claim: … “I am not a prophet, I am a 
farmer!”  Here the present tense is undoubtedly correct, and this would imply that 
the author of Zechariah 13:5 understood a present tense in Amos 7:14 as well. 
Although it is theoretically possible that the author of Zechariah 13:5 could have 
been mistaken about Amos 7:14, an ancient Judahite would certainly have been 
more familiar with the syntax of his own language than modern scholars, despite 
Amos 7:14 being several centuries old at the time of the writing of Zechariah 
13:5. (102)
ambiguity as a problem to be resolved—not, at least, by deciding about the tense.  I see it, rather, 
as a critical opportunity.
Both Marxist and psychoanalytic criticism promote searching the text for seams, for the 
fault lines or fissures that mark its points of ambiguity or incoherence.  Such fractures open upon 
contradictions—psychological, social, political, economic—to which the text is a response.  On 
the whole, the Bible is fraught with contradiction: as a compendium reflecting centuries of social 
experience and change, it could hardly be otherwise.  But individual books such as Amos were 
edited not only to keep them relevant but, above all, to achieve some consistent point of view in 
response to the contradictions informing and powering the social dynamic of the time.  As 
opposed to much modern literature, biblical literature is less interested in mirroring or represent-
ing contradiction than in resolving it.  I speak here very deliberately of contradiction rather than 
overt conflict, for most biblical books are filled with conflicts of the type that have been 
amenable to the binary analyses of structuralist criticism.  As we shall see in the upcoming 
theoretical discussion, in the Marxist view contradiction is systemic: it is fundamental to the 
ever-pre-given “structured complex unity” that characterizes social life (Althusser, “On the 
Materialist Dialectic” 198–99).  It may lead to overt conflict, but more typically it leads to repres-
sion: social repression (as analyzed by Marxist theory) or psychic repression (as analyzed by 
psychoanalysis).  When one detects cracks in the surface of the text, those cracks need to be 
explored and exploited as opportunities to penetrate to the latent processes at the heart of textual 
production.
The ambiguity in Amos 7.14-15 involves the thorny question of whether AmosI was a 
prophet and, if so, what type.  As the discussion in this and the following chapter demonstrates, 
this question relates to the further one of whether AmosI was, in fact, a shepherd and, if so, what 
type.  The historical treasure hunt for prophets has led most scholars to focus upon the former 
question rather than the latter.  Amos has commonly been studied as a source book for prophetic 
activity during the eighth century.  It has seemed likely to many studying Amos that, as a prophet, 
Amos would get involved in a shouting match with another religious functionary such as the 
priest Amaziah over the prerogatives of prophets.  It has occurred to few that he might have got-
ten into such a shouting match over the prerogatives of shepherds: that the shouting match 
reflects not professional but class antagonism.  
In this chapter I set aside the question of whether AmosI was a prophet and focus upon 
the implications of his claim that he was, at least sometime in his life, a shepherd.  Marxist criti-
cism must consider this possibility—and the possibility of regarding Amos as a source book for 
pastoral rather than  prophetic experience.  It must do so because in Marxist theory it is 
axiomatic  that “[t]he mode of production of material life conditions the general process of 
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social, political and intellectual life.  It is not the consciousness of men that determines their exis-
tence, but their social being that determines their consciousness” (Marx, “Preface” 211).  This is 
a sweeping statement, but one that is so fundamental to the argument I mount in this and the suc-
ceeding chapter—and to what Althusser calls the Marxist science of history—that it justifies a 
theoretical digression to summarize some key aspects of Marxist theory as Althusser distills 
them.  Following this digression, I turn to the question of the shepherd’s place within the rela-
tions of production in the highlands of Canaan.  After discussing further ambiguities concerning 
the precise nature of AmosI’s occupation, I turn to Gottwald’s concept of transhumant pastoral 
nomadism to suggest a model by which most shepherds of AmosI’s time and place can be 
understood.  I then examine the images and the tone of Amos for traces of a viewpoint that would 
fit a shepherd of the model just theorized.
1. Aspects of Marxist Theory
1.1. Marx Inaugurates the Science of History
Althusser contends that “Marx founded a new science: the science of history” (“Philos-
ophy” 18).  Thinking of the sciences as “a number of regional formations” within “great theoreti-
cal continents,” he declares that, before Marx, they had already been founded in the continents of 
mathematics and physics by the Greeks and by Galileo and his followers respectively.  Sub-
sequently, more specialized sciences had also been developed in these continents, e.g., chemistry 
and biology in physics and logic in mathematics.  Employing a concept from Gaston Bachelard,3 
Althusser argues that, by the mid-1840s,  Marx’s thought had progressed to the point that it 
achieved the sustained epistemological break necessary to open the continent of history to 
scientific knowledge (“Lenin and Philosophy” 41–42, emphasis original).4
Although Althusser goes to great lengths to defend his claim that Marxism is a science, 
he writes not as a scientist but as a philosopher.5  In his view philosophy and science are inter-
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3 Althusser attributes the concept to Bachelard but does not provide a source.
4 In what seems to be an aside, Althusser also speculates that “it is probable that Freud’s 
discovery has opened a new continent, one which we are only just beginning to explore” (“Lenin 
and Philosophy” 42).  Regarding the epistemological break, see also “Philosophy” 18).
5 After all, he reminds those who attended his seminar on Capital at the École Normale 
Supérieure in 1965, “[w]e are all philosophers.”  This being so, “[w]e did not read Capital as 
economists, as historians or as philologists.  We did not pose Capital the question of its eco-
twined.  “[G]reat scientific revolutions,” he declares, “induce important reorganizations in philo-
sophy” (“Lenin and Philosophy” 54).  He contends that the “opening up” of the “new continent” 
of history to science in its turn also “induced a revolution in philosophy”—all philosophy (“Ph-
ilosophy” 18).  Accordingly, “[t]he new theory of society and history” (“Marxism” 227) that 
Marx introduced includes both a “science (historical materialism) and a philosophy (dialectical 
materialism)” (“Philosophy” 17, emphasis original).  Much of Althusser’s writing may deal with 
the history of Marxian thought, but his focus very consistently is upon its philosophical basis.
1.1.1. The Epistemological Break: History as a Materialist Science Rather Than an Idealist 
Philosophy
The epistemological break that led to the scientific and philosophical revolutions in ques-
tion is encapsulated in Marx’s VIth Thesis on Feuerbach:
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence.  But the 
human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.  In its reality it 
is the ensemble of the social relations.
Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is con-
sequently compelled:
1.  To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious senti-
ment as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract—isolated—human indi-
vidual.
2.  Essence, consequently, can be comprehended only as a “genus”, as an 
internal, dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals.  (Marx, 
“Concerning Feuerbach” 423, emphasis original)
In dramatizing developments in Marxian thought, Althusser occasionally tends to overstate his 
case.  For instance, in elaborating upon Marx’s epistemological break, he insists: “In 1845, Marx 
broke radically with every theory that based history and politics on an essence of man” (“Mar-
xism” 227).  But a careful reading of the VIth Thesis reveals that this is not precisely the case. 
Marx does not deny there is a human essence.  He asserts, rather, that this essence is “no abstrac-
tion inherent in each single individual.”  In doing so, Marx is breaking with the idealism that had 
previously made the writing of history a philosophical undertaking (“Lenin and Philosophy” 42). 
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nomic or historical content, nor of its mere internal ‘logic’.  We read Capital as philosophers, 
and therefore posed it a different question” (“From Capital” 14).
Henceforth, the writing of history need not and should not be based upon some eternally given 
concept of  human nature in which “each single individual” shares.  It can and should be based, 
rather, upon an analysis of the material processes by and through which social groups interact. 
“In its  reality,” Marx’s thesis states, the human essence is to be apprehended scientifically in 
“the ensemble of the social relations.”
Although Althusser mounts detailed epistemological arguments that historical 
materialism is a science, in the last instance he bases them upon the simple notion that Marxism 
takes material processes as its object of knowledge.  If it has any claim to be a science of history, 
this focus upon material process must certainly be at the root of it.6  Idealist philosophy can pro-
duce no history because, based as it is upon timeless abstractions, it lacks a principle of change. 
What appears to be movement in such history is illusory: all such movement amounts to no more 
than the various and sometimes subtle manifestations of some grande idée.  Marx is constrained 
by no such preconceived ideal of human nature frozen in time.  In his view, human nature, such 
as it seems to be at any moment, is determined historically by material processes to which it is 
necessarily subject and responsive.
The idealist focus on the individual that Marx criticizes in Feuerbach characterizes much 
previous social thought.  Hobbes and Rousseau, for instance, in theorizing upon a social contract, 
proceed from the myth of natural humans living in social vacua.  Marx reverses this: he proceeds 
from the social and never abstracts from it to theorize upon the nature of isolated human beings. 
Indeed, Marx argues, humans are the only animals to have species consciousness, i.e., conscious-
ness of belonging to a species or having species being (Gattungswesen).  Such consciousness 
produces a distinctively human sense of self that extends beyond the purely individual.  Any 
force that derogates from this expanded, social sense of self toward a concentration upon the 
individual—as, for example, in idealism—is a source of alienation (Mészáros 81). 
1.1.2. Marx and the Hegelian Dialectic: The Turn from Ideal Simplicity to Material 
Complexity
Marx is convinced that simplicity itself is an abstraction, the product of an idealistic 
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6 As early as the “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts” of 1844 Marx criticizes politi-
cal economy because “it grasps the actual, material process of private property in abstract and 
general formulae which it then takes as laws.  It does not comprehend these laws, that is, does not 
prove them as proceeding from the nature of private property” (287–88, emphasis original).  In 
short, the political economists whom the young Marx was reading simply posited concepts such 
theoretical practice applied to raw material that is inherently complex.  His adaptation of the con-
cept of the dialectic he derives from Hegel demonstrates his turn from ideal simplicity to material 
complexity.  The study of the dialectic, Althusser tells us, is “‘the study of contradiction in the 
very essence of objects’” (“On the Materialist Dialectic” 193).7  For Hegel, the dialectic is the 
motor of history.  The contradictions that power this motor are internal to a simple, originary, 
spiritual dynamic attempting to realize its potential (or idea) over time.  The dialectic process 
functions as a cosmic heartbeat.  Its initial contraction, as it were, produces an internal alienation 
or contradiction, a contradiction overcome through a labour of supersession (Aufhebung) that 
creates a new state that will in its turn suffer a new alienation or contradiction in an ongoing pro-
cess.  This thinking is teleological: it presupposes development toward some end point, a point 
toward which each supersession is striving and at which, when reached, the spiritual idea labour-
ing to emerge will be fully realized.  The dialectic reflects the idea of progress found in much 
nineteenth-century thinking, but it does not, for all that, lose contact with origins.  It is akin to 
“the ground swell” that, T. S. Eliot tells us, “is and was from the beginning” (192).  In keeping 
with its nineteenth-century provenance, this thinking is also organic.  The dialectic is conceived 
as if it were alive.
Marx agrees the dialectic is the motor of history.  As does Hegel, he pinpoints the 
moment of historical change in the supersession of contradiction.8  But, true to his materialistic 
approach, he demystifies the dialectic and recasts it as a mechanical principle.9  Althusser 
stresses the unchanging simplicity of the Hegelian dialectic.  Marx, he insists, recognizes and 
resists such simplification and all it implies as distortions introduced by the abstracting process 
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as private property as abstract ideals without comprehending or explaining them in terms of a 
developmental process.
7 He is probably quoting Marx’s Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy here, 
but the citation is missing in the source.
8 Both Hegel and Marx are monistic thinkers, the one idealist and the other materialist. 
For each, the principle of supersession mediates between the poles of  contradiction, thereby pre-
venting those poles from resolving into a static dualism from which historical change cannot be 
theorized.  For thinking about contradiction to be dialectical, such mediation is always necessary 
(Mészáros 85–87).
9 For an excellent summary of the difference between the two in respect to the dialectic 
see Kontopoulos (passim).
of idealist philosophy.  “Instead of the ideological myth of a philosophy of origins and its organic 
concepts,” he points out, 
Marxism establishes in principle the recognition of the givenness of the complex 
structure which governs both the development of the object and the development 
of the theoretical practice which produces the knowledge of it.  There is no longer 
any original essence, only an ever-pre-givenness, however far knowledge delves 
into its past.  There is no longer any simple unity (in any form whatsoever), but 
instead, the ever-pre-givenness of a structured complex unity. (“On the Materialist 
Dialectic” 198–99, emphasis original)
In his demystification of the idealistic abstractions of the Hegelian dialectic, Marx eliminates 
origins from history.  The search for origins is the task of mythology, not science, which focuses 
solely upon analyzable material processes.
Marx’s rejection of reality as inherently simple underlies the difference between his con-
ception of the dialectic and that of Hegel.  For to Marx, Althusser insists, contradiction is not 
something internal to an irreducible, life-like dynamic. It describes, rather, the relationship 
among elements in an ever-pre-given “structured complex unity.”  Social reality properly 
understood involves a network of asymmetrical relationships in which certain elements 
inevitably dominate others, so much so that a social formation should be conceived as a structure 
in dominance.  The materialist science of history, as it was emerging in the 1840s at the time of 
Marx’s epistemological break, would map the vicissitudes of this asymmetry as manifested in 
“the ensemble of…social relations,” most particularly, in class struggle.
1.2. Marxism as a Theory of Production
Although Marxism discounts the possibility of a theory of history based upon idealist 
philosophy, it is, nevertheless, very much concerned with ideas.  In the Marxist scheme, how-
ever, ideas are material products rather than spiritual forces (Althusser, “Ideology” 159). 
Although Althusser insists that Marxism is the science of history, it is more illuminating, in fact, 
to think of it as a theory of production.  All social goods—both tangible and intangible—are pro-
duced by social practice, which he defines as the process of transforming raw materials into pro-
ducts.  The “determinant moment (or element)” in such transformation, he tells us, “is neither the 
raw material nor the product, but the practice in the narrow sense: the moment of the labour of 
transformation itself, which sets to work, in a specific structure, men, means and a technical 
method of utilizing the means” (“On the Materialist Dialectic” 166–67, emphasis original).  No 
less than a chair or a table, an idea is the product of social practice—a practice subject to 
change—not something eternally and unalterably given and taken.
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As a theory of production, Marxism approaches its object of knowledge with a particular 
interest.  It does not concern itself with how things are made technically but with the social con-
ditions that enable them to be made.  It does not allow that just anything can be produced but 
only those things that a current constellation of social conditions permits.  Therefore, as Althus-
ser’s focus upon identifying the “determinate moment” of practice suggests, Marxism is also a 
theory of determination, a concept that looms large in the history of Marxist thought.
As my discussion of ideology in Chapter 3 reveals, Marxist theory builds upon the insight 
that the ultimate rationale for social production is typically concealed from people going about 
their daily activities—veiled, as it were, by a construal of social process enforced in the interests 
of a dominant class.  It accounts for social action theoretically rather than experientially in terms 
of a hidden scene in which the participants are unaware they are acting (a figure to which I return 
in Chapter 5).  In doing so, it proceeds counter-intuitively in a way that incurs the resistance to 
theory I discuss in Chapter 1 (28-30 above).  A more direct theory of production would be little 
more than a set of directions that could be reduced to a model or blueprint.  Marxism does not 
concern itself with such directions per se.  It concerns itself, rather, with who writes the direc-
tions and who follows them.  Principally, it concerns itself with what Marx calls the relations of 
production, that is, how the various groups involved interact to produce what is produced.  Such 
relations of production are the material heart of the human essence as Marx understands it.
To say that Marxism is a theory of production may seem an oversimplification, for it is 
also a theory of distribution and consumption. Just as it analyzes relations of production, it also 
analyzes relations of distribution and consumption that determine to whom whatever is produced 
is distributed and by whom it is consumed.  The three are concomitant: there is no point in 
producing something that is not distributed and consumed.10  But Marxism is pre-eminently a 
theory of production because it is based upon Marx’s philosophical tenet that the most basic 
human response to the natural world is productive activity.  István Mészáros stresses this in his 
assessment of Marx’s “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts” of 1844, which I quote at some 
length because it makes the implications of this basic tenet so clear:
In this work Marx’s ontological starting point is the self-evident fact that man, a 
specific part of nature (i.e. a being with physical needs historically prior to all 
others) must produce in order to sustain himself, in order to satisfy these needs. 
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10 For critical theory, however, it does matter whether one focuses on consumption or pro-
duction.  Raymond Williams points out that “nearly all forms of contemporary critical theory are 
theories of consumption” (“Base” 14) that view works of art as objects.  With its emphasis upon 
production, however, Marxism views such works as practices (15).
However, he can only satisfy these primitive needs by necessarily creating, in the 
course of their satisfaction through his productive activity, a complex hierarchy of 
non-physical needs which thus become necessary conditions for the gratification 
of his original physical needs as well.  Human activities and needs of a “spiritual” 
kind thus have their ultimate ontological foundations in the sphere of material 
production as specific expressions of human interchange with nature, mediated in 
complex ways and forms.  As Marx puts it: “the entire so-called history of the 
world is nothing but the begetting of man through human labour, nothing but the 
coming-to-be [Werden] of nature for man”.  Productive activity is, therefore, the 
mediator in the “subject-object relationship” between man and nature. 
(Mészáros 80, emphasis original, quoting Marx’s “Economic and Philsophic Man-
uscripts”)
Productive activity mediates the subject-subject relationships among humans as well.  In satisfy-
ing our physical needs through productive activity, we also produce the social world in which we 
live, our position in which, so Marx argues, ultimately determines our viewpoint upon it.
1.2.1. The Production of the Society Effect
On the micro level, Marxism deals with the production of social goods such as knowl-
edge, but, on the macro level, it deals with the production of society itself or, more precisely, 
what Althusser calls the “society effect.”  Writing on Capital, Althusser states that it is “ab-
solutely fundamental for an understanding of Marx” to realize that he “regards contemporary 
society (and every other past form of society) both as a result and as a society” in a dialectic rela-
tion (“From Capital” 65, emphasis original).  In making this argument, Althusser attributes to 
Marx the same vision for the study of society that Saussure has for the study of  linguistics (Saus-
sure passim).  Each has a history to be studied diachronically and a structure to be studied syn-
chronically.  Althusser elaborates on the task of Marxist diachronic, historical analysis: “The 
theory of the mechanism of transformation of one mode of production into another […] has to 
pose and solve the problem of the result, i.e., of the historical production of a given mode of pro-
duction, of a given social formation” (“From Capital” 65, emphasis original).  This “transforma-
tion of one mode of production into another” is the stuff of historical change as Marxists under-
stand it, and its mechanism—its motor—is dialectic.  Such transformation depends upon how the 
contradictions inherent within any social formation—a structure in dominance—are resolved or 
superseded in the ongoing struggle among all groups engaged in producing whatever is produced.
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One approach to the social tensions at the heart of Amos is to analyze them as an effect of 
the transition then in progress in greater biblical Israel from a tribal society to a monarchical 
state.  This evolution in question was from a “classless primitive society” to a centralized state 
organized according to the Asiatic (or tributary) mode of production (Gottwald, “Hypothe-
sis” 150–51).  The resentment heating to a boil in Amos likely reflects the fact that, as Gottwald 
points out, the AMP [Asiatic mode of production] retained as its economic base the “agrarian, 
pastoral, and handicraft villages which constitute[d] self-sufficient units of residency and produc-
tion” in which most of the nation’s people lived and most of its wealth was produced.  The 
emerging cities, on the other hand, in which political power was being concentrated, “lacked a 
truly urban ethos and a genuinely productive basis.  They were centers of state administration and 
trading locations that were parasitical on the villages” (154).
But such diachronic study is not sufficient to describe a social structure at any particular 
point in history.  Ahistorical, synchronic analysis is required as well.  Althusser argues that the 
means to synchronic analysis is provided by Marx’s “theory of the structure of a mode of produc-
tion,” a  theory that includes 
the mechanism which makes the result of a history’s production exist as a society; 
it is therefore the mechanism which gives this product of history, that is precisely 
the society-product he is studying, the property of producing the “society effect” 
which makes this result exist as a society, and not as a heap of sand, an ant-hill, a 
workshop or a mere collection of men.  (“From Capital” 65, emphasis original)
This “mechanism of the production of the ‘society effect’” is complex.  The work of the struc-
tural, synchronic, social analysis upon which Althusser insists
is only complete when all the effects of the mechanism have been expounded, 
down to the point where they are produced in the form of the very effects that con-
stitute the concrete, conscious or unconscious relations of the individuals to the 
society as a society, i.e., down to the effects of the fetishism of ideology (or 
‘forms of social consciousness’…), in which men consciously or unconsciously 
live their lives, their projects, their actions, their attitudes and their functions, as 
social.  (“From Capital” 66, emphasis original)
The largest question, then, that Marxism addresses is the mechanism by which individuals come 
to find themselves linked together in a society.  I use the term mechanism here because Althusser 
himself uses it.  As we have seen, E. P. Thompson ridicules him for reducing complex human 
interactions to a mechanism.  Perhaps Althusser’s word choice is infelicitous, but it fits his 
insistence that Marxist theory includes not only a philosophy but a science: the science of history 
and, by extension to the synchronic analysis to which its practitioners are also called, the science 
of society (Althusser, “Philosophy” 17).
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2. A Shepherd’s Place within the Relations of Production in the Highlands of Canaan 
The Marxist theory I have so far summarized dictates that to uncover more than the trace 
of AmosI that exists in Amos, we must comprehend him socially, materially, in terms of  the rela-
tions of production through which he and others corporately produced not only their material 
necessities but also the “complex hierarchy of [their] non-physical needs” and their sense of 
belonging to a socially organized species.  This understanding is necessary to establish the class 
position from which the social critique attributed to AmosI originated.  As the ambiguity con-
cerning his prophetic status indicates, this is not an simple task.  It is, moreover, one that is fur-
ther complicated by an ambiguity concerning his pastoral activities, an ambiguity we are about to 
explore.
At the outset of this study I state my assumption “that the literary Amos the text embodies 
has been shaped to serve certain sociopolitical interests” (2 above), a process upon which I dwell 
in detail in Chapter 3.  Before doing so, however, AmosI  must be theorized to extricate him from 
a text that misconstrues him in the very process of representation.  For reasons adduced in Chap-
ter 1, this process of extrication involves a high degree of speculation.  There is no way to verify 
the results.  But  they can at least be tested by putting the words attributed to AmosL into the 
mouth of the theorized AmosI.  If they ring true, then we may be on to something.  May is 
normally the best one can hope for in this type of speculating.
2.1. A Herdsman and a Dresser of Sycomore Trees
As for AmosI’s place in the relations of production, I maintain the position adopted in my 
earlier paper that he actually was a shepherd, and I focus upon the implications of that.11  Most 
scholars who address the question of AmosI’s occupation study the text to determine what it 
might reveal about biblical prophets.  Few have ever taken it up to determine what it might have 
to say about biblical shepherds.  Andrew Mein rightly observes that “[g]iven the shepherd's 
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11 Some of the material on AmosI’s occupation draws upon my unpublished essay, “‘A 
Herdsman and a Dresser of Sycamore Trees’: Notes toward a Reading of the Book of Amos in 
the Light of Pastoralist Experience,” in which I discuss the textual ambiguity concerning the type 
of pastoralist AmosI was, a herdsman or a shepherd.  I conclude he was a shepherd, a conclusion 
I stand by in this study without revisiting my earlier arguments.  I am occasionally constrained to 
use the term herdsman because it is the best translation for רקב (boqer) in 7.14, a word at the 
heart of the ambiguity just mentioned.  More frequently, I use the term pastoralist.  It typically 
appears in my sources as a word applying to the activities of either herdsmen and shepherds. 
Regardless of that, I consistently conceptualize AmosI as a shepherd throughout this study.
familiar place in the biblical landscape, it is surprising how rarely commentators take an interest 
in the practices of animal husbandry that lie behind biblical stories and metaphors” (496).  How-
ever, some earlier critics did allow their imaginations to dwell upon AmosI as a shepherd.  For 
instance, in 1922 Julius Brewer stated his belief that AmosI
was not a professional prophet but a plain shepherd and dresser of sycamore trees 
in Tekoa, Judah.  His mind was wonderfully clear, his moral nature finely devel-
oped, his spiritual sensitiveness singularly alert.  He lived in the solitude of the 
steppe.  In the silence of the desert he meditated on important problems, pondered 
till a great fear came upon him, a dark presentiment of impending disaster; he 
brooded over it until he was in the ecstatic state, where his feelings crystallized 
into a vision in which Yahweh would have destroyed Israel by a locust plague, if 
Amos had not interceded for them.  (87)
Although Brewer imagines AmosI living as a shepherd “in the solitude of the steppe,” the whole 
tendency of his speculation is to determine the origin of Amos’s prophetic activity and voice. 
But Amos denies—or seems to deny, depending upon how one construes the text—that he is 
what Brewer calls “a professional prophet.”  What if, after all, AmosI were simply “a herdsman 
[or shepherd] and a dresser of sycamore trees” and nothing else?
The issue is complicated by the superscription, which, in Wolff’s view, appeared some 
150 years after the Amos material began to coalesce (108, 117–8).  It states that Amos was among 
the םדקנ (noqOδim) of Tekoa (1.1).  At this point the RSV does render the word as shepherds, 
but, as I indicate previously (34 above), this translation may be a bit misleading.  The root shows 
up in only one other place in the Bible (2 Kgs 3.4), this time in the singular (דקנ, noqed), where it 
characterizes King Mesha of Moab in his pastoral pursuits, which he conducted on a substantial 
scale.  At this point the RSV renders the word as sheep-breeder,12 a better choice than shepherd, 
for—whatever else he may have been—King Mesha of Moab was certainly not a shepherd. 
Before he “rebelled against the king of Israel” of his day (2 Kgs 3.5), he had to deliver to him an 
annual tribute of “a hundred thousand lambs, and the wool gathering of a hundred thousand 
lambs” (3.4).
The most convincing explanation I have found as to why someone like Mesha would be 
called a noqed is supplied by Murtonen.  He points out that a modern Arabic cognate of noqed, 
naqqad, means shepherd, upon which he elaborates:
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12 The JPS and Wolff (116) use sheepbreeders or sheep breeders respectively to translate 
noqOδim in Amos 1.1.  Andersen and Freedman use sheep raisers (xxv).
[T]he meaning “sheep-raiser” is very easy to derive from the original meaning of 
the root nqd “to puncture”.  We know from the OT that the ancient Israelites 
marked their slaves with an aul (Ex. xxi 6).  What is more natural than to suppose 
that they marked also their sheep to distinguish them from those of other cattle-
raisers?  The meaning of the root nqd fits very well the sense of such a marking. 
(170–71) 
As I stated in my previous study,
[i]f puncture were the original meaning of the word — and if the Deuteronomic 
scribe who provided this description had a sense of that — it could mean that a דקנ 
was a sheepman who branded his flock.  He would do this rather than keeping 
them in pens.  This would explain its application to Mesha, who simply had too 
many sheep to keep them in folds.  By necessity, they would need to range free. 
Branding would be the only viable option to identify them and to discourage theft. 
(“Herdsman” 10)
If a noqed when applied to someone in the livestock business originally distinguished a 
puncturer or brander, its use may imply that the person so designated had so many sheep that he 
had to resort to this practice out of necessity.
Amos’s description as a noqed has fueled millennia of speculation that he was something 
more than a labourer who tended sheep.  An early Jewish tradition holds that Amos owned not 
only the flocks he tended but also the sycomore trees he cultivated (Cathcart, Mahler and 
McNamara 91; Neusner 104).13  Moreover, various cross-cultural studies of the occupational 
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13 The question of what a םימקׁש סלב (a dresser of sycamore trees, boles ¯Iqmim) may 
have been is even more vexed than that of a noqed.  It has produced at least one doctoral thesis in 
its own right, that by Steiner, who reviews the ancient and medieval interpretive history of the 
phrase.  It is generally agreed that םימקׁש (¯Iqmim) denotes a relative of the common fig tree (3). 
Since the word sycamore also “is applied to unrelated trees in America and England” (3–4), 
Steiner uses sycomore to designate the Palestinian fig tree with which Amos was involved.  I fol-
low this procedure.
The interpretation of the present participle סלב is much more complicated.  Not only is it 
a hapax legomenon (a word appearing only once in the Jewish Bible) but, as Steiner observes, 
“even its root is unattested elsewhere in the Bible” (2).  He discusses the Septuagint’s rendering 
of םימקׁש סלב as κνι'ζων συκα΄μινα, which, he says, is best translated as “‘a scratcher of sycomore 
figs’” (7).  Although various explanations have been advanced over centuries of exegesis to 
explain the ancient practice of gashing sycomore figs prior to their harvest, recent experiments 
have demonstrated that “gashing stimulates the production of ethylene, a gas that is used com-
mercially for the ripening of oranges, bananas, etc.  With the sycomore fig, it acts as a growth 
roles signified by the Arabic, Babylonian, and Ugaritic cognates for noqed connect it to some 
position within a ruling establishment.  For instance, Bic contends that noqOδim “had a cultic 
function that may have extended to the practice of augury” (293–6).  Craigie goes beyond this to 
argue that as large scale “sheep managers” most noqOδim were “servants of a king,” some of 
whom “reported to a High Priest” (33).  Rosenbaum concludes that Amos as a noqed
could have been some sort of district supervisor of royal herds since דֵקׁנ indicates 
no ordinary shepherd.  The use of the plural םיִדְִקׁנ makes it possible that there were 
several people, perhaps a guild, with similar responsibilities in different adminis-
trative districts.  Why a group of these people should cast up in Judean Tekoa 
remains obscure. (46)
Such speculations as Rosenbaum’s remain unaccountably obscure.  How can we characterize the 
suggestions of Bic, Craigie, or Rosenbaum just summarized in respect to the light they shed upon 
AmosI?  In some other time and place, noqOδim may have been district supervisors of royal 
herds, some of whom may have reported to a high priest.  But how can anyone believe that Amos 
is such a civil servant employed by the king?  Who can read Amos’s encounter with Amaziah, 
the priest of Bethel (7.10-17), and think this—or contend that Amos and Amaziah are engaged in 
some bureaucratic turf war?
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stimulator as well as a ripener, inducing a very great increase in size and weight” (9).  However, 
influential as the Septuagint’s understanding of סלב as deriving from scratching may have been, 
it has hardly been decisive.
 Steiner also considers Rashi’s eleventh century reading of סלב as deriving from search-
ing.  This interpretation focuses upon the sycomore as a source of  timber rather than fruit. 
Sycomores were cultivated as the best local source for roof beams.  Although there have been 
still other renderings of סלב, scratching the fruit and searching for timber stock best reflect the 
most common forms of labour undertaken to enhance the sycomore’s commercial value.
After tracing the etymology and meaning of סלב in Mishnaic Hebrew and other semitic 
languages, Steiner concludes that the Septuagint’s reading of the word is too narrow.  He insists 
that the word names the tree’s fruit generally rather than any operation specifically (45).  It fol-
lows, therefore, “that Amos’ term םימקׁש סלב referred to a person that harvests the fruit of the 
sycomore” (46).  He surmises that this term distinguished someone with a horticultural rather 
than a silvicultural interest in sycomores: a putative but unattested םימקש תרוכ (cutter of 
sycomores, koreθ ¯Iqmim).  This broader meaning for which Steiner argues does not preclude 
that of the Septuagint.  After all, Steiner points out, the “gashing of the sycomore figs may well 
have been viewed as the beginning of the harvest, since the picking of the figs followed only a 
few days later” (47).
Regardless of the dramatic tension within the text itself, most commentators nevertheless 
tend to agree with Blenkinsopp, who observes that "[i]n the account of his arrest at Bethel 
[Amos] himself describes his profession as tending herds and dressing sycamore fig trees (7:14), 
which, whatever we make of it, does not warrant the image of an uneducated rustic visionary" 
(79).  Perhaps some have believed that AmosI was something more than a simple shepherd 
because he declares he was called by Yahweh to prophesy, an event marking him as a special 
person, trusted to be a divine intermediary.  Perhaps some have believed it because some editor 
thought to identify a particular collection of sayings as the words of Amos, thereby signalling 
him as a man to remember.  These are a few good reasons to think that Amos was not an ordinary 
man.
But there are other reasons to think this as well, reasons that are more subtle.  One of 
these is his very identification as a noqed that we have been discussing, which, whatever it may 
mean, is not the usual word for shepherd.  That term, הער (roIh), does appear twice in Amos (1.2, 
3.12) but is never applied to him personally.  At the very least, the application of the unusual 
term noqed to AmosI suggests that he was an unusual shepherd.  The fact that the only analogue 
the Bible provides for fleshing out the term is King Mesha of Moab and his pursuits has had a 
very subtle but persistent impact upon colouring the interpretation of what sort of shepherd 
AmosI may have been and to which class he may have belonged.  Although Amos condemns 
domestic crimes against the poor, there is nothing in the biographical fragment of  his encounter 
with Amaziah (7.10-17) to suggest that he himself is affected by the depredations he denounces. 
Although he identifies himself as a working person, he seems curiously abstracted from the fray. 
The question arises of the basis upon which Amos qualifies as a spokesperson for the poor.  Is it 
as a boqer—conceivably as one of them—or as a noqed—one who acts, perhaps, from a sense of 
noblesse oblige?  To address this question, we need to think more deliberately about pastoral pur-
suits in the highlands of Canaan.14
2.2. Shepherds as Transhumant Pastoral Nomads
When we think of shepherding, I believe we have generally been conditioned by pastoral 
conventions to think of sheep grazing in a field with the shepherd more or less loafing around 
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14 The highlands of Canaan, where the biblical kingdoms of Israel and Judah were 
situated, comprise the heartland of greater biblical Israel.  The hill country west of the depression 
of the Dead Sea and the River Jordan, these highlands have traditionally been identified as the 
homeland of Yahweh-worshiping tribes named, from north to south, Manasseh, Ephraim, Ben-
jamin, and Judah.
with a crook.  More properly, such a stationary enterprise should be called sheeptending, for the 
herding involved is minimal.  However, the invariable summer drought in the highlands of 
Canaan (Hopkins 80) necessitated that many biblical-era shepherds in the region be quite 
involved in actual herding.  In discussing early settlement patterns in the region, Gottwald argues 
that herdsmen as well as shepherds were typically transhumant pastoral nomads (Tribes 435-63), 
transhumance being a technical term meaning movement across the ground that he defines as 
referring “to all pastoral nomadism in which there is a seasonal movement of livestock to regions 
of different climate” (444–45).
Regardless of what the superscription to Amos says, Rosenbaum is quite right to be 
puzzled as to why the noqOδim he construes to have been administrators should have been “cast 
up in Judean Tekoa” (46).  Mesha-scale noqOδiming does not fit the highlands of Canaan.  Nei-
ther the land itself nor the necessity of annual migration allows for sheep raising on Mesha’s 
scale.  That requires land more suitable to the enterprise, land in the Mishor, for instance, that 
remarkably level plain of gently rolling country famous for its sheep in northern Moab where 
Mesha undoubtedly set up.  If noqOδim were the ruling-class types that Bic, Craigie, and Rosen-
baum argue, they need not have established themselves on marginal lands requiring 
transhumance.  Sheep raising in the highlands of Canaan was set up on a scale much humbler 
than that of Mesha, a scale insufficiently remunerative to allow for the presence of  a managerial 
class of sheep breeders employing manual labourers.  Sheep raising in the highlands required that 
shepherds take the sheep to water and pasture on a seasonal basis, a fact confirmed by Amos’s 
declaration that the Lord took him “from following the flock” (7.15) rather than from the midst 
of it.  I argue that AmosI was himself a small-holder engaged in the actual physical work of 
shepherding and sycomore dressing.
A key to theorizing the social significance of small holding shepherds such as AmosI is 
transhumance.  The seasonal movement required of them would not be random.  They would 
have sought to reduce their risks by determining the best routes to follow on the basis of ecologi-
cal, economic, and political factors.15  As itinerants, they would also have developed functions 
beyond providing meat and wool gathering to secure themselves a welcome in the places they 
visited, functions that would have caused their visits to be anticipated.  As Amos 7.14 suggests, 
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15 In my earlier paper on Amos I study the geography of the ancient Near East to 
determine the routes an eighth-century shepherd from the highlands of Canaan would have likely 
followed.  Not only do I agree with Wolff (150–1), Cohen (155–6), and Haran (278) that Amos 
describes only contemporary events, but I go beyond them to argue that they are events that a 
small holding shepherd might very well have seen on his annual peregrinations.
they may have provided other economic services such a dressing sycomores, a tree normally 
associated with the Shephelah or coastal plain that did not grow in the highlands of Canaan.16 
Although there is no necessary connection between shepherding and sycomore dressing, the two 
activities are not mutually exclusive: in fact, they could be symbiotically related. Putting sheep 
needing pasture into sycomore orchards would, as Hopkins suggests (247), manure the ground 
while shepherds picked up dead fruit—to be mixed with barley or straw to make fodder—and 
gashed the figs (Wright passim).
More generally, however, I speculate that the chief social function of shepherds for those 
they visited was to bring the news.  Perhaps unwittingly, but perhaps not, Amaziah is correct in 
calling Amos—as a shepherd—a seer, for he would have seen many things as he travelled around 
about which farmers rooted in the soil would have been curious.  And he would have told those 
farmers about the world as he witnessed it.  He would have told them about conditions elsewhere 
facing people such as themselves.  And he would have been welcomed and listened to not as an 
agent of ruling class interests—not as a noqed—but as one of themselves, as a person facing the 
same challenges and hardships that they did.
It seems incontrovertible that, as transhumant pastoral nomads, shepherds would have 
spread news.  In doing so, they inevitably comprised a specialized part of the mechanism through 
which the society effect was created.  Not only did they distribute news: inevitably, they would 
have given it a distinctive shape.  They would have edited it.  They would have arranged it in a 
particular sequence in which some aspects of what they had seen were emphasized and others 
downplayed or ignored entirely.  As we have seen, it is axiomatic in Marxist theory that the con-
sciousness according to which such shaping is accomplished depends in the last instance upon 
social being.  If shepherds generally had a sense of being hard done by, their news would have 
been shaped to reinforce similar sentiments on the part of the villagers among whom they came. 
They would have been more likely to vent their grievances than others.  The dangers attendant 
upon speaking one’s own mind “were mitigated by transhumance.  If things got too hot, the 
sheepman could move on” (Cowsill, “Herdsman” 20).  Moreover, Gottwald speculates that 
pastoral nomadism attracted people we would now call libertarian.  He sees this life
in part as a form of political resistance.  The rural segments of the populace, under 
pressure from the dominant urban centers, could relieve that pressure by moving 
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16 Zohary, in fact, assumes that the species in question “is indigenous to the southern part 
of the Coastal Plain” (69). The early Jewish tradition that AmosI owned the sycomores that he 
tended (52 above) locates them here (Cathcart, Mahler and MacNamara 91) or “in the valley” 
(Neusner 104).
toward pastoral specialization.  Movable flocks and herds were less easily taxed 
than real property.  The periodic trek over the steppe carried the nomads beyond 
the normal reach of the police power of the state and made impressment into the 
army less likely.  Nomads who moved over regions that lay between two conflict-
ing central authorities could parlay advantages by playing one authority against 
the other.  In short, there were possibilities in pastoral nomadism for relative 
political independence vis-a-vis the state in comparison with the farmer wholly 
tied to his land.  (Tribes 450)
Therefore, the sense of social reality that shepherds would have fostered would have accentuated 
the antagonism among the classes that Mays argues in AmosI’s day were emerging from an 
“older homogenous economic structure” (2).  They would have reinforced the conception that the 
society coming into being was, indeed, a structure in dominance marked by a network of asym-
metrical relationships in which certain elements inevitably dominate others. Depending upon 
how effectively they highlighted the contradictions implicit in such a structure, such purveyors of 
news threatened to become agents of dialectical or historical change, i.e., relevant factors in the 
production of an ideology potentially sufficient in the struggle among groups to supersede or 
alter the current relations of production.
So we return to the question whether AmosI suffered from the domestic crimes against 
the poor that Amos denounces and, if so, how.  Are the words of Amos attributable to a noqed 
chosen to deliver Yahweh’s verdict upon Israel who is himself unaffected by the depredations he 
denounces?  Or are there any traces in Amos of words that would ring true in the mouth of a con-
sciously oppressed shepherd?  I argue that there are, but, before proceeding to that argument, 
something of a digression upon reading strategy is appropriate.
3. Traces of Transhumance in Amos
3.1. Digression on Reading Strategy
Searching for traces of AmosI in Amos inevitably encourages the type of archaeological 
work discussed in Chapter 1 in which the critic attempts to neutralize the literary dimensions of 
the text beneath which AmosI is conceived to lie, to use Derrida’s term, as a man sous rature 
(under erasure).  Redaction is clearly one of these literary dimensions.  One’s views of the redac-
tion history of Amos will govern the weight assigned to various passages as evidence for AmosI. 
If one accepts Paul’s argument that Amos comes from a single, unredacted source, all passages 
will be assigned equal weight.  If, however, one follows Wolff, who distinguishes six levels of 
redaction in Amos, one will probably give greater weight to the earlier levels as being closer to 
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the living, breathing man.  I adopt this procedure myself in my earlier study.  It can lead, how-
ever, to the trap of distinguishing authentic from unauthentic oracles purely on the basis of some 
highly tenuous hypothesis about their date of origin.  For instance, those who follow Wolff will 
tend to classify the oracles against the nations that he attributes to the eighth-century “Literary 
Fixation of the Cycles” (107–8) as authentic (Damascus (1.3-5), Gaza (1.6-8), Ammon (1.13-15), 
and Moab (2.1-3)) and those that he assigns to the seventh-century “Bethel-Exposition of the 
Josianic Age” (111) as unauthentic (Tyre (1.9-10), Edom (1.11-12), and Judah (2.4-5)) while 
accepting his verdict that the oracle against Israel (2.6-16) is quasi-authentic: on the whole, it is 
eighth century, but 2.10-12 is a seventh-century interpolation (169).
The trap in such classificatory schemes is that they beg the question: authentic in what 
respect?   The common assumption seems to be that, if passages can be assigned to the eighth 
century, they can be assigned to AmosI, but, if they must be assigned to a later period, then they 
must be assigned to a scribe—despite the equally common concession that the physical labour of 
actually writing the oracles down was done at all times by scribes.  This assumption leads to two 
others: (1) that the eighth-century scribes involved with Amos were actually transcribers, whereas 
those who succeeded them worked with some creative latitude; and (2) that AmosI wandered 
around greater biblical Israel spouting oracles.  Although I do think Amos has been redacted, I do 
not think that any of its oracles are more authentic than others.  Of course, this question revolves 
around how one defines authentic and the value one assigns to the concept.  I argue in Chapter 3 
that all the oracles of Amos are the interpretive work of scribes, who, regardless of when they 
worked, did so with considerably greater creative latitude than several millennia of exegetes have 
normally suspected.  In accordance with White’s contention that historiography involves an orga-
nization of data according to conventional literary plots (11-12 above), I argue in Chapter 3 that 
these ancient scribes themselves produced a fictional approximation of the otherwise unknow-
able reality of eighth-century Israel.  Within such an assessment of the text,  the concept of 
authenticity has no function.  It serves only to identify an ideological and rhetorical ploy by 
which exegetes seek to enforce a particular view of past events.  On the other hand, I find the 
archaeological work in which investigators such as Wolff and Coote assess various strata of 
redaction as being authentic expressions of ideology obtaining at various periods to be thought-
fully provocative exercises.  However, because such speculation does not pertain to my own criti-
cal approach, it suffices to say that, as a rule, I will not distinguish between oracles according to 
some theory of redaction.
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3.2. Something There Is that Does Not Love a Wall
I argue that there are traces in Amos of words that would ring true in the mouth of a con-
sciously oppressed shepherd.  These traces are not to be found in what we can deduce of the for-
mal structure of Amos, i.e., in the self-conscious literary product produced by the scribal shaping 
of AmosL from more original materials.  They are to be found, rather, in the images and tone of 
Amos, which preserve something of the prototypical social consciousness upon which Amos is 
based, a social consciousness rooted in the tenuous experience of transhumant pastoral 
nomadism.
As for images, Amos is obsessed with building projects of all kinds.  He is fascinated 
with cities (3.6 (twice), 4.6, 4.7 (twice), 4.8 (twice), 5.3, 6.8, 7.17, 9.14), with their environs and 
appurtenances.  He is fascinated with sanctuaries (7.9, 7.13), temples (8.3), and associated high 
places (7.9).  He focuses upon structural details: gate bars (1.5), capitals (9.1), and thresholds 
(9.1).  Depending upon how one construes some notoriously difficult Hebrew in 7.7-8, his 
visions may also include a carpenter's tool, the plumb line.17
Above all, Amos is engrossed with houses, strongholds, and walls.  The word house 
appears in some form 27 times.  In some instances, these are concrete images of buildings.  He 
speaks of great houses,  a winter house,  a summer house, and houses of ivory (all 3.15), as well 
as houses of hewn stone (5.11) and a house of the realm (s. הכלממ תיב, beθ mammOl&x&h: 7.13; 
translated “‘temple of the kingdom’” in the RSV).  He speaks generically of the great house and 
the little house (both 6.11).  He speaks of being “‘in one house’” (6.9) or “‘in the innermost parts 
of the house’” and of bringing bones “‘out of the house’” (both 6.10).  Most frequently, the word 
is used to designate a monarchy or a people.  In the former sense, Amos speaks of the house of 
Hazael (1.4) or the house of Jeroboam (7.9).  In the latter, he speaks many times of the house of 
Israel (5.1, 5.3, 5.4, 5.25, 6.1, 6.14, 7.10, 9.9) as well as the house of Jacob (3.13, 9.8), the house 
of Joseph (5.6), and the house of Isaac (7.16).  It may be argued that the use in these instances is 
figurative, but the word for the tangible object remains on the scroll.
  Amos is also preoccupied with תונמרא (pl. armOnoθ), which always appears in the plural 
and which the RSV and Wolff  rather quaintly translate as strongholds but which the JPS renders 
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17 There is no consensus what the word ךנא (Onak) that the RSV here translates as plumb 
line means.  It appears four times in 7.7-8 but nowhere else in the Bible.  Paul claims that 
Landsberger has definitively shown that it means tin and offers an interpretation based upon this 
meaning, but he concludes, for reasons he does not spell out, that “it is no wonder that the pro-
phet, as well as his exegetes, remains baffled by its symbolism” (233–5, qtd. fr. 235).  Its fre-
quent repetition suggests that it is a word play, the precise meaning of which we may never sort 
out.  Word play does appear in the vision of “a basket of summer fruit” reported in 8.1-3.
as fortresses and Andersen and Freedman as citadels.  The word appears 12 times.  The strong-
holds are everywhere: Damascus (“‘the strongholds of Ben-ha’dad’” (1.4)), Gaza (1.7), Tyre 
(1.10), Edom (“‘the strongholds of Bozrah’” (1.12)), Rabbah (1.14), Moab (“‘the strongholds of 
Ker’ioth’” (2.2)), Judah (“‘the strongholds of Jerusalem’” (2.5), Assyria (3.9), Egypt (3.9), and, 
presumably, Israel (3.10, 3.11, 6.8).  The walls show up everywhere as well.  City walls (s. המוה, 
hom&h) stretch from Damascus (assumed by the gate bars of 1.5), Gaza (1.7), Tyre (1.10) to 
Rabbah (1.14) and include the wall by which or on which Yahweh is standing in the plumb line 
(?) vision (7.7).  A house wall (s. ריק, kir) shows up in 5.19.
Amos’s fascination with building projects is that of obsessive hatred.  They are targets of 
Yahweh’s wrath against which he will wreak vengeance upon the various nations whose crimes 
Amos denounces.  In the initial oracles against the nations, for instance, through Amos Yahweh 
promises to visit every nation mentioned other than Israel with fire.  As for Gaza (1.7) or Tyre 
(1.10), he promises to “‘send a fire upon the wall’” of each respectively, a fire that in turn “‘shall 
devour her strongholds.’”  The other nations are promised some variation of this arrangement 
(Damascus (1.4), Edom (1.12), Ammon (1.14),  Moab (2.2),  and Judah (2.5)).  Some nations are 
promised other things as well, but, with the exception of Israel, the common denominator in all 
these oracles is wall- and stronghold-devouring fire.  Moreover, although the destruction by fire 
of walls and strongholds is threatened only in the oracles against the nations, a more general and 
ominous threat of fire hangs over the rest of Amos as well.  Hearers or readers are admonished to 
“‘Seek the LORD and live, lest he break out like fire in the house of Joseph, and it devour’” (5.6), 
while in a vision of cosmic dimensions Amos declares: “Thus the Lord GOD showed me: 
behold, the Lord GOD was calling for a judgment by fire, and it devoured the great deep and was 
eating up the land” (7.4).
Neither fire nor walls nor strongholds, however, are mentioned in the oracle against 
Israel.  What is portended here is the coming of a day when it will be pressed down and 
paralyzed:
13  “Behold, I will press you down in
your place,
As a cart full of sheaves presses
down.
14  Flight shall perish from the swift,
and the strong shall not retain his
strength,
nor shall the mighty save his life;
15  he who handles the bow shall not
stand,
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and he who is swift of foot shall
not save himself,
nor shall he who rides the horse
save his life;
16  and he who is stout of heart among
the mighty
shall flee away naked in that day,”
                             Says the LORD.  (2.13-16)
The notoriously difficult Hebrew of 2.13 has been susceptible to a range of interpretive transla-
tions.  For instance, Wolff reads it to mean that a heavily laden cart presses down and breaks 
open the soft earth (171).  Significantly, however, he sees this as a simile for earthquake, the sec-
ond great agency of destruction in Amos.  Earthquake is consonant not only with the action of 
shaking down that the RSV translators seem to have in mind but also with the paralysis that 
verses 13-15 portray.  On this reading, the phrase “stout of heart” (2.16) is ironical.  Those 
“among the mighty” who survive the earthquake do so only with their lives, having been reduced 
to fleeing the wrath of Yahweh as completely and shamefully naked as the poor who once fled 
them.  Anyone who has lived through earthquakes knows how difficult it is to move when the 
ground is shaking.  Although earthquake brings paralysis to Israel in the oracles against the 
nations, it brings a wholesale shattering of structures in the rest of Amos.  In a theophany, Yah-
weh is depicted as the  “GOD of hosts, […] who touches the earth and it melts, and all who dwell 
in it mourn, and all of it rises like the Nile, and sinks again, like the Nile of Egypt” (9.5, cf. 8.8). 
When Yahweh so commands, “the great house shall be smitten into fragments, and the little 
house into bits” (6.11).  
Amos is full of such shattered structures, but it is not always clear to what to attribute 
them.  For instance, 9.1 states that “I saw the LORD standing beside the altar, and he said, ‘Smite 
the capitals until the thresholds shake, and shatter them on the heads of all the people’” (9.1). 
Here some other agent of destruction is working, probably the invading armies who introduce the 
sounds of battle heard in the book.  “‘Moab,’” we are promised, “‘shall die amid uproar, amid 
shouting and the sound of the trumpet’” (2.2).  And although the strongholds of Rabbah will be 
devoured by fire, this will be accompanied “‘with shouting in the day of battle, with a tempest in 
the day of the whirlwind’” (1.14).  Human and cosmic forces will work in concert18 to destroy 
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18 It amounts to the same thing if one reads tempest and whirlwind as metaphors for 
shouting and battle: the parallelism of the two phrases emphasizes that the human agent is 
functioning as a cosmic force.
not only the Ammonites of Rabbah but also the Israelites, for through Amos Yahweh declares 
that  “‘I will command, and shake the house of Israel among all the nations as one shakes with a 
sieve, but no pebble shall fall upon the earth.19 / All the sinners of my people shall die by the 
sword, who say, “Evil shall not overtake or meet us”’” (9.9-10).
The destruction of physical structures does not exhaust the punishments to be meted out 
to those who have incurred Amos’s (Yahweh’s)  wrath, nor do fire, earthquake, and invading 
armies exhaust the agents of this wrath.  These extend to the “recurring fourfold pattern of 
‘pestilence, sword, famine, and captivity,’ a cluster of threats that are said to be YHWH’s charac-
teristically ferocious manifestation of sovereignty over recalcitrant subjects” (Brueggemann, 
Reverberations 145).  But it is remarkable that the physical structures just surveyed predominate 
as the targets for destruction throughout Amos—and equally remarkable that they are the types of 
structures that would kindle the wrath of a hard-done-by small holding transhumant pastoral 
nomad.  If there is someone who does not love a wall—or strongholds-fortresses-citadels, for that 
matter—that someone is a person dependent upon transhumance for livelihood.  It is not so much 
that walls enclose the ground but that they block the roads.  In biblical times, the southern Levant 
never counted for much in terms of the power dynamics of the Middle East.  But it occupied a 
strategic position between Egypt and the powers to the north.  It was traversed by north-south 
trade routes upon which caravans travelled to market and shepherds, so I speculate, travelled to 
pasture.  Because these trade routes could be and frequently were paths for invading armies, they 
were heavily fortified at strategic spots for defensive purposes.  These are the strongholds-
fortresses-citadels upon which Amos calls down destruction.  Amos’s grievances against the 
strongholds of other nations are not specified, but a part of his (Yahweh’s) indictment against 
Israel states that “‘They do not know how to do right, […] those who store up violence and rob-
bery in their strongholds’” (3.10-11).  If the military garrisons straddling the roads throughout the 
southern Levant were also administrative centres, as there is evidence that the strongholds of 
Israel were becoming in the eighth century (Dearman 95), it seems likely that these were places 
where the surplus labour of shepherds and other transhumants was extracted in the form of tolls, 
customs, and other taxes.  Given the prickly, libertarian streak that Gottwald speculates charac-
terized transhumant pastoralists (56 above), it is altogether probable that they would have 
labelled such strongholds as places of “violence and robbery” that they would relish seeing 
destroyed.
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19 I accept Wolff’s gloss that “[w]e must … think here of a sieve with coarse meshing, 
such as is used on the threshing floor; the grains fall through, but that which is useless—straw, 
stones, clods of earth—is retained” and cannot escape the shaking action (349).
The language of Amos is hardly that of a noqed such as Mesha.  Fortuitously, we have an 
extra-biblical example of such noqed language on a stele Mesha erected at an entrance to his 
kingdom.  Among other things he proclaims that
It was I (who) built Qarhoh, the wall of the forests and the wall of the citadel; I 
also built its gates and I built its towers and I built the king's house, and I made 
both of its reservoirs for water inside the town.  And there was no cistern inside 
the town at Qarhoh, so I said to all the people, “Let each of you make a cistern for 
himself in his house!”  And I cut beams for Qarhoh with Israelite captives.  I built 
Aroer, and I made the highway in the Arnon (valley); I built Beth-baoth, for it had 
been destroyed; I built Bezer — for it lay in ruins — with fifty men of Dibon, for 
all Dibon is (my) loyal dependency.
And I reigned [in peace] over the hundred towns which I had added to the 
land.  And I built […] Medeba and Beth-diblathan and Beth-baal-meon, and I set 
there the […] of the land. (Allbright 320–1, italics, brackets, and bracketed 
material in original)
This proclamation suggests values that run exactly counter to those of Amos.  Mesha prides him-
self upon having built the very type of structures that Amos would see violently destroyed: he 
proclaims that it is he who built the walls (including those of the citadel), gates, towers, reser-
voirs, cities, and highways of the realm in which the travelers now reading the stele find them-
selves.  Indeed, he restored some places, such as Bezer, from ruins.  To crown this construction 
programme, he built the great house from which he now rules as king.  This is a far cry from a 
vision emerging, as Brewer would have it, from “the solitude of the steppe.”   It is more in line 
with that of that same King Uzziah whose name appears in the superscription to Amos, who 
“built towers in the wilderness and hewed out many cisterns, for he had large herds, both in the 
Shephelah and the plain” (2 Chr 26.10).
3.3. Class Animus in Amos
Traces of the consciously oppressed shepherd also appear in the class animus according 
to which the wrath of Amos (Yahweh) is distilled in a tone of almost unrelieved accusation and 
threat.  I concede that in some instances entire populations are threatened.  “‘[T]he inhabitants 
from the Valley of Aven,’” for instance, will be “‘cut off,’” and “‘the people of Syria shall go 
into exile to Kir’” (1.5).  But he “that holds the scepter from Beth-eden” (1.5) or “from 
Ash’kelon” is particularly singled out for punishment.  From among the Ammonites, it is the 
king who “shall go into exile, he and his princes together” (1.15).  Who, after all, built the 
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strongholds to be fired and the houses to be smashed: the winter houses and the summer houses, 
the great houses and the houses of ivory?  I have noted that the oracle against Israel suggests 
earthquake (61 above), but it is the swift, the strong, the mighty (2.14), and the stout of heart 
(2.16) who are to be particularly afflicted.  Some of these are warriors: we are told that “‘he who 
handles the bow shall not stand’” and that he “‘who rides the horse [shall not] save his life’” 
(2.15).  But who employs these warriors and whose interests have they been hired to defend?  
Among the Israelites, the finger points to those accused in the indictments with which this 
chapter opens, indictments of domestic crimes against the poor.  By implication, the they being 
accused—the they who “sell the righteous for silver” (2.6) or “trample the head of the poor into 
the dust of the earth” (2.7)—are the wealthy or relatively wealthy, most probably those who are 
benefiting the most from the “social revolution” in which, as Mays remarks, “older homogenous 
economic structure of Israel” was giving “way to sharp distinctions of wealth and privilege” (39 
above).  The finger points to the emerging upper class then consolidating its rule in Israel.
In Chapter 5 I discuss Amos as a fantasy of violence in greater depth.  At this point, I 
stress that the tone of accusation and threat against the ruling classes of various states 
exemplifies the manner in which a hard-done-by small holding transhumant pastoral nomad 
might well have vented his spleen.  Moreover, it confirms that whoever did speak this way was 
no noqed.  There is no hint here of the pride manifest on Mesha’s stele.  Nor is there any hint of 
joy in the life that has been thus far led.  Indeed, hatred of the good life that some lead is one of 
the tone’s more salient aspects.
4. Conclusion
In my earlier search for AmosI, I conclude that he was not originally from Tekoa.  I 
adduce some linguistic evidence to support this contention, but I base it principally upon the 
argument that the language and themes of Amos reflect the theological traditions of the northern 
kingdom of Israel rather than the southern kingdom of Judah, where Tekoa is located.  If AmosI 
wound up in Tekoa, I reason, he did not start out from there.  Having now reconsidered AmosI’s 
origins from a class rather than national perspective, I conclude that  AmosI was not a noqed, not, 
at least, as we can make sense of that word from what we can construe from cross-cultural 
studies and the life and times of Mesha of Moab.  
As we have seen, however, even ancient Jewish tradition holds that Amos was a man of 
means, that he owned not only the flocks he tended but the sycomore trees he cultivated (52 
above).  If I am right in my contention that AmosI was originally a small holding transhumant 
shepherd, it is nevertheless true that in fairly short order he came to be seen as a noqed: that is, he 
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came to be seen less and less as a man of the people with a social consciousness materially 
determined in the last instance by his class position and more and more as an idealized, individu-
alized rich man with a conscience. Why a person with the court connections theorized by Bic, 
Craigie, and Rosenbaum should be wandering around Israel expressing himself with images and 
in tones of violent discontent has apparently led very few to question whether his designation as a 
noqed accurately reflects his position in the relations of production of his place and time.  In the 




The Production of AmosL
Over the past decade I have been pondering several intriguing questions.  One simply 
asks, “Who read the Book of Job?”  It does not inquire about Job’s audience since its incorpora-
tion into the biblical compendium.  It asks, rather, who read it when the ink was just dry on the 
scroll, way back before the common era, in some tributary agricultural backwater of an Asiatic 
empire?  It inquires about Job’s intended audience, the group of readers to whom it was 
originally directed.
The other question asks: “Why did ancient Israelites and Judahites collect and preserve 
prophecy?”  More specifically, it asks what motivated them to collect texts such as Amos, which 
so stridently castigates ruling class practices and so violently fantasizes the destruction of the pre-
sent order?  Moreover, it asks what enabled them to preserve such texts, quite possibly in the 
same archives where government records were kept?
Both questions involve literary production.  I raise them to introduce the search for 
AmosL, Amos as a literary product, with which, I argue, AmosI, the historical kernel of Amos, 
stands in dialectic tension.  In some circles, the proposition that Amos is a literary product—a 
product of human labour—is highly contentious.  For Amos is not just any text but a sacred one. 
Its canonization has mystified1 it in a way that may affect our ability to comprehend and study it 
as a product of human labour in the same way that we would, for instance, the poems of James 
Merrill or the novels of Ian McEwan.  Marxism has evolved a descriptive theory that helps to 
clarify such complications, one that I take up in this chapter in the ensuing discussion of literary 
production as an ideological practice and of Amos specifically as a literature of alienation reflect-
ing the political hegemony of the existing ruling class.  At the outset, however, I stress that I pose 
the two questions with which this chapter begins to introduce the discussion of Amos as a literary 
product and to suggest what kind of literature it originally was and how and why it came to be 
written.  I turn now to consider the first of these questions: “Who read the Book of Job?” 
1. Who Read the Book of Job?
I have thought about this question in several ways.  It is fair to speculate that the audience 
in question would not have been large.  Before the advent of books and printing, the slow speed 
and high price of producing manuscripts ensured that any reading public would be small.  We 
  
 66 
1 I am not necessarily using this term pejoratively.  Theologically, the sacred nature of 
these texts is frequently accounted to be a mystery of faith. 
might assume, as well, that another factor limiting audience size in greater biblical Israel would 
have been a low literacy rate, but Richard Hess adduces evidence to the contrary by pointing out 
the numerous “[e]pigraphic and biblical attestations to the early and ongoing presence of readers 
and writers at many levels of [greater] Israelite society” (346).  The Bible, after all, was neither 
written nor compiled in a vacuum.  The diversity of its contents and the centuries of history they 
reflect testify to an enduring literary culture.
Despite its disarmingly simple plot, Job is not popular literature.  It poses philosophical 
questions that have not lost their currency since the day it appeared.  The book was intended for 
people like the person who wrote it, a subgroup, I speculate, of the persons now generally 
labelled as scribes.  Scribes were professional writers and readers.  Undoubtedly, many per-
formed routine clerical and administrative tasks within monarchical government, in which 
secular and sacred tasks were not distinguished.  They maintained official correspondence, kept 
records and accounts, collected and dispersed supplies, and performed the daily administrative 
tasks of government from central or regional centres.  But some, I argue, were undoubtedly 
educators, wise men who as part and parcel of their place in the relations of production 
deliberately reflected upon issues that included the origins and traditions of greater biblical Israel. 
A compendium like the Bible, a literary labour of centuries, attests to their existence, for it could 
not have been produced without scholarly institutions to foster and sustain the work.
The book of Job, I suspect, was originally written by and for those involved in such 
institutions: teachers, for the most part, whose professional lives were also engaged in the pro-
duction of knowledge.  It was taken up and studied principally by the relative few engaged in 
their various and sundry projects within an ancient academy.  If you queried peddlers sitting in a 
marketplace outside its walls about the Book of Job, I suspect you would have drawn many blank 
stares.  Job was a literature for the erudite.
This question interests me in the context of the present study for several reasons.  First, I 
speculate that the same scholarly, scribal types whom I argue wrote and first read the book of Job 
also wrote and first read the book of Amos—and that they did so in consequence of their usual 
employment.  This, in turn, has provided me with a conceptual framework in which to articulate 
a process by which Amos may have been produced, one that accounts for what I take to have 
been normal scribal functions at its time of composition.  Second, the question of who read the 
Book of Job and, by extension, the Book of Amos leads to the further question of what those 
original readers would have taken these texts to be. I submit that they would have taken them to 
be what we would now call literature of high culture.  Regardless of their quality, however, the 
point I am arguing is that they would have taken them to be literature, i.e., to be a product of 
human labour intended to address and to meet some human need: in their case, the need to 
  
 67 
identify and associate themselves with an idealized historical tradition.  The assertion, however, 
that Amos and, by extension, other prophetic biblical books are scribal literature of the type that I 
suspect Job to be is highly contentious.  To elaborate upon this assertion, I now turn to the sec-
ond question upon which I have been pondering for so long: “Why did ancient Israelites and 
Judahites collect and preserve prophecy?”
2. “Why Did Ancient Israelites and Judahites Collect and Preserve Prophecy?”: The 
Production of Amos
Job and Amos clearly differ generically.  Few people, I suspect, would fail to recognize 
that Job is a didactic story.  Amos, on the other hand, introduces itself as a collection of “the 
words of Amos” (1.1).  Indeed, the question I am now considering assumes this in its very terms. 
Compared to the common view about the Book of Job, it assumes that Amos is more a transcrip-
tion than a literary product.  Althusser, we will recall, states that all human products result from 
social practice involving a labour of transformation (46 above).  The common view of Amos is 
that the scribal labour involved in its production primarily involved the transformation of audible 
into written signs.  This hardly qualifies as a labour of literary production as I have defined it, 
which involves transforming experience into meaning by impressing some pattern upon it 
according to the various lexical, syntactical, tropological, rhetorical, and other choices governing 
the organization of a text.  Granted, those who view Amos as a transcription will admit that the 
scribes involved did undertake the literary work of arranging the oracles into a sequence.  By and 
large, however, the scribes’ function is seen to have been secretarial.  The literary work must be 
assigned to whoever produced the oracles, either Amos or Yahweh himself, in which case Amos 
is seen to function only as a messenger.
Critics who do address the production of Amos tend to view the scribes’ function as a 
hybrid of secretarial and literary labour.  For example, Wolff’s attribution of three of his six 
strata of redaction to later centuries clearly views the scribal work therein entailed as literary pro-
duction.  But, for the most part, he proceeds on the assumption that the core of Amos is a tran-
scription.  As we have seen, he assumes the existence of an Old School of Amos that included at 
least one eyewitness of AmosI’s words and activities (10 above).  He attributes his third stratum 
of redaction to this school, a stratum that includes Amos’s dispute with Amaziah (7.10-17) upon 
which I have focussed much of my attention.  This school, he insists, “still had at its disposal 
remembered deeds and sayings of the prophet” (108).  He does not, however, further specify how 
it came to have access to this material.  He is even less specific as to how and by whom the 
materials in his first two strata were collected.  “For the most part,” he says, along with the 
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material in the third stratum they “derive from Amos himself and his contemporary disciples” 
(107) and leaves it at that.
Although I do think that Amos is a hybrid product of scribal secretarial and literary 
labour, I suspect Wolff’s theory of an “Old School of Amos” and possibly other contemporary 
disciples is an idealist fallacy.  His notion of the secretarial work of ancient scribes is too ethe-
realized to bear the weight an historical account demands.  A materialist analysis must make 
sense of labour output in terms of the material exigencies of the producers’ daily lives.  Highly 
speculative though it may be, the reconstruction of AmosI offered in the previous chapter has the 
virtue of not abstracting him from the social matrix in which he lived and produced the neces-
sities of life.  It uses what we can theorize about the life of a shepherd in the highlands of Canaan 
to assess both the biographical scraps we are offered about him and the words that are attributed 
to him.  In terms of those productive activities, it makes sense that, in addition to being a 
shepherd, he could also be a dresser of sycomore trees.  It makes sense that he could come 
knowledgeably and expressively to articulate an experience of oppression that poor people could 
adopt as their own.  It makes sense that he could appear at a place like Bethel to denounce that 
oppression caustically in terms of a hatred for walls, strongholds, temples, great houses, and the 
other physical symbols of an emerging ruling class consolidating its power.  Before we can sub-
scribe to an “Old School of Amos,” we should demand to know how to make similar sense of its 
members’ labour output in terms of their daily, productive activities.
Wolff does not doubt that AmosI supported himself through pastoral pursuits.  He con-
cedes that “he made his living raising livestock and as a tender of mulberry trees.”  But he does 
not doubt, for all that, that AmosI was also a prophet, despite the fact that he “declined to be 
addressed as a professional prophet,” i.e., as a member of a prophetic guild.  He also concedes 
that AmosI was peripatetic.  But he does not connect his travels to the necessities of sheep tend-
ing.  He argues, rather, for “the migratory character of [Amos’s] work” on the grounds that “he 
stirred up unrest in at least two localities, and perhaps three, of the northern kingdom”: Samaria 
(3:9; 4:1; 6:1), Bethel (7:10-17), and perhaps Gilgal (5:5).2  He writes about AmosI’s movements 
only in association with what he calls his “prophetic ministry,” as if this were the only work 
worth considering in a commentary on Amos (90).
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2 For Wolff the textual evidence for Amos’s presence in Gilgal is less compelling than for 
Bethel or Samaria.  “[N]o one contests,” he states, “the fact that Amos […] spoke out in the 
sanctuary of Bethel,” and he argues that the oracles associated with Samaria “become more 
meaningful when it is assumed that they were proclaimed” there (90).  Nothing in the text seems 
to connect Amos to Gilgal other than its appearance as a place name.
In line with his conviction that AmosI is a prophet, Wolff accords him his prophetic due: 
as befits his conception of a prophet, he has AmosI not only attracting disciples but engendering a 
school.  As I have already suggested, this aspect of Wolff’s presentation is puzzling.  How are we 
to think of these disciples who transcribed the words of AmosI: as ancient groupies following 
their guru around lest they miss a single flash of oracular inspiration?  And how are we to think 
of their school, the “Old School of Amos”: as an ancient analogue, perhaps, of the Frankfurt 
school of critical theory or the Chicago school of economics?  These questions are facetious, but 
they respond to some fuzzy thinking in Wolff that invites some level of gentle ridicule.  It is 
simply too facile, whenever the question of the production of a biblical text arises, to posit the 
existence of some school and leave it at that.  He needs to be more specific.  Can we seriously 
believe that people followed AmosI around like modern field anthropologists, taking down his 
every word?  If not, how did this “Old School of Amos” acquire its materials?  What position did 
its members occupy in the relations of production that allowed them to attend to these 
materials—that allowed and motivated them to spend time and energy on them?  And how did 
they eat while doing so?  Who sponsored this work?
A better approach to the production of Amos involves taking a more practical view of the 
daily, secretarial work of scribes.  I suspect that Amos itself does preserve an example of this 
work, one that, moreover, suggests how the memory of AmosI and his words may have been 
originally preserved.  It is the passage that introduces Amos’s dispute with Amaziah: 
10 Then Amazi’ah the priest of Bethel sent to Jerobo’am king of Israel, saying, 
“Amos has conspired [רׁשק] against you in the midst of the house of Israel; the 
land [ץרא] is not able to bear all his words.  11 For thus Amos has said, ‘Jerobo’am 
shall die by the sword, and Israel must go into exile away from his land.’”  (7.10-
11)
Whoever wrote this claims to be quoting from an official dispatch from the priest Amaziah to his 
king, Jeroboam.  There can be no doubt that Amaziah is a royal functionary.  After all, he goes on 
to describe the temple at Bethel where he serves as “the king’s sanctuary,” and he further 
qualifies it as “a temple of the kingdom” (7.13).3  The dispatch itself, the composition of which 
Amaziah would have entrusted to a scribe, has a ring of authenticity.  It is precisely the type of 
document that a very accomplished scribe would have produced in Amaziah’s behalf.  In describ-
ing AmosI’s activity at Bethel, the scribe uses the word רׁשק (q$¯ar: bind, league together, con-
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3 The temple in Bethel had a status within Israel equal to that of the temple in Jerusalem 
within Judah.
spire) to accuse him of conspiracy.  But Andersen and Freedman remark, quite correctly in my 
view, that “there is no indication that Amos was involved in political machinations to achieve the 
fulfillment of his own prophecies” (767).  In his encounter with Amaziah, AmosI is portrayed as 
a lone ranger, as many shepherds tended to be.  One cannot conspire in the singular: there must 
be co-conspirators for there to be any conspiracy at all.  But רׁשק is precisely the type of word that 
a skilled scribe would have chosen for its rhetorical effect.  By characterizing AmosI’s activities 
as conspiratorial, the scribe thereby heightens their danger—and Amaziah’s importance.  “There 
are dangerous characters roaming around here,” Amaziah seems to be telling the king, “who aim 
at your destruction.”  But he immediately reduces the tension thereby created by declaring that 
“the land [ץרא] is not able to bear all his words” (10).  Translating ץרא (IrIts) as land here seems 
misleading.  It does mean that, but it can also mean the inhabitants of a land, just as in English 
we can ask people from what land they come when inquiring about a population.  That meaning 
fits better here.4  As Andersen and Freedman point out, by using it Amaziah “assures the king 
that Amos has no popular support” (766).  The message of Amaziah to the king, therefore, 
implies that, despite these being perilous times, the people here remain loyal to us—i.e., to you 
through me—by virtue of my vigilance and my capacities.
It is, of course, impossible to determine whether Amos 7.10-11 quotes or incorporates 
material from an official dispatch verbatim.5  At the very least, however, it is possible that it 
does, for scribes such as the one we can imagine composing Amaziah’s correspondence would 
also have been responsible for archiving it against a response and for future reference.  The 
Deuteronomic History of the kingdoms of Israel and Judah (Deuteronomy through Kings) refers 
continually to what must have been a fruit of such scribal archiving, i.e., to the Chronicles of the 
Kings of Israel, which were apparently still available to those who wrote this history hundreds of 
years after the time of Amos and the fall of the northern kingdom.6
More significantly, no theory of the existence of a group of disciples such as an Old 
School of Amos is necessary to account for the recording and preserving of AmosI’s words at a 
place like Bethel.  If AmosI had felt compelled to prophesy, it seems altogether likely that he 
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4 The JPS version is better: “The country cannot endure the things he is saying.”
5 The possibility that the dispatch would have been delivered orally by a messenger does 
not preclude the archiving of its written text.
6 For most of their subsequent history, what had been the kingdoms of Israel and Judah 
remained united under succeeding empires.  Administrators in all times and places, I submit, 
have ever been loath to discard official records.
would have done so at Bethel, where cult prophets were employed and, presumably, their pro-
phecy was publicly heard at least on festive occasions.  On the other hand, if AmosI had felt com-
pelled to vent his confrontational spleen concerning burgeoning class inequalities and their social 
consequences, it also seems altogether likely that he would have done so at Bethel.  After all, as I 
have already pointed out, the sacred and the secular were not distinguished.  The seats of official 
power were identical for each.  The words of anyone assailing that power at Bethel would have 
been taken down, considered, perhaps acted upon, and then filed away, available to anyone 
among future generations of scribes who took an interest in them.
In fact, if AmosI’s words as reported in 7.11 were taken from a state archive, no theory 
that they were originally uttered or understood as prophecy is necessary to account for their their 
presence.  Any threat directed against the monarch or his realm would qualify.  They lack the for-
mulae of prophetic speech—that, among other things, attribute the messages to Yahweh—that 
typify the oracles in Amos.7  On the other hand, Amaziah’s immediate response to these words 
does confirm his belief that Amos is prophesying.  For we are told that 
12 […]Amazi’ah said to Amos, “O seer [הזח], go, flee away to the land of Judah, ` 
and eat bread there;  13 but never again prophesy at Bethel, for it is the king’s 
sanctuary, and it is a temple of the kingdom.”
But these lines clearly form no part of the quotation in 7.10-11 that precedes them.  Amaziah’s 
response returns to the thread of a narrative into which archival material has been interpolated. 
What I suspect we have here is a literary production (7.12-13) inspired by and elaborating upon a 
scribal dispatch (7.10-11), a dispatch from an archive typifying the secretarial work done by 
scribes.
This construal of scribal secretarial work in terms of writing and archiving official 
documents, in this case relating to rural discontent, puts flesh upon Wolff’s spiritualized notion 
of this same work as somehow dedicated to recording the words of recognized holy men wander-
ing around Israel.  One response, then, to the question of why ancient Israelites and Judahites col-
lected and preserved prophecy is to wonder, in turn, whether that question assumes something 
that should be demonstrated.  Did ancient Israelites and Judahites, in fact, collect prophecy?  Or 
did they create it in interpreting their own historical chronicle?  In the hindsight of history, 
Amos’s declaration that “Jerobo’am shall die by the sword, and Israel must go into exile away 
from his land” certainly seems prophetic, if we mean by that term the ability to foretell the future. 
But would it have been so understood by those who first heard it, if it were, as I suspect, uttered 
by a small-holding transhumant shepherd?  Might it not, rather, have been understood as rather 
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7  For a formal account of the basic forms of prophetic speech, see Westermann passim.
direful wishful thinking, as an exasperated venting of frustration?  Might it not, in fact, have been 
accepted as the informed opinion of a perceptive traveler able to detect a power shift in the tide 
of international affairs and to read the handwriting on the wall concerning what this likely meant 
for the future of Israel?  In view of this possibility, what is the link between Amos’s sheep tend-
ing and Amos’s prophesying?
Clearly, Wolff and other critics find this link in Amos’s own conviction that he was 
called to prophesy, which he declares immediately after denying that he is a prophet by neverthe-
less proclaiming that “the LORD took me from following the flock, and […] said to me, ‘Go, pro-
phesy to my people Israel’” (7.15).  Moreover, words attributed to him declare the necessity to 
prophesy given the parlous signs of the times and strongly imply that those who do are to be 
counted among the Lord God’s “servants the prophets” (3.3-8).  Such convictions have per-
suaded millennia of exegetes to conceptualize Amos’s life’s work primarily in terms of prophetic 
labour, a labour that was peripatetic by virtue of the command to go out and prophesy to Israel as 
a whole.  Yet this link becomes more difficult to establish as an historical datum if these words 
preserve something other than the secretarial transcription of a scribe recorded some contentious 
day when AmosI showed up at Bethel.  I suspect that the link between Amos the shepherd and 
Amos the prophet was forged in the process of scholarly reflection long after the former was 
dust.  I suspect, in fact, that Amos the prophet is principally a literary product, the result of a 
labour of transformation through which AmosI was recast as AmosL.
I am not the only person to suspect this.  I have already noted R. P. Carroll’s suspicion 
that biblical writers “helped to invent the ancient prophets as biographical figures” by assigning 
various collections of sayings to them in the superscriptions of the prophetic books (6 above). 
He goes beyond this elsewhere to argue that prophets in general were scribal inventions.  He 
points out that “[t]he problem of defining the term ‘prophet' and thereby ‘prophecy’ dogs biblical 
scholarship and undermines much of what passes for it” (“Prophecy” 209).  Considerable 
scholarly attention, such as that of Wilson and Petersen, has certainly been paid to defining pro-
phetic roles and functions in biblical times.  The text itself is not too helpful in spelling these out. 
Because prophets seem to address their contemporaries, we might assume that those con-
temporaries understood their role and function, thereby obviating any necessity of specifying it. 
However, it could be that the text is mute on the subject because its compilers had no clearer an 
idea about prophets and prophecy than we do.  Carroll, at least, suspects this was the case.  “The 
biblical traditions,” he claims,
themselves are equally unsure of, and indefinite about, what a prophet is, who is a 
prophet, and whether prophets are or are not a good thing.  That is, the Hebrew 
Bible presents so many different, ambiguous and ambivalent stories and treat-
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ments of prophets that the modern reader has to admit that ancient Israelite writers 
had no clear image of what a prophet is or should be.  (“Prophecy” 213)
To support this conclusion, Carroll summarizes scholarly work on the biblical tendency “to refer 
to all significant figures as ‘prophets’,” seeing it as a blanket term applied retroactively to any 
persons remembered to possess the oratorical power to move others, insisting that “there is no 
prima facie evidence for regarding any of these speakers as ‘prophets’ except for the secondary 
editing of the traditions and later traditional readings of the Bible” (213).  Graeme Auld, for one, 
is convinced of this.  Although cult prophets did function in the eighth century, he argues that 
prophetic titles such as those that appear in Amos were developed only from the mid-sixth 
century onwards and anachronistically applied to earlier texts by later redactors (passim).  In a 
citation of Auld’s article, James Linville states that Auld “argues that the term ‘prophecy’ was 
anachronistically applied to the works of poets” (402).  Although Auld makes no such argument, 
Linville’s note nevertheless intriguingly suggests what those who uttered speeches later identified 
as prophetic originally might have been: poets, poets recast as prophets at a later time when the 
role of prophets had become institutionalized and the activity of prophesying had come to be 
more greatly esteemed.  Some of them may also have been shepherds, especially those who, in 
their capacity as disseminators of news, developed rhetorical or poetic skills to make their 
oratory memorable.
Quite clearly, this is a highly contentious point of view.  The idea that greater biblical 
Israel was a place—not only a place, but, preeminently, the place—where prophets and their dis-
ciples wandered around is so firmly ingrained in the western imagination that it seems unassail-
able, particularly since it serves as a model for Jesus and his disciples.  But unless someone can 
better specify how a person responding to a call to a peripatetic prophetic ministry highly critical 
of the existing ruling class supported not only himself but a band of disciples as they wandered 
around, it does not seem likely that much if any wandering could have been initiated in response 
to such a call.  It seems more likely that persons who already wandered as a normal part of their 
place in the existing relations of production would develop quasi-prophetic skills (as those skills 
would later come to be romanticized) as part of their strategy to secure forage and shelter.  As I 
propose in Chapter 2, these would include the skills of a news gatherer and disseminator (seer 
and story-teller).  Quite conceivably, a transhumant pastoralist might learn, as a member of a 
oppressed underclass to whose experience he was giving shape, as Auden said of Yeats, to “Sing 
of human unsuccess / In a rapture of distress” (294, lines 60–1).
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3. Amos as a Literary Production
It is impossible to determine what popular legends, if any, may have coalesced around the 
name of Amos.  All we appear to have are transcribed records that appear to have been drawn 
from an archive.  As testified by the presence of glosses such as the superscription (1.1) and the 
evidence of the careful arrangement of oracles, Amos is clearly edited.  Moreover, it incorporates 
various conventions that distinguish prophetic literature generally.  Among these may be the pro-
phetic commissioning to which Amos alludes in 7.15.  Petersen observes that “the stereotypic 
nature of these accounts” in books in which they do appear “makes claims for the historical 
veracity difficult to adjudicate,” which is a polite, scholarly way of intimating that somebody 
made them up, perhaps to give authority to words considered prophetic when they were 
eventually collected (76).  He mounts an ingenious argument based upon a personal communica-
tion from S. Dean McBride that the vision report (7.7-8) immediately preceding the biographical 
fragment we have been considering (7.10-17) contains just such a prophetic commissioning 
account, a fact obscured by a pun so torturously obscure that even the biblical editors missed it 
(77–78).8  Indeed, Shalom Paul expresses his conviction that the language in this passage is so 
convoluted that Amos himself has no clear idea what Yahweh means by using it (235).  Regard-
less of the merits of McBride’s interpretation, he is probably correct that it involves some word 
play.  His analysis illuminates the literary activity at the heart of the production of Amos, an 
activity that suggests the the mindset that cast certain psalms and a part of Lamentations as 
acrostics.9
Even if McBride proves not to have made a convincing case that the vision report in 
question is a conventional commissioning account, it cannot be doubted that Amos, however it 
originated, ultimately received the impress of generic conventions that made it a prophetic book. 
The oracles against the nations testify to such conventions.  As John Hayes points out, “Every 
prophetic book in the OT, with the exception of Hosea, contains oracles against non-Israelite 
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8 I refer here to the passage in which the RSV editors include the image of a plumb line 
(see 73, note 17 above).
9 Petersen considers the divine commissioning account to be a distinctive, identifying fea-
ture of Judahite prophecy (e.g., First and Second Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel).  Because he 
assumes that Amos is of southern, Judahite provenance, the apparent absence of a such a 
stereotypic account puzzles him and inclines him to accept McBride’s discovery of one.  The 
possible presence of such an account in Amos, however, does not dissuade me that it is northern, 
Israelite provenance.  The final editing had to have been done somewhere else, most likely in 
Judah.
nations.”  Very perceptively, he goes on to remark that “[t]hese speeches against foreign powers 
represent a major problem-area for exegetes and commentators since they sit like extraneous 
literary and theological blocks within the prophetic books” (81).  It is altogether natural to see 
Amos’s oracles against the nations, grouped together as they are at the beginning of the book and 
similarly patterned as they are in many respects, as just such a block—from one particular 
source—and to study them as such.  Their cohesiveness certainly suggests that they were 
imported en bloc from somewhere.  I argue, however, that the preoccupation of many scholars 
with identifying historical sources may have blinded some to the possibility that the problem to 
which Hayes alludes—that of the oracles against the nations sitting “like extraneous literary and 
theological blocks within the prophetic books”—may be at least partly literary.  As I intimate 
above, it may well have been that their compilers were faced with literary conventions that dic-
tated that prophetic books should have such blocks.  Of course, if Amos were the first prophetic 
book, its compilers would have no such model to follow.  But this observation begs the question 
of which compilers one is talking about—those who compiled the original oracles or those who 
were still reshaping them centuries later, at the time, for instance, when the Book of the Twelve 
itself was being compiled.
The formulaic nature of the oracles does suggest material that may have been chanted as 
some type of oracular refrain.  In the RSV, for instance, each begins with the formula “Thus says 
the LORD: ‘For three transgressions of [name of a nation], and for four, I will not revoke the 
punishment’” (1.3, 6, 9, 11, 13; 2.1, 4, 6).10  However, Barton reviews evidence that these for-
mulae derive either from cultic observances or from the execration texts of international treaties 
(8), either or both of which is quite possible but which, in any case, suggests material deriving 
from a ruling-class establishment milieu.  Moreover, an analysis of the sequence in which the 
oracles have been arranged in terms of the crimes denounced points to a very deliberate literary 
labour to achieve a rhetorical effect.  The first six nations brought to the bar are indicted for their 
military conduct: indeed, AmosL seems to be accusing them of war crimes.  Damascus has 
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10 The main clause in this formula is a notorious Amosian interpretive crux.  By glossing 
the final three words with “Heb cause it to return,” the RSV translators admit that, like the 
legions who have read it over the millennia, they can only guess at what it means, which they do 
with “I will not revoke the punishment.”  Personally, I prefer the more literal translation: “Thus 
says the LORD: ‘For three transgressions of [name of a nation], and for four, I will not cause it to 
return.’”  I am persuaded by Linville that in each instance the pronoun it refers back to Yahweh’s 
voice in 1.2: “‘The LORD roars from Zion, and utters his voice from Jerusalem; the pastures of 
the shepherds mourn, and the top of Carmel withers’” (416–7).  This flies in the face of Wolff’s 
schema, which assigns 1.2 to a stratum some 100+ years later than that of most of these oracles, 
but that is another problem (112).
“‘threshed Gilead [traditional Israelite territory] with threshing sledges of iron’” (1.3), Gaza has 
“‘carried into exile a whole people to deliver them up to Edom’” (1.6), and Tyre has “‘delivered 
up a whole people to Edom, and did not remember the covenant of brotherhood [probably treaty 
obligations]’” (1.9).  Understanding brother to mean treaty partner as suggested in the oracle just 
quoted, Edom also seems to be accused of some international crime, for “‘he pursued his brother 
with the sword, and cast off all pity, and his anger tore perpetually, and he kept his wrath 
forever’” (1.11).  Ammon has “‘ripped up women with child in Gilead, that they may enlarge 
their border [at Israel’s expense]’” (1.13), and Moab has “‘burned to lime the bones of the king 
of Edom’” (2.1).
The exceptions to the rule that the nations named are accused of war crimes are Judah and 
Israel.  Judah is accused of violating its covenant with Yahweh, for “‘they [the Judahites] have 
rejected the law of the LORD, and have not kept his statutes, but their lives have led them astray, 
after which their fathers walked’” (2.4).  The real fly in the ointment, however, is the indictment 
against Israel, which, as the superscription declares, is the true subject of the words that Amos 
saw.  There is not a hint of war crimes here.  It makes sense that Israel should be the sticking 
point.  Hayes observes that such oracles were originally curses hurled at enemies at the onset of 
battle (81–87) that eventually became ritualized within the cult (87–92).  But, as the domestic 
target of the oracles in Amos, Israel is hardly a foreign power.11
Barton observes that “Most commentators agree that these oracles build up to a climax in 
the oracle against Israel, and that the prophet’s intention is to startle his hearers by suddenly turn-
ing on them after lulling them into a false sense of their own security by denouncing their neigh-
bours” (36).  This tactic implies that the actions of the rich against the poor within Israel that 
Amos denounces are equivalent to the war crimes of the other nations, all of whom had been at 
war against Israel at one time or another.  The upshot is that, because of these actions, Israel has 
become foreign to Yahweh as well.  It could be argued that the rhetorical effect achieved by the 
sequencing of these oracles is simply a mark of good oratory.  But the use of skills calculated to 
achieve an oratorical effect is foreign to the inspired immediacy characterizing prophecy.  The 
hand of some non-prophetic type at home within a ruling-class establishment, skilled in writing 
and reading and well-versed in the history and traditions of Israel, is evident throughout the 
oracles against the nations.
I suspect the non-prophetic types whose work I detect in the pun(s) in the vision reports 
and in the arrangement of oracles are the same class of academics who wrote the Book of Job. 
Moreover, I suspect they are the same academic scribes who compiled the Bible itself, which I 
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11 Although Judah also worships Yahweh, it is still a nation foreign to Israel.
see as an intellectual undertaking of great complexity aimed principally at coming to terms with 
several national catastrophes: the conquest and reduction of Israel and, more particularly, of 
Judah to tributary provinces in someone else’s empire.  In many respects, it is an edition of vari-
ous source materials, primary and secondary, bearing upon the history of greater biblical Israel. 
If, while compiling these sources, the scribes in question came across materials critical of the 
Israelite monarchy that seemed in hindsight to have been prophetic, they may well have been 
encouraged to cast them up as prophecy.  Therefore, if my question why ancient Israelites and 
Judahites collected and preserved prophecy be understood to ask why scribes collected material 
that castigated a regime they were seen to serve, I suggest they did nothing of the sort.  They col-
lected, rather, materials to enable them to analyze some predecessor regime that had failed.
This intellectualizing about the traditions of greater biblical Israel connects modern bibli-
cal scholars to the book’s ancient compilers.  As they configured their past into a structure of 
ideas, these compilers abstracted various persons named in their sources from the material 
drudgery of their daily lives and recast them according to nobler ideals.  In the process a dirty, 
sweating transhumant shepherd like AmosI got noqeded, i.e., transformed into some type of agri-
cultural potentate.  The words attributed to him have been amplified and reworked into a rhetoric 
so sophisticated that no one could ever take his protest that he was “a herdsman and a dresser of 
sycamore trees” too seriously.  As we have seen, early Jewish lore holds that AmosI was both a 
sheep breeder and landowner of considerable means (56 above, fn 16).  As for modern critics, 
some, such as Petersen, simply pass over Amos’s disclaimer that he is no prophet without com-
ment.  Others, such as Wolff, while acknowledging that Amos had a day job, downplay it, refer-
ring to it only in passing as a detail they must acknowledge.  Wolff’s interest centres on what he 
calls Amos’s “prophetic ministry” (90).  Willy Schottroff in “The Prophet Amos: A Socio-
Historical Assessment of His Ministry” provides another case in point.  Although he devotes a 
paragraph to the day job (28–29), he focuses almost exclusively upon what he sees as Amos’s 
work of prophetic ministry, a labour preserved, as in Wolff, by equally undefined “disciples and 
other supporters” (29).  Other scholars adopt a different approach to resolving the shepherd-
prophet dilemma.  Rather than downplaying Amos’s pastoral activities, they accentuate them by 
speculating upon the implications of his being a noqed.  As I point out in Chapter 2, Bic, Craigie, 
and Rosenbaum speculate that it connected him to the royal establishment as a civil servant. 
Regardless of the strategy employed, however, the conclusion seems to be universal: that the per-
son presented to the world in Amos, AmosL, “does not,” as Blenkinsopp puts it, “warrant the 
image of an uneducated rustic visionary” (79).  This view is so ingrained that it has assumed the 




Simply put, ideology is the network of ideas comprising the unacknowledged framework 
within which most conscious thought transpires. Althusser’s most influential contribution to the 
theory of ideology emerges in his delineation of the processes involved in shaping human collec-
tivities into distinct societies.  He describes ideology in relation to practice, which, as we have 
seen, he defines as the transformative labour process through which we produce not only the 
material goods required to meet our physical needs but the complex superstructures of society 
itself—the social world in which we live.  The most intellectually provocative aspect of his work 
on ideology has been his elucidation of its concealed political basis, its tendency to maintain the 
societies to which it gives shape as networks of asymmetrical relationships in which certain ele-
ments inevitably dominate others—in short, as structures in dominance. 
Althusser writes about ideology from various perspectives.  In construing the develop-
ment of Marx’s thought, he pinpoints the epistemological break initiating the materialist revolu-
tion in philosophy in Marx’s realization that the idealist tradition of thinking about human nature 
in terms of universal qualities in which each person shares is simply an ingrained habit of 
thought, an ideology to be challenged and rejected to establish social thinking upon a scientific 
basis through the analysis of material processes.  In language obviously influenced by Freud’s 
Traumdeutung, Althusser elaborates upon Marx’s
radical suppression of philosophy […] inscribed in so many words in The German 
Ideology [1845-46].[12]  It is essential, says Marx in that work, to get rid of all 
philosophical fancies and turn to the study of positive reality, to tear aside the veil 
of philosophy and at least see reality for what it is.
The German Ideology bases this suppression of philosophy on a theory of 
philosophy as a hallucination and mystification, or to go further, a dream, 
manufactured from what I shall call the day’s residues endowed with a purely 
imaginary existence in which the order of things is inverted.  Philosophy, like reli-
gion and ethics, is only ideology; it has no history, everything which seems to hap-
pen in it really happens outside it, in the only real history, the history of the 
material life of men.   (“Lenin and Philosophy” 41, emphasis original)
The key insights here are that the idealist ideology in which Marx was nurtured casts a veil over 
reality that conceals its true nature and that Marx took it upon himself to rip that veil off.  How-
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12 Identified by Althusser with the Theses on Feuerbach as the “Works of the Break” 
(“From Capital” 39).
ever, despite Althusser’s continual demands for philosophical rigour, his own writing about how 
idealist ideology in fact veils or distorts reality is remarkably imprecise.  Reading Althusser, it is 
difficult to determine if idealist ideology distorts by virtue of being idealist or by virtue of being 
ideological.  He frequently conflates the two as if they were identical.  He makes a better case 
that the dragon Marx set out to slay was, in fact, idealism.  Given Marx’s proclivity to analyze 
social life in terms of dynamic processes he considered to be irreducibly complex, he could not 
fail to see that idealist abstractions distort the sense of our own involvement in these processes by 
imposing stabilizing patterns or structures upon them.  This imposition of structure upon process 
necessarily valorizes one moment of that process among its many moments—one possibility—as 
representative of all its moments and possibilities.  In the elegant dictum Stephen Heath 
attributes to Roland Barthes, the effect of such distortion is “to transform ‘history into 
nature’”(21).  It veils the contingency of our real conditions of existence by eternalizing one his-
torical moment—one historical configuration—as natural.  The assessment that ideology per se 
distorts, however, cannot rest upon any specific content.  It can only arise from a functional anal-
ysis.  Although Althusser does not say this,  channeling thought ideology distorts by limiting our 
sense of the possible, a factor best conceived in terms of power, for in and through its power to 
limit our sense of the possible the political dimension of ideology becomes most clearly manifest.
Althusser’s more incisive work on ideology involves identifying the function of dominant 
ideologies in the formation of subjects and the reproduction of the social order.13  In his well-
known essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” he observes that the task of molding 
subjects is entrusted by the state to various agencies or “state apparatuses,” previously the church 
and currently the schools.  He argues that the success of these agencies in discharging this task 
depends upon their effectively inculcating existing habits of thought whereby the subjects formed 
persistently misapprehend their relation “to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 
“Ideology” 153).14  “What do children learn at school?” he asks.  Techniques, for one thing, and 
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13  Indeed, Stuart Hall points out that the best illustration Althusser adduces that ideology 
is a material force is its operation “in and through the production of subjects” (48). 
14 The “Glossary” edited by Althusser and supplied by Ben Brewster in his English trans-
lation of Althusser’s and Etienne Balibar’s Reading Capital provides a more general definition of 
ideology:
Ideology is the “lived” relation between men and their world, or a reflected form 
of this unconscious relation, for instance, a “philosophy,” etc.  It is distinguished 
from a science not by its falsity, for it can be coherent and logical (for instance, 
theology), but by the fact that the practico-social predominates in it over the 
theoretical, over knowledge.  Historically, it precedes the science that is produced 
concepts for fitting into society, for another.  “They go varying distances in their studies,” he tells 
us, 
but at any rate they learn to read, to write and to add—i.e. a number of techniques, 
and a number of other things as well, including elements (which may be 
rudimentary or on the contrary thoroughgoing) of “scientific” or “literary culture”, 
which are directly useful in the different jobs in production (one instruction for 
manual workers, another for technicians, a third for engineers, a final one for 
higher management, etc.).  Thus they learn “know-how”.
But besides these techniques and knowledges, and in learning them, chil-
dren at school also learn the “rules” of good behaviour, i.e. the attitude that should 
be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he is 
“destined” for: rules of morality, civic and professional conscience, which actually 
means rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the 
rules of the order established by class domination. (“Ideology” 127–28)
The acquisition of techniques or job skills is obviously critical if goods are to be produced, but it 
will hardly suffice unless the application of such skills is harmonized by a sense of the 
appropriate relations of production—appropriate, that is, in the view of those organizing the 
instruction.  Children are sent to school ostensibly to learn skills but in the last instance to imbibe 
as ideologies the rules that govern their formation into a specific society, rules for acting and 
thinking that they must accept and promote as their own.  The enduring effectiveness of this 
process—in liberal western democracies, at least—depends upon ingraining the misconception in 
those under tutelage that they are autonomous subjects of consciousness who freely choose the 
places in the social structure for which they are trained and to which, in fact, they are assigned. 
Therefore, ideology as here conceived by Althusser is not just any ingrained system of thought 




by making an epistemological break with it, but it survives alongside science as an 
essential element of every social formation, including a socialist and even a com-
munist society. (314)
Much of Althusser’s writing deals with ideology in this broader sense of it being the “uncon-
scious … practico-social” dimension of our relation to our world.  But he does insist that ideol-
ogy causes us to misconstrue our sense of how we relate to our “real conditions of existence.”  It 
is to this somewhat narrower sense of ideology as an ingrained or unconscious distortion that 
most of my remarks apply. 
by misrepresenting them—to others, perhaps, but most particularly to ourselves—as better than 
they actually are.
Althusser elaborates the means by which a particular social configuration is sustained 
ideologically in the interests of a dominant class, thereby demonstrating that ideological practice 
is also political practice.  Political struggle among classes is fought primarily in terms of ideol-
ogy.  Indeed, in the “Preface to his Critique of Political Economy,” Marx conceives the social 
superstructure, which comprises the systems such as law, politics, philosophy, religion, art and 
science in which social consciousness becomes manifest, as a theatre of “ideological forms in 
which men become conscious of [their conflicts] and fight it out” (qtd. in Williams, Cul-
ture 258).  Given this conception of philosophy, Althusser argues that, correctly understood, it is 
“a practice of political intervention carried out in a theoretical form” (“Lenin Before Hegel” 105). 
“All philosophy,” he insists, “expresses a class position, a ‘partisanship’ in the great debate 
which dominates the whole history of philosophy, the debate between idealism and materialism” 
(105–06), a struggle in which Marxist philosophers are called to participate.15  As Althusser sees 
it, Marxist philosophy—dialectical materialism—is no less ideological than idealist philosophy. 
Its aim is political.  It seeks to reveal the class interest behind the idealist transformation of his-
tory into nature that Barthes describes (80 above).  In doing so, it aims to reverse the process, to 
transform nature back into history by illustrating that social configurations that idealism posits as 
immutably natural are merely historical contingencies subject to ongoing change.  Ultimately, its 
aim is revolutionary (“Lenin Before Hegel” 106).
4.1. The Noqeding (and Prophetizing) of AmosI
Gerhard von Rad writes very perceptively about the scribal transformation of traditional, 
cultic materials into biblical literature.  The process of detaching such traditions “from the 
locality with which they had cultic associations,” he reasons, inevitably “caused their content to 
become highly spiritualised” (von Rad, “Form” 49).  Although I argue against Bic, Craigie, and 
Rosenbaum that the provenance of Amos is not the cult but a record (or memory) of an angry 
shepherd, von Rad’s observation applies to the transformation of this shepherd into literature as 
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15 Althusser’s response to this call gives his writing a polemic edge that can lead him to 
overstate his positions.  In consequence, he frequently does not express himself with the subtlety 
he attributes to Marx—particularly to Marx’s appreciation of social process as an ever-ramifying 
response to the never-ending stream of contradiction animating the pulse of social existence.  To 
some extent Thompson is responding to Althusser’s stridency when he remarks that social pro-
cess is not cut and dried as Althusser makes it out to be (29 above).   
well.  In the process AmosI was abstracted from the material cares of his daily life and invested 
with the aura of a man with a ministry to something more glorious than sheep.  This literary 
articulation has been decisive: for millennia of readers, the literary Amos, AmosL, the sage who 
could see the future, has been Amos, pure and simple.  His spiritualization has been so effective 
that even critics such as Schottroff do not wonder how this über-shepherd “was able to acquire a 
high level of self-expression and a familiarity with the broad range of Israelite educational tradi-
tion” (29), accomplishments most typically attributable to the academically-oriented scribes who 
undoubtedly edited the text.
In creating AmosL largely in their own image (or according to their own ideals), the 
scribes involved were engaging in a practice—a labour of transformation—susceptible to produc-
ing ideology along lines that Althusser describes.  AmosI’s real conditions of existence were dis-
torted.  In the noqeding process, he came to be represented, if not beyond the necessity of daily, 
physical labour, at least as a person with the leisure and the means to speculate and to cultivate 
his mind.  His gentrification led by an easy step, despite his disclaimer preserved in the text, to 
his prophetization.  Although I have touched upon the attempts of scholars such as Petersen and 
Wilson to figure out conclusively what the various intermediaries named in the Bible actually 
did, it is sufficient for my argument to state that the biblical compilers conceived them as holy 
people—as people, to adapt a phrase from von Rad, in whom faith lived freely (Holy 39)—and to 
leave it at that.16  Von Rad’s contention that biblical sources were spiritualized in the course of 
their compilation illuminates the production of AmosL, leaving us with the image of a person 
whose only real concern in life was the oppression of the poor.  Furthermore, this spiritualizing 
bias of the compilers’ practice significantly contributed to the emergence of one of the most pow-
erful ideologies governing the reading of the text for millennia: that, to borrow von Rad’s words 
once again, a “complex of religious ideas about God and creation, the person, sin and forgive-
ness, and so forth hover[ed] over the people of Israel like a spiritual cloud” (39).  A principal 
beneficiary of this spiritualizing process has been the prophets, over whom the spiritual cloud has 
remained particularly dense ever since.
One effect of the biblical writers’ practice of abstracting idealized characters from their 
material bases has been to divinize the text they populate: to saturate it with logos.  In semiotic 
language clearly reminiscent of Althusser’s writing on ideology, Fernando Belo states that “the 
ideological text brought into existence by the establishment of the logos (or the god) effects a 
  
 83 
16 Following Carroll’s lead, I believe the biblical sources about intermediaries are so 
vague that the question of precisely what any of them actually did—if, in fact, they existed at 
all—will never be answered.
division between the signifier (ever-already in a textual body) and the signified (which is put in 
an imaginary relation17 with the logos and with things).”  The signifier in the literary as well as 
the social text is its material body, which, as we have seen, Marx envisions in terms of an ever-
pre-given complexity from which he never derogates.  The division that a logocentic text such as 
Amos effects between its material body and the meaning (the signified) with which we invest it is 
distorted by an idealizing simplification that promises to make all things clear, which encourages, 
Belo argues, “reading in which the elements of the whole are isolated from what determines 
them.”  Moreover, the truth values that regnant ideologies attribute to cetain logocentric texts 
largely determines the manner in which they are read.  Belo observes that, “as readers fascinated 
by rational evidence (or divine revelation) or even by literary beauty or by the scholarly authority 
of the specialists in ideology, the agents read only ‘through the eyes’ of reason (or faith) and in 
accordance with its codes” (24).
Although it distorts, there is nothing necessarily sinister in the scribes’ practice of idealiz-
ing the source material available to them.  As von Rad points out in a discussion of the transition 
from tradition to literature, it is hardly surprising that the scribes involved in the process would 
“take control of [the source material] and shape it according to the needs of [their] own reason” 
(von Rad, “Form” 49).  If anything, it reflects a highly sophisticated attitude toward their sources. 
The scribal practice of shaping biblical sources “according to the needs of [one’s] own reason” 
and time has continued unabated among the exegetes of our day.  The lack of precise knowledge 
about the functions of those figures the Bible identifies as prophets—a lack that, Carroll insists, 
goes right back to the biblical compilers themselves (74 above)—has made these figures suscep-
tible to a broad range of interpretation.  In the “Introduction” to his study of Property Rights in 
the Eighth-Century Prophets, John Dearman reviews typical avenues of critical approach to the 
social criticism attributed to prophets.  One such approach posits that the “prophets perceived a 
moral order which was universal in scope and in which the consciousness of the prophet was 
deeply imbued.”  A second conceives them as “preachers of the divine law” (5, emphasis 
original).  A third stresses “a societal ideal upon which the prophets drew for their social criti-
que,” an ideal frequently based upon some utopian vision of what Israel once was and should 
strive to become again (6–7, emphasis original).  A fourth emphasizes tribal wisdom as the root 
of prophecy (7).  A fifth “employs elements of Marxist interpretation” in which the “prophets are 
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17 Elsewhere Belo describes “an imaginary relation” as a “kind of identification,” which 
suggests that he has in mind the mirror-stage dynamics of Lacan’s imaginary register (12, empha-
sis original).  See Lacan’s “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience.”
perceived as representing Urkomminismus or protest against private property” (7–8, emphasis 
original).  Dearman demonstrates that each interpretation in turn reflects a critical tendency 
prevailing at the time and place it originated.  For example, the first alternative listed above, 
stressing that the “prophets depended primarily on the natural moral law and not on a written 
code” (3), prevailed among the nineteenth-century German and Dutch scholars Dearman dis-
cusses.  He notes that “the apprehension of a moral world as the goal of history was an important 
theme in nineteenth century German historical scholarship” (3, fn 6), thereby implying that these 
scholars saw their own world view reflected in the text.  He goes on to stipulate that “the moral 
character of God and prophetic individualism is symptomatic of nineteenth-century ethical 
idealism, making the prophets romantic figures while ignoring the specific location of the pro-
phetic ministry” (8).  He highlights the tendency toward eisegesis18 masked by several of these 
approaches by mentioning W. C. Graham’s The Prophets and Israel’s Culture, a 1934 American 
work in which the prophets are seen as offering Israel a New Deal (Dearman 4, citing Graham 
40).
5. Why Do They Not Revolt?: Gottwald’s Elaboration of Social Revolution as One Model 
for the Settlement of Israel 
A question continually recurs to me respecting Amos that no one else seems to ask: if 
things were as bad for the working class of Israel as AmosL makes out, why did its members not 
revolt?  The theory that most of them were rural poor tied to the land under the Asiatic mode of 
production rightly suggests that conditions were not normally propitious for revolt.  But Got-
twald, following George Mendenhall, advances a detailed argument in The Tribes of Yahweh that 
the forbears of these same rural poor had been Canaanite peasants who did revolt, probably 
around the 13th century, from monarchical city states in the lowlands of Canaan.  His account of 
conditions there is remarkably similar to that of Amos:
For some centuries Canaan had been dominated by city-states with hierar-
chies of aristocratic warriors and bureaucrats who took over the agricultural sur-
plus of the villages where the majority of the populace lived and primary produc-
tion was based.  This tributary mode of production (often called the Asiatic mode 
of production) laid on the mass of peasants and herdsmen heavy burdens of taxa-
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18 According to the OED, eisegesis is “the interpretation of a word of passage (of the 
Scriptures) by reading into it one’s own ideas,” whereas exegesis is simply “the interpretation of 
Scripture or a Scriptural passage.”  As I suggest throughout this study, the line between the two is 
so fine that it is typically difficult if not impossible to determine.
tion in kind, forced labor, and military service.  Indebted peasants, deprived of 
independent means of subsistence, were recruited as cultivators of large estates or 
reduced to the status of tenant farmers.  A large percentage of the communal pro-
ductive energy and resources went into warfare and the luxuried life of the ruling 
classes that included lavish religious displays. (272–73)
The times being propitious for revolt, restive labourers abandoned the fields in which they had 
been oppressed to take a stand in the marginal, thinly-populated highlands of Canaan.  They 
could do so because of three technological innovations: iron implements; rock terracing, which 
enabled them to plant intensively in the hill country; and water-tight cisterns, which allowed for 
the irrigation of crops during the summer drought (Gottwald, “Domain” 10). Over the next two-
and-a-half centuries, they were joined by other marginalized, disaffected groups.  In Gottwald’s 
view, the patriarchal history the Bible recounts is a synthesis of the traditions the various groups 
brought with them.  One claimed to have descended from a patriarch named Abraham, another 
from one named Isaac, still another from a Jacob, and so forth.  These legends were concatenated 
as various groups arrived by making Abraham the father of Isaac and Isaac the father of Jacob. 
One group came in from the southern desert with a legend that they had been led out of Egyptian 
slavery by a miracle worker named Moses.  That story was threaded on to the ever lengthening 
chain of narrative as well.19
Gottwald’s book created quite a stir when it appeared almost thirty years ago.  One does 
not hear much about it now.  In the The Quest for Historical Israel: Debating Archaeology and 
the History of Early Israel published in 2007, Israel Finkelstein and Amihai Mazar present con-
trasting contemporary assessments.  Finkelstein dismisses the social revolution theory as “a 
somewhat naïve product of Marxist undercurrents in American campuses of the utopian 1960s.” 
Not only does he state that archaeology comes “up short of tracing any clues to such a dramatic 
shift from the sedentary lowlands to the sedentary highlands in a short period of time,” but he 
insists that “there were not enough Late Bronze settlements in the lowlands to supply a sufficient 
number of withdrawing people” (75).  On the other hand, Mazar observes that “nothing in the 
archaeological findings from this period [Late Bronze age] points to the foreign [non-Canaanite] 
origin of the hill-country settlers as posited by alternative conquest and immigration models for 
  
 86 
19 Gottwald summarizes his theory of the development of the biblical narrative in the first 
six books of the Bible (the Hexateuch) from the patriarchal history (which begins with the story 
of Abraham in Gen 12) onward in The Tribes of Yahweh, pp 100–14.
the settlement of the area” (94).20
It is not my purpose here to enter this argument in a decisive way.  Being myself “a some-
what naïve product of Marxist undercurrents in American campuses of the utopian 1960s,” the 
social revolution model appeals to me.  But I do not introduce it into a study of Amos to insist 
upon it in preference to a conquest or immigration model.  The text itself is informed by the 
Exodus tradition normally associated with the northern kingdom of Israel, and I have no doubt 
that its compilers subscribed to a conquest model.  I introduce the social revolution model here 
because of its ideological suggestiveness.  Before taking up this suggestiveness, however, a more 
detailed theoretical discussion of Gottwald’s argument is in order.
This argument depends upon the concept of the Asiatic mode of production (AMP) to 
which, in the passage quoted above, he speculates the proto-Israelite revolutionaries had been 
subjected by the Canaanite city states of the plains.  The AMP has a controversial place in the 
history of Marxist thought because it is not included in the scheme of successive “modes of pro-
duction and types of society” outlined by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto, which 
Gottwald summarizes as
1.  the classless primitive community;
2.  the slave-based society of classical times;
3.  the feudal society based on serfdom;
4.  the modern bourgeois society based on the capitalist mode of production;
5.  the classless society of the future. (Gottwald, “Hypothesis” 150)
This scheme is quite clearly based on the economic and social development of Europe.  Proposed 
as a stage 2 alternate to classical, slave-based society, the Asiatic mode reflects the system of 
production typical of the large empires of North Africa and the Middle East (Sumerian, Egyptian, 
Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, to name a few).21  Gottwald summarizes the most prominent fea-
tures of the AMP.  First, in theory at least, land is not privately owned.  All land belongs to “the 
state as sovereign and landlord” (153).  Second, it is based upon “self-sufficient village com-
munities” engaged in “agrarian, pastoral, and handicraft” pursuits as the source of its wealth. 
Third, it features a “highly centralized state in a commanding social role whose functionaries 
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20  For a summary of hypotheses about Israel’s rise to power in terms of conquest, 
immigration, and social revolutions models, see Gottwald, Hebrew 261–76.
21 The Inca Empire also seems to have been functioned along the lines of what Marx 
identifies as the Asiatic mode of production (Jobling, “Introduction”).  Although Prescott 
precedes Marx, his classic account of the Inca Empire at the time of the Spanish conquest still 
provides an excellent account summary of this mode.
exact tribute from village labourers both in kind and in labour” (upon public works “such as 
irrigation systems, defense works, administrative and religious structures, and storage of large 
quantities of food”) (154).
In describing the conditions prevailing under an AMP, Gottwald is discussing the polity 
of a state.  It is not altogether clear from the above summary of successive modes of production 
that when a society evolves from the primitive (stage 1) to either the classical (stage 2) or the 
Asiatic mode of production (alternate stage 2), it becomes a state.  Among other things, a politi-
cal entity becomes a state by virtue of a centralization of power.  Central governmental 
institutions—executive, legislative, and judicial—monopolize what comes to be seen as the legit-
imate use of force within a state’s territory.  A Marxist tenet holds that, as a consequence of this 
centralization, the emergence of the state mirrors the emergence of class society by enabling a 
non-productive ruling group to enforce its claims within the relations of production.  Gottwald 
sums up the Marxist position in observing that “class is seen to exist when some people live off 
the labor product of others” (147).
As a concomitant of this analysis, the primitive societies (stage 1) from which states 
emerge are designated as classless (as is that stage 5 society of the future when, according to 
Marxist eschatology, the state will finally wither away).  In non-Marxist schema of the evolution 
of the state, these primitive22 societies correspond to segmentary, tribal societies, which Sigrist 
defines as “‘an acephalous society, i.e. not politically organized by a central court, whose politi-
cal organization is established by multi-graded groups which are politically of equal rank and 
similarly classified’” (30, quoted in Frick 52).  Frank Frick theorizes that early greater-Israel 
moved on a “path from a segmentary society in the ‘tribal’ period (twelfth to early eleventh 
centuries B.C.), to a chiefdom in the days of Saul and the early David (middle to late eleventh 
century B.C.), to statehood under the later David and Solomon (first half of the tenth century 
B.C.)” (191).  In this view, the chiefdom occupies an intermediate stage in the centralization of 
power, somewhere between its concentration in a state and its dispersal in a tribal polity.
Simply breaking free from the Canaanite city states would not have guaranteed the proto-
Israelites against ultimately changing one master for another.  To prevent this, they needed to 
achieve a social and economic as well as a political revolution.  Analyzing the accounts of the 
occupation of the highlands in Joshua and Judges, Gottwald argues that the proto-Israelites 
involved were stridently anti-statist.  To prevent once again being oppressed by class domination, 
they deliberately dispersed power so that a ruling class could not emerge.  As an experiment in 
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22 The use of the word primitive here would be unfortunate if it were taken to mean 
unsophisticated.  It is better to understand it to mean coming first.
radical egalitarianism, they retribalized, thereby turning the clock back to the polity in which they 
had lived—or thought they had lived—before being subjected to the Canaanite AMP (Tribes, 
summarized at 489-92).
For retribalization to work, tribal polity had to be conceptualized to overcome—at least 
partially—the contradictions inherent within it.  The tribal organization Sigrist describes is two-
fold: internal within tribes and external among them.  Because tribes are multi-graded or hierar-
chical, internally they may be no less despotic than states.  I suspect the tribal life of most pre-
monarchic Canaanites had been no less “nasty, brutish, and short” than the life in the state that 
followed it.  As for external relations, Gottwald theorizes that Israelite tribes co-ordinated mutual 
defense and cultic activities through sodalities that cut across the grain of tribal organization 
(Tribes 293-341).  But I also suspect that much of the co-ordination among these tribes was 
likely enforced by some who were more equal than others.
Practical difficulties could be met, at least symbolically, by idealizing the co-ordination of 
inter-tribal relations.  Lest the formally acephalous nature of those relations create a vacuum fill-
able by some flesh-and-blood person seizing monarchical power, the leadership of the emerging 
tribal confederation was vested in Yahweh (הוהי), a local war god with whom that confederation 
was now conceived to be in a covenant relation.23  Regardless of who might be practically com-
manding the armies of tribal Israel on any given day, ideologically it was always Yahweh, to 
whom all victories could be attributed.  Defeats, on the other hand, could be chalked up to the 
failure of humans to respond  adequately to Yahweh’s commands.  In either victory or defeat, 
Yahweh’s symbolic leadership served to brake the long-term consolidation of power by any indi-
vidual.
If Gottwald is right, such deliberate retribalization would mark a dialectical crossroads in 
being the tangible fruit of a labour to supersede an existing, unsatisfactory state of affairs.  When 
I first read Gottwald’s argument, I had much the same reaction as Finkelstein: that he is simply 
retrojecting 1960s utopian dreaming about building a classless society upon ancient peoples who 
could know nothing of modern sociopolitical theory.  Upon reflection, however, I realized that 
Gottwald is suggesting precisely the thing that people do in revolutionary times: they think very 
deliberately about constructing ideal societies.  One need only think about the radical reforms of 
the French, Russian, Chinese, and Cuban revolutions to verify this.  On a humbler scale, the 
social agenda of the Münster rebellion, the Paris Commune, and the Republican government in 
Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War come to mind.  If the founders of greater Israel were 
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23 Covenants were international treaties regulating the relations between parties of 
unequal strength.
social revolutionaries, how likely is it that they would not have engaged in the sociopolitical 
theorizing and experimenting that marks revolutionaries generally?  How likely is it that they 
would not have theorized how a new society effect could be created given their altered circum-
stances and aims?  As social revolutionaries invariably do, they would have preoccupied them-
selves with idealizing new arrangements that would eventually become the ideological basis of a 
new society.  To me, the thought that they could not seems the height of modern arrogance.
As I have intimated above, however, I suspect the everyday life of many persons and 
groups in tribal Israel was nowhere as egalitarian as Gottwald suggests.  As insightful as it is, the 
chief value of his analysis of biblical texts covering this period lies principally in what it implies 
about their ideological motivation and their compilers’ sophisticated understanding of the 
function of ideology in political practice.  As Althusser points out, ideology does not reflect 
people’s real relations of production or, as Thompson might add, their real experience.  It always 
misrepresents either—misrepresents them by idealizing them—even as a political weapon in the 
hands of the working class.  Instead of reflecting reality, ideology creates it: therein lies its real 
power.  What counts is not what happens but what people can be persuaded to construe what 
happens—that and nothing else.
On the face of it, Gottwald’s sociology of Israelite religion—focussing, as it does, on a 
period ending in the mid-eleventh century—would seem to have little to do with the issues in 
Amos, composed as it was from the eighth century onward.  By AmosI’s day, Israel was evolving 
from a tribal society to a monarchic state.  From the standpoint of Gottwald’s theory, the experi-
ment in retribalization had given way to the very polity it had been intended to replace: a monar-
chy based upon the Asiatic mode of production.  Although AmosL is typically considered to have 
been a southern, Judahite prophet, Amos is framed in terms of the northern, Israelite tradition of a 
conditional or Mosaic covenant.  Walter Brueggemann observes that “the Mosaic tradition tends 
to be a movement of protest that is situated among the disinherited and that articulates its 
theological vision in terms of a God who decisively intrudes, even against seemingly 
impenetrable institutions and orderings” (“Trajectories” 14).  AmosI certainly seems to have been 
a spokesperson for rural folk for whom the “institutions and orderings” of a monarchical state 
may well have seemed “impenetrable.”  As such, it could well be that the scribes who recast him 
as AmosL saw him as a person whose thinking illustrated the force of what Raymond Williams 
calls residual ideology.  “By ‘residual’,” he says, “I mean that some experiences, meanings and 
values which cannot be verified or cannot be expressed in the terms of the dominant culture, are 
nevertheless lived and practised on the basis of the residue —cultural as well as social—of some 
previous social formation” (“Base” 10).  In AmosI’s case, that residual ideology had to involve an 
idealization of tribal life similar to that which, Gottwald argues, animated the ancestral occupiers 
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of the highlands who retribalized as a political practice.  AmosI would have idealized tribal life 
as one in which power was dispersed and land apportioned or justice dispensed based on the 
equality of tribes and of persons of similar rank. Such idealization would be particularly tena-
cious if there were some memory that tribal ideology had once served to resist monarchy. 
Although the crimes Amos denounces are reprehensible, Dearman’s reading of the clause “they 
turn aside the way of the afflicted” (4.7) as evidence for “the failure of Israel’s social institutions 
to administer YHWH’s will” (22) leads to the interesting question of the degree to which Yah-
weh’s will reflects the class position of the speaker.  Members of the ruling class quite likely per-
ceived Yahweh’s will in different terms, making it, as Marx says, one of the “ideological forms 
in which men become conscious of [their conflicts] and fight it out.”  The extent to which AmosI 
gave shape to rural discontent as arising from violations of Yahweh’s will is impossible to 
determine.  It is altogether likely he would have done so, if Gottwald’s thesis is correct that Yah-
weh served an anti-monarchical political function in tribal Israel.  But Yahweh’s will as a factor 
in the history of Israel is perhaps the organizing factor in the reflections of the scribes who 
eventually put the Bible together.  It is even fair to speculate that they saw AmosL somewhat in 
the terms of Wilson’s peripheral prophets, who, as we have seen (31 above), are peripheral in 
two respects: in respect to their own status and social power and in respect to the gods who pos-
sess them.  In casting AmosL as they did, they certainly seem to imply that an older, more tradi-
tional notion of Yahweh was becoming peripheral to the way that the more socially dominant 
members of Israelite society were now conceptualizing it.24
5.1. Alienation
The foregoing discussion of the Mendenhall-Gottwald social revolution model for the 
origins of Israel provides context for the question that initiates it: if things were as bad for the 
working class of Israel as AmosL makes out, why did its members not revolt?  It demonstrates 
that, according to some theories, at least, the idea of revolution was not totally foreign to the tra-
ditions of greater biblical Israel.  In fact, it suggests that the concept of Yahweh partly evolved in 
response to the exigencies of social revolution.  However, even if scholars could detect no trace 
of a revolutionary motif running through the biblical traditions, the question posed remains an 
intriguing one, for some potential for revolution—even among peasants—certainly exists at all 
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24 Because Amos is social rather than theological critique, it condemns ruling class wor-
ship as empty sacrificial formalism that does not lead to justice (5.21-23) without otherwise 
specifying how the concept of Yahweh may have been evolving to justify the exercise of monar-
chical power.
times and places where oppression on the scale depicted in Amos exists, a potential that has 
occasionally been realized (e.g., the English Peasants’ Revolt of 1381).  That potential exists in 
Amos as well, for Amos does envision sweeping change in Israel, envisions it in terms of the 
complete destruction of the existing order.  But he does not envision revolutionary change in 
which the oppressed workers take any active part.  They are consistently depicted as passive vic-
tims.  The change to come is to be accomplished exclusively through Yahweh’s agency. 
Therefore, in relation to the larger question of the functioning of ideology in the shaping of con-
sciousness addressed in this study, a different question needs to be asked, one that takes the con-
sciousness manifest in Amos as somehow representative of eighth-century rural discontent: if 
things are as bad for the working people of Israel as Amos makes out, why does he not con-
ceptualize any possibility that they could mount a revolt?  Indeed, why can he not conceive any 
practical action that the oppressed themselves could take to ameliorate their condition?  The ans-
wer, I suspect, lies largely in the alienating effect of ideology, to a consideration of which I now 
turn.
Marx’s theory of alienation emerged in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, a work not published until 1927 that precedes those that Althusser identifies as the “Works 
of the Break” (The German Ideology and Theses on Feuerbach).  In fact, Althusser insists that 
this theory—more precisely, the theory of alienated labour—is not only untenable but part and 
parcel of the ideological mystification under which the young Marx laboured until the explosion 
of insight that comprised the epistemological break (“Lenin Before Hegel” 116–17).  In con-
sequence, Althusser has little to say about alienation beyond exposing it as a theoretical error. 
On the other hand, István Mészáros, who has written extensively on the subject, claims that the 
theory of alienation is the key synthesizing idea upon which Marx erected his system (18).
In its broad outlines, alienation arises in the specialization of labour, which makes it a 
commodity subject to exchange or confiscation.  As we have seen (44 above), in Marx’s view 
human nature expresses itself through productivity.  The reification of labour, therefore, deprives 
humankind of its proper means of expression.  Labour ceases to be a manifestation of life 
(Lebensäusserung), which it is when one works from an inner necessity.  It represents, rather, an 
alienation from life (Lebensentäusserung), which it becomes when one works from an external 
necessity—when, as Marx puts it, “‘I work in order to live, in order to produce a means of living, 
but my work itself is not living’” (Mészáros 91, quoting Marx’s “Comments on James Mill’s 
Elements of Political Economy” (c. 1844)).  Under this circumstance, labour has been 
expropriated, torn from its proper place at the centre of human meaning-making.
In keeping with the complexity of Marx’s vision of social reality, his theory of alienation 
is also highly complex. Mészáros points out that it is fourfold: humans are alienated from (a) 
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nature, (b) their own activity, (c) their “being as a member of the human species,” and (d) one 
another (14).  In respect to (a), I have already discussed Marx’s concept that only humans have 
species-being and that productive activity mediates between them as species-beings and nature 
(44 above).  Such activity is not inherently alienating.  Only second-order mediations are alienat-
ing, those introduced by the reification and isolation attendant upon the emergence of the con-
cepts of private property, exchange, and labour specialization that are dominant features of the 
capitalist system Marx principally analyzes (79).  Such alienation strips humans of their species 
consciousness and reduces them to functioning only as individuals, which is a universal rather 
than a specifically human category (c above). As individuals, they are reabsorbed into nature and 
subjected to the natural law of a war of all against all, thereby alienating one person from another 
(d above).  Paradoxically, however, such unmediated reabsorption into nature alienates humanity 
from nature (a above) because humanity’s proper relationship to nature is through the mediation 
of productive activity (labour or practice) that establishes humanity’s anthropological nature 
(107–8).
The aspect of Marx’s theory that best illuminates the dynamics of Amos, however, is that 
treating the alienation of humanity from its labour (b above), a manifestation of which is its 
inability to recognize its own products.  Umberto Eco elaborates upon this in distinguishing 
Hegel’s concept of alienation from that of Marx.  “Of course,” he says,
everyone is free to build a personal myth in which the word “alienation” has this 
particular meaning [of some alien, hostile force acting upon us], but this is 
certainly not the meaning it had either for Hegel or for Marx.  According to Hegel, 
man alienates himself by objectivizing himself in the aim of his work or his 
actions.  In other words, he alienates himself in the world of things and of social 
relationships because he has constructed it according to the laws of subsistence 
and development that he himself must adjust to and respect.  Marx, on the other 
hand, reproached Hegel for not making a clear distinction between objectification 
(Entäusserung) and alienation (Entfremdung).  In the first case, man turns himself 
into a thing; he expresses himself in the world through his creations, thus con-
structing the world to which he then commits himself.  (Open 124, emphasis 
original)
Objectification (Entäusserung), therefore, is not in itself negative: it is integral to practice—to 
the transformative labour through which we create complex social structures within which we 
take our places and in terms of which we conceptualize what it means to be human.25  “But,” Eco 
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goes on to declare,
when the mechanism of this world begins to get the upper hand—when man sud-
denly becomes unable to recognize it as his own creation, unable to use for his 
own purposes the things he has produced, and instead ends up serving their pur-
poses (which he might identify with the purposes of other men)—then he finds 
himself alienated; it is his creations henceforth that tell him what to do, what to 
feel, and what to become.  The stronger the alienation, the deeper man's belief that 
he is still in control (whereas, in fact, he is being controlled) and that the situation 
in which he lives is the best of all possible worlds.  (124)
Alienation (Entfremdung), therefore, arises in misrecognition—the misrecognition of the very 
specific, time-bound world that we ourselves create and in which we contemplate ourselves.  In 
this misrecognition, we come back full circle to Barthes’ description of ideology in effect turning 
“history into nature.”  Eco’s conclusion that alienation produces an illusion of control among the 
controlled in its turn comes back to Althusser’s description of ideology functioning to conceal or 
veil our real conditions of existence by misrepresenting them as better than they actually are. 
Insightful though Eco’s conclusion is, it is a bit too sweeping, for people with no illusions of 
control also suffer alienation as an effect of ideology, which leads them to think not that they live 
in “the best of all possible worlds,” as Eco would have it, but that they live in the only possible 
world.
Amos is a profound literature of alienation.  It is permeated by a structure of feeling that 
the poor of Israel are being overwhelmed by a totally incomprehensible system they cannot 
recognize as a human product, one which, most likely, was in process of being eternalized as 
Yahweh’s will.  This structure of feeling renders ironic the scribal dispatch (7.10) discussed 
above (71), which characterizes Amos’s activities around Bethel as conspiratorial.  The 
mystification of the oppressive forces arrayed against the poor affects AmosL’s ability to “take 
arms against a sea of troubles.”  His inability to conspire—to become an agent for social change 




25 Part of Marx’s understanding of objectification pertains to the creation of humanity’s 
sense of species life (species consciousness).  For Marx, Mészáros points out, part of the “object 
of labour is the objectification of man’s species life, for man ‘duplicates himself not only, as in 
consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself 
in a world that he has created’” (14,  emphasis original, quoting Marx’s Economic and Philo-
sophic Manuscripts of 1844).
of Israel as a fantasy, as arising in that realm of waking dreams in which we achieve our ends—
often socially proscribed—without lifting a finger.
6. The Rage of Amos
If we can neutralize the effect that later scribes created through their spiritualizing prac-
tice and entertain the possibility that the words of AmosI might have been something other than 
the inspired pronouncements of a holy man, some questions about those words arise that, I 
suspect, have rarely if ever been asked, questions that touch upon my original impression that 
Amos is a literature of madness.  How can we, for instance, account for the vitriol or apoplectic 
rage of AmosL?  It makes sense that AmosI, as a shepherd, would not love a wall and would want 
it down.  But if we take him to be representative of working class people generally, does it make 
sense that he would fantasize its removal as part of a thoroughgoing orgy of destruction, even if 
we could imagine him as having a sense of being miserably enmeshed in a seemingly alien sys-
tem?  We can all think of isolated examples in which people have developed and acted upon such 
rage.  But most people—working class or otherwise—develop strategies for coping with 
injustice, real or imagined, that stop short of imagining or committing mayhem.
The rage with which Amos expresses himself and the violence of his fantasy life that it 
reflects cannot be attributed entirely or even principally to alienation.  The fact that things are 
rendered foreign or strange so that people can no longer recognize them for what they originally 
were does not necessarily conduce to anger.  Indeed, as Eco points out, alienation can produce 
the illusion that people are in control—of all the processes that are, in fact, mystifying them.  Eco 
explicates alienation entirely in cognitive terms as a consequence of misrecognition.  But Marx’s 
writing on alienation is charged with affect.  Writing about “the fact that the worker is related to 
the product of his labor as to an alien object,” Marx goes on to state that
it is clear according to this premise: The more the worker exerts himself, the more 
powerful becomes the alien objective world which he fashions against himself, the 
poorer he and his inner world become, the less there is that belongs to him.  It is 
the same in religion.  The more man attributes to God, the less he retains in him-
self.  The worker puts his life into the object; then it no longer belongs to him but 
to the object.  The greater this activity, the poorer is the worker.  What the product 
of his work is, he is not.  The greater this product is, the smaller he is himself. 
The externalization of the worker in his product means not only that his work 
becomes an object, an external existence, but also that it exists outside him inde-
pendently, alien, an autonomous power, opposed to him.  The life he has given to 
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the object confronts him as hostile and alien.  (“Economic” 289–90, emphasis 
original)
A righteous anger against a seemingly alien, oppressive force reducing human labour to mere 
drudgery—and, in the process, hollowing out human existence—permeates these words.26  This 
is not, however, an anger directed against the extortion of surplus value per se.  It is anger, rather, 
directed against the psychic misery of being reduced to a cog in an intricate system operating 
according to an impenetrable logic of its own.  It is, moreover, a constructive anger arising from 
Marx’s determination to redress the misery of alienation by illuminating its mechanism in order 
to assist those it affects to resist their oppressors and to adopt new, non-alienating social prac-
tices.  Marx’s anger reveals that he himself is not alienated—that he can take action in a way that 
AmosL seemingly cannot.27
AmosL’s loss of temper or command over his emotions may be largely attributable to a 
certain demoralization arising as a consequence of action.  For, despite his alienation, AmosL 
does respond to his discontent.  He goes to Bethel and curses Amaziah.
As we have seen (54 above), Blenkinsopp characterizes this encounter as “the account of 
his [Amos’s] arrest at Bethel.”  But this view is not supported in the text.  There is no account of 
any arrest in Amos.  Schottroff, on the other hand, states that “the priest Amaziah put a sudden 
end to his [Amos’s] activity at Bethel” (27).  This statement is also highly dubious.  The narrative 
in question is baldly inserted into a series of vision reports with no transitional material to indi-
cate whether the encounter occurred at the beginning or end of what Schottroff calls Amos’s min-
istry.  Moreover, in terms of the narrative itself, Amos is hardly intimidated by Amaziah.  The 
priest’s command to “flee away to the land of Judah” (7.12), rather than ending Amos’s activity 
at Bethel, only inspires more:
16 “Now therefore hear the word of the LORD.
You say, ‘Do not prophesy against Israel,
and do not preach against the house of Isaac.’
17 Therefore thus says the LORD:
‘Your wife shall be a harlot in the city,
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26  “Authentic art” as Althusser defines it provides one example of labour that is not 
alienated precisely because it deliberately reflects “the ideology from which it is born” (“A Let-
ter” 204, emphasis original, see 7 above).
27 A moral dilemma of working class or peasant revolutions as opposed to more 
spontaneous outbreaks such as riots is that they are typically led by disaffected intellectuals with 
the means to theorize and the capacity to organize.
and your sons and your daughters shall fall by the sword, 
and your land shall be parceled out by line;
you yourself shall die in an unclean land,
and Israel shall surely go into exile away from its land.’”
In response to all Amos’s provocation, Amaziah neither arrests him nor makes any overt move to 
silence him.  All we know from the narrative itself is that he makes a record of Amos’s 
appearance at Bethel and sends it off to Jeroboam.
To some extent, AmosL’s rage may be born in his frustration that he can gain no sense of 
traction or leverage—no point from which to make a stand—in his sense of grievance against the 
current state of affairs.  If Amaziah came out of the temple busting heads, he would provide some 
solid, representable basis against which resistance to the current regime could be defined.  But he 
does not.  He does not ignore the fact that Amos constitutes some sort of threat.  Accordingly, he 
does what bureaucrats typically do: he reports Amos to the proper authorities.  But he does not 
exaggerate the threat by overreacting to it, thereby creating a situation that could indeed make the 
threat worse than it actually is.  In consequence, malcontents such as Amos can make no head-
way: it is as if they are always operating in quicksand.  Amaziah reacts as an authority figure 
functioning within a hegemonic regime, a person who has assimilated the principles of such a 
regime even though he may not be able formally to state them.  Antonio Gramsci did the seminal 
thinking on the theory of hegemony, to a consideration of which we now turn.
6.1. Hegemony
Chantal Mouffe contends that Gramsci was the first Marxist thinker to elaborate a theory 
of ideology totally free from the implications of rigid economic determinism, thereby founding a 
tradition of Marxist thought of which Althusser is perhaps the most illustrious heir (169). 
Although Georg Lukàcs and Vladimir Lenin strove in various ways to develop a theory of ideol-
ogy freed from such rigid economic determinism (177), it was Gramsci who finally managed to 
do so.  Within Marxism specifically, the problem of determination has normally been fought out 
over the nature and degree of the relation of a determining economic base (the index of social 
being articulated in the mode of production) to a determined superstructure (the index of social 
consciousness manifest in law, politics, philosophy, religion, art and science, all of which Marx 
considers ideological forms), a relation which, as Raymond Williams points out, “has been com-
monly held to be the key to Marxist cultural analysis” (“Base” 3).  During the years of the Second 
International, a rigid economic determinism typically attributed to Karl Kautsky dominated Mar-
xist thinking.  In this classical Marxist theory of ideology, ideological superstructures are con-
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ceptualized “purely as a mechanical reflection of the economic base,” which, in turn, leads to 
their being viewed as “epiphenomena which play no part in the historical process.”  Moreover, 
they are “conceived as being determined by the position of the subjects in the relations of produc-
tion” (Mouffe 169).  In criticizing this species of determinism, Williams suggests that the early 
Marxists who believed in it had already lost touch with the key insights of Marx’s epistemologi-
cal break.  For the concept of determinism this classical theory evinces is clearly “inherited from 
idealist and especially theological accounts of the world and man.”  Marx, however, consistently 
opposes a concept of ideology “insistent on the power of certain forces outside man, or, in its 
secular version, on an abstract determining consciousness.”  For Marx, all social consciousness, 
though it may reflect social being, is ultimately determined in humans’ “own activities” (“Base” 
4).
Writing about the fluidity in the relation of forces in a way that anticipates Foucault, 
Gramsci introduces a subtlety into the Marxist understanding of class dominance it had pre-
viously lacked.  His theory of hegemony, developed during the 1920s and 1930s, has been 
decisive in granting an intermediate determinant function to superstructural elements.  For one 
class to dominate others, he argues, its peculiar interests must be adopted as universal 
(Gramsci 181).  This cannot happen if those interests are perceived as purely economic.  Eco-
nomic interests must seem to be transcended for the good of all, a transcendence only to be 
achieved on the superstructural plane.  After all, as we have seen (82 above), Marx contends that 
people only become conscious of basic economic contradictions in their superstructural 
manifestations: that it is on the level of “the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic” 
that they “fight it out.” Picking up the thread of this argument, Gramsci was the first cogently to 
argue that the dominance of any particular class depends upon “bringing about not only a unison 
of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity” (181), i.e., a superstructural 
consensus.  Indeed, such dominance may lay in its flexibility to make continuous concessions. 
Gramsci points out that 
the State is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create favourable 
conditions for the latter’s maximum expansion.  But the development and expan-
sion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the “natio-
nal” energies.  In other words, the dominant group is coordinated concretely with 
the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is con-
ceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equi-
libria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and 
those of the subordinate groups—equilibria in which the interests of the dominant 




In fleshing out Gramsci's theory of hegemony, Raymond Williams reminds us that
A lived hegemony is always a process.  It is not, except analytically, a system or a 
structure.  It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships, and activities, 
with specific and changing pressures and limits.  In practice, that is, hegemony 
can never be singular.  Its internal structures are highly complex, as can be readily 
seen in any concrete analysis.  Moreover (and this is crucial, reminding us of the 
necessary thrust of the concept), it does not just passively exist as a form of domi-
nance.  It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified.  It is 
also continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its 
own.  We have then to add to the concept of hegemony the concepts of counter-
hegemony and alternative hegemony, which are real and persistent elements of 
practice. (Marxism 112–13)
Maintaining hegemony is an ideological practice, and the success of any class in doing so 
ultimately depends upon how well it manages this practice amidst the daily vicissitudes of social 
life.  Management may seem to be too strong a word, for the extent to which a ruling class may 
seem to control this process can vary widely.  Because the terrain upon which the struggle for 
hegemony is fought is ideological, its ultimately political and economic nature may be effectively 
veiled even from the dominant class it principally serves.
For one class to maintain its hegemony, the state it controls must be seen to serve the 
interests of all classes.  How well the state does so is perpetually contested, but the very fact that 
such contestation is tolerated—within limits—guarantees the continued hegemony of the domi-
nant class.  Its ideology consistently casts the state as the protector of all, rich and poor alike, and 
it continually rehearses the benefits that accrue to all from the state’s existence.  Granted, we do 
not see Amaziah, the state’s representative, redressing Amos’s grievances.  Indeed, he warns him 
away.  But the fact that Amos is not intimidated by the warning and that Amaziah does not back 
it up with force suggests that this state, to use Williams’s words just quoted, “does not just pas-
sively exist as a form of dominance.”  It manages discontent partly by taking note of it, a note 
that remains in the archives as a record of rural discontent to which the state may one day need to 
respond.  The dispatch that Amaziah sends to Jeroboam is not necessarily a prelude to repression. 
Indeed, it declares that the situation is well under control.  Moreover, it implies that monarchical 
ideology has been largely effective: “the land," Jeroboam is told, "is not able to bear all his 
[Amos's] words” (7.10).  Ironically, that monarchical ideology has had its effects on Amos as 
well, for he continues to engage the state, if only to denounce its representatives.  Hegemonic 
states retain their control as long as their people continue to conceive them as adjudicators of 
their internal differences and continue to refer their grievances to them.  When the people stop 
doing so, parallel governments are established, and revolutions begin.
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Blenkinsopp’s conviction that Amos was arrested at Bethel assumes that the monarchy of 
Jeroboam could tolerate no criticism.  Such an assumption reflects the idealizing process that 
casts prophets as a species of principled knights errant waging war against oppressive states in 
the cause of justice.  Furthermore, in abstracting AmosI from the material drudgery of his daily 
existence and recasting him according to the nobler ideal of AmosL, the scribes involved were, I 
suspect, recasting him in terms of their own ideal selves.  In producing the texts, they could, in 
fact, see themselves as spreading the prophetic word as the Amoses of their times, as noqeded 
spokespeople for the poor.  To have done so, however, they themselves would have had to be 
working within a regime not itself particularly threatened by such a critique of a monarchical (or 
imperial) state, regardless of the extent to which that critique may have been blunted by being 
cast back in time or spiritualized by being transferred to the lips of an angry god.
7. Conclusion
In Chapters 2 and 3 I have elaborated a theory that the production of Amos involved a 
scribal idealization of an historical datum, one of rural discontent coalescing around various 
physical structures, not only the walls that impeded free movement in pursuit of livelihood but 
also the citadels that enhanced the state’s capacity to extract surplus value.  In Chapter 2 I have 
given flesh and blood to that historical datum in the form of a transhumant shepherd I have 
designated AmosI by adducing certain elements in the imaginary world of the text that reflect the 
frustrations a transhumant shepherd may have experienced.  I have also theorized how shepherds 
may have gained the reputation of being worldly wise and the skills of storytellers or even bards, 
accomplishments that may have led them to be remembered as seers who expressed rural dis-
content.  In Chapter 3 I have theorized that this working shepherd came to be represented as the 
literary figure whom I designate AmosL through an idealizing process that shifted his principal, 
daily concern from earning his bread to speculating upon questions of right and wrong.  In this 
process he was made a spokesperson for the northern, Mosaic tradition that Israel’s covenant 
with Yahweh depended upon moral conditions that it had now irrevocably breached.
At the outset of this study I posit that a dialectic tension exists between AmosI and 
AmosL.  We will recall that Althusser states that the study of the dialectic is “‘the study of con-
tradiction in the very essence of objects’” (45 above) and that the supersession of contradiction 
gives rise to historical change (46 above).  However, the tension between AmosI and AmosL is 
not manifest dramatically in the text itself.  It cannot be, for the Amos of the text is AmosL, a 
product of idealizing literary practice.  AmosI exists there only as a trace largely overwritten by 
AmosL.  He needs, therefore, to be resurrected theoretically from the few traces of him that the 
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text seems to preserve.  The tension of which I speak, on the other hand, was a latent spring to 
the production of the text itself, a tension born in contradiction that was resolved or superseded 
in the very idealization of AmosI as AmosL.
The contradiction in question is that between reality and ideology or, more particularly, 
the many social expectations that are ideologically shaped.  Very early on, we come to believe in 
a host of seemingly natural causes and effects: to believe that if we do so and so, such and such 
will naturally follow.  We come to believe that if we get a degree, a new job, a raise in pay, a dif-
ferent car, such and such will happen.  These consequences are usually quite vaguely conceived: 
they are generally limited to a sense that something good or bad will ensue.
Contradictions arise when these expectations are clearly not met: when we get the degree 
and wind up working at a hamburger stand anyway.  In that case, our situation is analogous to 
that of the ancient scribes puzzling over the covenant relation of Yahweh to greater biblical 
Israel.  The expectation had always been that, even though Israel and Judah had had different 
notions of that covenant, in general it was a good thing: it augured well for both.  How then, 
those scribes must have wondered, did Israel and Judah wind up a provincial backwater of the 
Persian Empire?  How had the ideologically shaped expectation of Yahweh’s protection failed? 
One way out of such an impasse is to glorify one’s history to provide an imaginary origin through 
which one can be sustained.  I may work at a hamburger stand, but by idealizing the education I 
have received, I can still maintain that I am a person of culture and vision.  The biblical com-
pilers may have been working, so to speak, in a hamburger stand of the Persian Empire, but by 
idealizing their history they could come to believe that they were, nevertheless, carrying on in the 
traditions of the spiritual heroes of their past—traditions that they were, in fact, in the process of 
elaborating as they worked.
AmosI—dirty, sweating working person with some local grievance that he quite possibly 
was—simply would not do.  He contradicts what the scribes needed him to be to make meaning 
out of their own lives.  He simply would not bear the ideological freight they needed him to 
carry.  Returning once more to Althusser’s insight that ideology causes us persistently to misap-
prehend our relation “to [our] real conditions of existence,” the problem with AmosI is that he 
represents those real conditions of existence.  He represents reality.28
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28 In saying this I do not intend to suggest that AmosI was not himself caught up in ideol-
ogy.  In fact, I have speculated above that he was motivated by an ideology idealizing what he 
took to be tribal virtues.  But the necessity to earn one’s daily bread by the sweat of one’s brow is 
a reality that, in respect to Amos at least, Biblical compilers and interpreters have tended to 
obviate in the fictions they have created about him.  
Some scholars have recognized the idealizing tendency of the biblical compilers.  As we 
have seen, von Rad observes that their detaching traditions “from the locality with which they 
had cultic associations caused their content to become highly spiritualised” (82 above).  But most 
have been quite willing to think in terms of the idealizations offered them by the compilers them-
selves: terms such as covenant and prophecy.  The fascination that logos-saturated texts featuring 
prophets evoke, added to the prophets’ protean capacity to support a diverse range of meanings, 
has made them an irresistible point of imaginative contact for hearers and readers ever since they 
first appeared.  As Dearman demonstrates, there has been a tendency among the well-educated, 
white, western liberals who produce much of the biblical criticism written and read in academia 
to continue the practice of their ancient, scribal forbears to cast up the characters they study in 
terms of their own values and class positions.  Typically they see Amos as a call to justice, but of 
the type they imagine they themselves would make.  Significantly for white American liberals, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. quotes Amos 5.24 in his historic “I Have a Dream” speech: “But let jus-
tice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.”  But the nature of jus-
tice itself, as Sergio Rostagno points out, varies according to the class position of the person call-
ing for it.  As a ruling-class institution and an ideological state apparatus, the church during the 
sixteen hundred years of Christendom tended to promote an interpretation of the biblical text 
based upon an idealist, individual conception of humankind stripped of class determination rather 
than upon a materialist, social one.  God’s justice was seen to be available to all, rich and poor 
alike.  Due to the influence of this teaching, Rostagno concludes that within western churches 
generally “[t]he Marxist belief that the mode of production in material matters governs the devel-
opment of social, political, and intellectual life [came to be] regarded as merely a heretical way 
of thinking” (62).  For a Marxist reading of Amos to be possible, Amos must be stripped of the 
ideality with which he has been invested by centuries of exegetes and reinserted into the working 
world in which he or the people he represents lived and breathed—complete with their class 
antagonisms.  Traditional, idealist hermeneutics blind to the implications of class differ little in 
their ideological aims from traditional, idealist hermeneutics blind to the implications of gender 
or race among other categories.  In his illuminating study on Biblical Hermeneutics and Black 
Theology in South Africa, Itumeleng Mosala demonstrates the necessity for black exegetes to cor-
rect for a normalized-as-white bias in interpretation (passim).  Similarly, Marxist critics must 
correct for a normalized-as-idealized-individual conception of social existence if they are to con-




Amos and the Dialectic of Trauma
In Chapters 2 and 3 I use Marxist theory to speculate upon the production of Amos.  Such 
a discussion of a text’s compositional process would seem almost by necessity to involve some 
argument concerning authorial intention.  But I use Amos to demonstrate the tendency of biblical 
compilers and interpreters to idealize the history of greater Biblical Israel.  Whether they do so 
from deliberate intention is a grey area indeed, for the larger issue I address is the idealizing 
tendency inherent in the operation of ideology.  Marx understands ideology to be a latent process 
governing thought and action, a process whose functioning, like that of Freud’s unconscious, can 
be comprehended only through analysis.  In line with the argument introduced in Chapter 1 that 
Marxist and psychoanalytic theory complement one another, in Chapters 4 and 5 I turn to psycho-
analytic theory to evaluate Amos in the form in which it eventually appeared in the Jewish Bible. 
Because I now consider Amos synchronically rather than diachronically as a work in progress, I 
henceforth drop the distinction between AmosI and AmosL.  Furthermore, I leave the question 
open whether the traumatic reading of Amos I propose in this chapter is a product of conscious 
design.  It is aesthetically appealing to believe this, but the question of authorial intention need 
not be pursued when analysis turns away from a theory of production.
1. Amos and the Trauma of Earthquake
As we have seen, Amos begins with a superscription.  Because I take it as my own starting 
point for the psychoanalytic evaluation of the text, it bears restating here: “The words of Amos, 
who was among the shepherds of Teko’a, which he saw concerning Israel in the days of Uzzi’ah 
king of Judah and in the days of Jerobo’am the son of Jo’ash, king of Israel, two years before the 
earthquake” ( םָעְבָרָי יֵמיִבּו הָדּוהְי־ְךֶלֶמ הָּיִּזֻע יֵמיִּב לֵאָרְׂשִי־לַע הָזָח רֶׁשֲא ַעֹוקְּתִמ םיִדְקּׁנַב הָזָה־רֶׁשֲא סֹומָע יֵרְבִּד
(ׁשַעָרָה יֵנְפִל םִיַתָנְׁש לֵאָרְׂשִי ְךֶלֶמ ׁשָאֹוי־ןֶּב (1.1).  The word that most interests me by way of reintroduc-
tion is the second to last in the Hebrew, יֵנְפִל (lIfne).  Its root is construed to be הנפ (p$nIh), 
which, for some reason yet to be adequately explained, is written invariably in the plural, םינפ 
(p$nim).  It means face(s).  The root has been prefixed and inflected to produce a construction 
meaning in the face(s) of, which the RSV translators render into English as before.  Therefore, a 
biblical Israelite standing before the king was literally understood to be standing in the face(s) of 
the king.  I point this out to emphasize that the construction originally denoted a spatial relation, 
one that was later adapted to denote the temporal relation of one event occurring prior to another. 
The upshot is that יֵנְפִל can be used either spatially or temporally, as can its English analogue 
before: e.g., I brushed my teeth before (temporal) I stood before (spatial) the king.
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In the superscription to Amos, יֵנְפִל is conventionally translated temporally, just as the 
RSV translators have rendered it.  They construe the superscription to mean that Amos pro-
phesied at a point in time two years prior to another point in time, that of the earthquake.  How 
would this meaning change, however, if we translated יֵנְפִל spatially?  One could render it more 
literally, according to its original meaning, in which case the English for the conclusion of the 
superscription would read “two years in the face of the earthquake.”  This reading is intelligible 
if we make the earthquake something more than a mere reference point, i.e., if we make it 
integral to the prophesy itself.  For the phrase “in the face of the earthquake” can be taken to 
imply not only that Amos experienced the earthquake but that it remains engraved in his memory. 
On this view, the words that Amos saw might be a response to an experience that he relives, as if 
it were unfolding before him spatially in his mind.  The two years, then, become not the point in 
time at which he prophesizes but the period of time during which he prophesizes affected by his 
memories of catastrophe.1
In contemporary psychotherapy, such memories are termed traumatic.  In this chapter, I 
review some early thinking about trauma in the history of modern psychiatry.  I discuss trauma in 
terms of dissociation, a concept embraced by many current theorists.  I move on to speculate 
about how the concept of dissociation fits a psychology of consciousness, taking as my particular 
reference the thought of Freud’s contemporary Pierre Janet.  Against the background of dissocia-
tion and a psychology of consciousness, I discuss Freud’s turn to a psychology of unconscious 
drives and distinguish his theory of trauma based upon repression from that based upon dissocia-
tion.  I go on to speculate that there is a dialectic to trauma in that it affects the psyche both on 
the level of the unconscious instincts, which humans share with all living beings, and on the level 
of the conscious cognitive schemes that are distinctively human.  Relying upon Ernest Becker's 
existentialist psychology, I argue that the essence of the traumatic is an inexorable sense of vul-
nerability arising in an experience of shock, as a result of which the structures of meaning within 
which humans normally take shelter are shattered.  I conclude by using the theory of trauma I 
elaborate to suggest a traumatic reading of Amos.
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1 I am indebted to the late Roger Pavey, rabbi emeritus of Congregation Agudas Israel in 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, who confirmed to me orally that this proposed reading is entirely natu-
ral and plausible in terms of the grammar, syntax, and semantics of biblical Hebrew.  In fact, he 
points out that interpretation in terms of the literal meaning of words, in this case reading before 
spatially rather than temporally, is the guiding principle of the first level of biblical interpretation 
employed in the Talmud. 
2. Some Early Thinking about Trauma in Modern Psychology
Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart point out that, toward the end of the nine-
teenth century, “the very foundation of modern psychiatry was laid with the study of conscious-
ness and the disruptive impact of” overwhelming or what we now call “traumatic experiences.” 
The disruption in question seemed to involve the processing of memory.  Certain memories, it 
seemed, “became obstacles that kept people from going on with their lives” (425).  “Certain hap-
penings,” the psychologist Pierre Janet later recalled, “would leave indelible and distressing 
memories—memories to which the sufferer was continually returning, and by which he was tor-
mented by day and by night” (qtd. in van der Kolk and van der Hart 425).2   Janet joined other 
turn of the century investigators such as J. M. Charcot, Alfred Binet, Morton Prince, Josef 
Breuer, and Sigmund Freud in attributing such memories to a “wounding of the mind brought 
about by sudden, unexpected, emotional shock” (Leys 3–4, emphasis original).
The concept of wounding is appropriate to a discussion of trauma, for, as Ian Hacking 
points out, “[t]rauma means wound” (76, see also Leys 19)3.  One can quite correctly speak of 
surgical trauma: a wound to the body deliberately inflicted by incision. But the concept of a 
wound to the mind was based upon an analogy to “what we now call whiplash injury, or the old 
‘railway spine’” (Hacking 76).  Contrary to surgical trauma, what were conceived to be the 
wounds of psychological trauma seemed to occur accidentally rather than deliberately.  More-
over, they left no visible, physical scars.4  Many of the early railway accidents of which Hacking 
writes seemed to produce wounds such as this.  “Engines went off the rails,” he tells us, “steam 
boilers blew up, cuttings caved in, at a rate per mile that would now seem impossible to us” (76), 
but people walked away apparently unfazed only to be afflicted later on by a bewildering array of 
ailments that incapacitated them seemingly as the result of a “catastrophic global reaction in the 
entire organism” (Leys 19).  The symptoms following upon an experience of what Allan Young 
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2 The documentation for the source of the Janet quotation is inaccurate in van der Kolk 
and van der Hart.  It is a translation from Janet’s Les médications psychologiques (580).
3 “‘Trauma’ is a term that has long been used in medicine and surgery.  It comes from the 
Greek τραυ^μα, meaning wound, which in turn derives from τιτρω' σχω, to pierce.  It generally 
means any injury where the skin is broken as a consequence of external violence, and the effects 
of such an injury upon the organism as a whole; the implication of the skin being broken is not 
always present, however—we may speak, for example, of ‘closed head and brain traumas’” 
(Laplanche and Pontalis 465). 
4 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (henceforth BTPP), Freud classifies such railway acci-
dents among the “traumatic neuroses of peace” (12).
calls “fear plus surprise” included “weak and fluttering pulse, cold sweat, relaxed sphincter mus-
cles, shallow breathing, deep depression, incoherent speech, etc.” (90)—symptoms comprising a 
syndrome often accompanying the intrusive flashbacks5 and nightmares tending to recur as an 
aftermath of trauma.
The upshot, Young reports, is that the “earliest medical reports concerning the phenome-
non that we now call traumatic stress” were written generally by “surgeons employed by railway 
companies” that believed they were “targets of people seeking compensation for spurious dis-
abilities.”  “[T]he physician’s job,” Young continues, was “to distinguish the fakes from func-
tional disorders, that is, cases in which the disability [seemed] authentic enough even though its 
physical basis [was] unknown” (90).  Sufferers from railway spine constituted a class of male 
hysterics (Hacking 76) who complemented the female sufferers of conversion hysteria populating 
“Breuer and Freud’s ground-breaking Studies of Hysteria (1895)” in which, according to Elaine 
Showalter, “women’s voices, stories, memories, dreams and fantasies enter the medical record” 
(155).  A third group that became a subject for early theorizing about psychological trauma com-
prised the shell-shocked soldiers of the First World War—the sufferers of what Freud calls war 
neuroses—who, as Robert Waelder, “a distinguished second-generation Viennese disciple of 
Freud,” remarked, could be seen shaking in the streets of Europe (qtd. in Lifton 164).  The nature 
of the psychological wound afflicting the various groups of sufferers was so mysterious that, as 
Ruth Leys observes,
[t]he twin problems of suggestion and simulation have haunted the history of 
trauma from the beginning.  Victims of railway accidents were often accused of 
malingering, especially when they sought compensation in the courts of law. 
Hysterics were frequently suspected of feigning the symptoms they so dramati-
cally displayed in their spontaneous or hypnotically induced performances.  And 
the shell-shocked soldier of World War I was repeatedly accused of fabricating his 
symptoms in order to avoid combat.6,7  (153)
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5 I use the term flashbacks to refer to “daytime reexperiences or reenactments of the 
traumatic event” that take “the form of recurrent, intrusive images or sensations associated with 
[it] or of a sudden feeling that the traumatic event is literally happening all over again” 
(Leys 241).  The term only entered the psychological lexicon in the 1960s (see Frankel passim).
6 To her credit, Pat Barker in Regeneration, a novel about shell-shocked soldiers based 
upon the notorious Siegfried Sassoon case during the Great War, leaves the extent to which he 
may have been simulating his symptoms ambiguous.  
This last group, Waelder speculates, led Freud to refine and extend his earlier work on trauma in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) (Lifton 164).
One lesson of “[t]he terrible war which has just ended,” Freud declares, which “gave rise 
to a great number of illnesses of this kind [‘traumatic neurosis’],” is that “it at least put an end to 
the temptation to attribute the cause of the disorder to organic lesions of the nervous system 
brought about by mechanical force.”  He is particularly engrossed by the recurrent distressing 
dreams connected to the “severe mechanical concussions” either of “railway disasters and other 
accidents involving a risk to life” or of the shock of battle (BTPP 12).  For, he insists,
[a]nyone who accepts it as something self-evident that their dreams should put 
them back at night into the situation that caused them to fall ill has misunderstood 
the nature of dreams. It would be more in harmony with their nature if they 
showed the patient pictures from his healthy past or of the cure for which he 
hopes. (13)
Freud’s thinking about traumatic dreams represents a watershed that very typically divides him 
and psychoanalysts generally from other theorists of trauma.  To demonstrate this, it is necessary 
first to turn to a consideration of the concept of dissociation.
3. Dissociation
At the very beginning of Freud’s career as a psychological theorist, a career that would 
establish him as “a founding figure in the history of the conceptualization of trauma” (Leys 18), 
he and Breuer sought to understand the conversion hysterias suffered by their female patients by 
analogy to the delayed psychological effects of physical shocks.  In their jointly authored “On the 
Psychical Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: A Preliminary Communication” (1893), they 
report that their investigations over a number of years have taught them “that external events 
determine the pathology of hysteria to an extent far greater than is known or recognized” (4), 
events that often comprise memories that “persist for a long time with astonishing freshness and 




7 Since the mid-nineteenth century, the juridical consequences of trauma have helped to 
maintain it as a subject of popular consciousness.  Over the past thirty years, the greatest public 
controversy has centered upon what Frederick Crews (Memory Wars, passim) has called the 
memory wars stemming from allegations of childhood sexual abuse based upon the reputed 
recovery of long- and deeply-buried memories.  One of the most prominent advocates for the 
authenticity of such memory has been Judith Herman (see her Trauma and Recovery).
are not at the patients’ disposal.  On the contrary,” they continue, “these experiences are com-
pletely absent from the patients’ memories when they are in a normal psychical state, or are only 
present in a highly summary form.  Not until they have been questioned under hypnosis do these 
memories emerge with the undiminished vividness of a recent event” (9, emphasis original). 
“Observations such as these,” they argue, “seem to us to establish an analogy between the 
pathogenesis of common hysteria and that of traumatic neuroses, and to justify an extension of 
the concept of common hysteria.  In traumatic neuroses,” they point out, “the operative cause of 
the illness is not the trifling physical injury but the affect of fright—the psychical trauma.  In an 
analogous manner,” they continue, “our investigations reveal, for many, if not for most, hysteri-
cal symptoms, precipitating causes which can only be described as psychical traumas.  Any expe-
rience which calls up distressing affects—such as those of fright, anxiety, shame or physical 
pain—may operate as a trauma of this kind….” (5–6, emphasis original).
The operative or precipitating cause in many of these illnesses, therefore, is trauma, 
which they identify as an “experience which calls up distressing affects”: fright in the case of 
physical accidents or fright, anxiety, shame or physical pain in other instances (5–6).  From the 
economic point of view of the Freudian metapsychology8 already being elaborated, the authors 
argue that, in certain dispositions, illnesses may occur that later manifest themselves either in 
chronic symptoms or in hysterical attacks (15–17) if patients do not react to trauma when it 
occurs to discharge its corresponding affect.  In “a normal person who has experienced a psychi-
cal trauma,” the authors state, the “memory of such a trauma […] enters the great complex of 
associations, [and] it comes alongside other experiences, which may contradict it.”  Through its 
integration into a broad range of ongoing experience, the shocking episode is put into a context 
of meaning that prevents it from becoming life defining.  Freud and Breuer elaborate:
After an accident, for instance, the memory of the danger and the (mitigated) 
repetition of the fright becomes associated with the memory of what happened 
afterwards—rescue and the consciousness of present safety.  Again, a person’s 
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8 Peter Gay explains that
[a]s Freud worked with his coinage “metapsychology,” […] he defined it more 
and more strictly, as a psychology that analyzes the workings of the mind from 
three perspectives: the dynamic, the economic, and the topographic.  The first of 
these perspectives entails probing mental phenomena to their roots in conflict-
ridden unconscious forces mainly originating in, but not confined to, the drives; 
the second attempts to specify the quantities and vicissitudes of mental energies; 
the third undertakes to differentiate distinct domains within the mind.  Together, 
these defining perspectives sharply distinguished psychoanalysis from other 
psychologies. (369, fn)
memory of a humiliation is corrected by his putting the facts right, by considering 
his own worth, etc.  In this way a normal person is able to bring about the dis-
appearance of the accompanying affect through the process of association. (9)
 Others who suffer psychic trauma, however, are not so fortunate.  In some instances, people do 
not immediately and adequately react to a psychic trauma because its circumstances dictate 
against it. One reason adduced is that the trauma may involve “things which the patient wished to 
forget, and therefore intentionally repressed9 from his conscious thought and inhibited and sup-
pressed” (10).  In other instances, the person affected is incapacitated and cannot immediately 
and adequately react due to “severely paralysing affects, such as fright” or to “positively 
abnormal psychical states, such as the semi-hypnotic twilight state of day-dreaming, auto-
hypnoses, and so on.  In such instances,” the authors declare, “it is the nature of the states which 
makes a reaction to the [traumatic] event impossible” (11).
The upshot of the inability to react to the affect of the traumatic event by associating that 
event with other experience is that its memory becomes insulated from or encapsulated in that of 
normal, integrated experience in an abnormal, dissociated state of consciousness the authors 
describe as hypnoid, a state in which the affect connected to the trauma continues to press for dis-
charge.  This pressure produces the chronic symptoms or hysterical attacks from which the 
patient suffers, and it continues to do so until discharge is effected.  The catharsis required may 
be achieved therapeutically through hypnosis, whereby the sufferer, by being returned to the hyp-
noid state in which the traumatic memory is encapsulated, is enabled to recall the event and react 
to it retroactively, a process the authors term abreaction.  Abreaction facilitates symbolizing the 
event in language, which is often a key to discharge.  “The injured person’s reaction to the 
trauma,” the authors insist, “only exercises a completely ‘cathartic’ effect if it is an adequate 
reaction—as, for instance, revenge.  But language serves as a substitute for action; by its help, an 
affect can be ‘abreacted’ almost as effectively” (8, emphasis original).
Much of what Breuer and Freud wrote in 1893 has remarkable currency.  For instance, in 
summarizing the thought of Bessel van der Kolk, a prominent modern trauma theorist, Ruth Leys 
observes that, according to van der Kolk, traumatic memory
is not integrated into ordinary awareness but is cut off or “dissociated” from con-
sciousness and hence is unavailable for normal recollection.  Traumatic disorders 
are thus simultaneously disorders of remembering and forgetting: the traumatic 
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9 The editors point out that “[t]his is the first appearance of the term ‘repressed’ 
(‘verdrängt’) in what was to be its psycho-analytic sense.”  At this early date, repression was still 
attributed to conscious intention (10, fn. 1). 
“stimulus” seems to be recorded in the brain with unparalleled vividness and 
accuracy but, precisely because the traumatic event is so shattering, the memory of 
the trauma is radically dissociated from symbolization, meaning, and the usual 
processes of integration. (239)
 Although Breuer and Freud make no statements about the accuracy of traumatic memory, this 
summary is otherwise consonant with views they express at the beginning of Freud’s career.  But 
it is not Breuer and Freud among the progenitors of trauma theory to whom contemporary inves-
tigators now allude so much as Pierre Janet, whose “monumental legacy,” according to van der 
Kolk and van der Hart, “was crowded out by psychoanalysis, and largely forgotten, until Henri 
Ellenberger rescued him from total obscurity in ‘The Discovery of the Unconscious’ (1970).”10 
Like Breuer and Freud, Janet also believes that some people are temperamentally disposed to suf-
fer the effects of trauma more than others: to some extent the proclivity to suffer is inversely pro-
portional to one’s “‘psychological force’ (overall energy level) and psychological tension (the 
capacity to focus on relevant information and utilize available data for appropriate action).”11 
More significantly, however, Janet insists that “healthy psychological functioning” depends upon 
the ability automatically to assimilate new experience into an ever-evolving, flexible network of 
memory now commonly referred to as implicit memory (426).  Frightening experiences may pose 
cognitive problems that prevent their automatic integration into this implicit memory.  “[E]xist-
ing meaning schemes may be entirely unable to accommodate” such experiences, “which causes 
[their] memory…to be stored differently and not available for retrieval under ordinary condi-




10 As I discuss below, in turning his attention to the instinctual basis of psychic life, Freud 
would soon dissociate himself from his early theories of dissociation and abreaction that have 
once again achieved prominence in the thinking of many trauma theorists.
11 Breuer and Freud also declare that some people are more disposed than others to drift 
into the hypnoid states that render people more susceptible to suffering traumas with enduring, 
dissociated effects.  Apparently, the tendency to drift into such states can be culturally enhanced. 
Such states, they speculate, often “grow out of the day-dreams which are so common in healthy 
people and to which needlework and similar occupations render women especially prone” (“On 
the Psychical Mechanism” 8).  
12 The authors are summarizing Janet’s views published in his L’automatisme psychologi-
que and Les médications psychologiques.
Although Breuer and Freud on the one hand and Janet on the other agree (or agreed in the 
early 1890s) that traumatic memories are dissociated from normal consciousness, the former tend 
to see trauma as an emotional problem (a problem of undischarged affect) while Janet analyzes it 
more as a cognitive problem.  The traumatic experience simply does not make sense in terms of a 
memory structure that one has elaborated in the course of one’s life.  In its dissociated state, how-
ever, Janet insists that the experience becomes a “‘traumatic memory,’ which merely and uncon-
sciously repeats the past.”  The object of therapy is to convert that traumatic memory, if memory 
it is, into “‘narrative memory,’ which narrates the past as past” (Leys 105, emphasis original). 
Over time, therefore, the cognitive problem of trauma more and more becomes a temporal one. 
Traumatic memory may not be memory at all, for, so the argument goes, it is experienced in 
nightmares, flashbacks, and bodily sensations as if it were happening for the first time.  The point 
of narrating the story of the traumatic event is to get the patient to “say ‘I remember’”13 in order 
to put it “in its place as one of the chapters in our personal history”14 (111, emphasis original). 
The patient continues to suffer due to an inability to comprehend that the precipitating event 
properly lies in a past that has been survived.  The resolution of traumatic neurosis, then, is seen 
to lie principally in putting one’s experiences in proper temporal sequence.
4. Conceptualizing Trauma in Terms of a Psychology of Consciousness
When van der Kolk and van der Hart state that Janet's “monumental legacy was crowded 
out by psychoanalysis" (110 above), this is probably largely attributable to the circumstance that, 
"[i]n contrast with Freud, who thought that memories of conflictual issues were repressed, Janet 
thought that mental patients suffered from a loss of capacity to store and utilize conscious 
information” (van der Kolk, Brown, and van der Hart 376).  In focussing as he does on the 
psychology of consciousness, Janet seems to be working within a western philosophical tradition 
stemming from classical Athens that the good life—individually and corporately—is achievable 
but only through the exercise of rationality.  In particular, Plato and Aristotle teach that rea-
sonable individuals can achieve not only intellectual and moral coherence but harmony within 
the political state and, through the contemplation of the good, within the cosmos itself.  I believe 
I am on safe ground in arguing that the early psychological investigators of trauma—Freud as 
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13 Leys is quoting a translation from Janet’s Névroses et idées fixes (137, emphasis added 
by Leys).
14 Leys is quoting from Janet’s Psychological Healing: A Historical and Clinical Study, 
an English language translation of Médications psychologiques (1:661–2). 
well as Janet—understand the resulting hysteria as rooted in a failure of the coherence that Plato 
and Aristotle value as an attribute of the good life.15  On this view, the goal of therapy lies in 
healing the fracture or wound produced by trauma in one’s psychic life by rendering a consistent 
account of one’s experience.  This goal manifests the enduring appeal or desire for the wholeness 
characterizing the classical Athenian conception of the good life to which I allude above, an ideal 
translated into Christian terms by such biblical injunctions as “You, therefore, must be perfect, as 
your heavenly Father is perfect” (Mat 5.48).
Leys suggests the imperative dominating Janet’s therapeutic technique is to heal the 
traumatic wound by helping the sufferer to achieve a symbolically coherent account of his or her 
life by the best means available, even if this involves forgetting certain events rather than remem-
bering them.  In fact, she says,
[i]n 1894, Janet […] remarked that one of the most valuable discoveries of 
pathological psychology would be a sure means of helping us to forget.  The same 
year he criticized Breuer and Freud’s account of the cathartic cure on the grounds 
that what mattered in the treatment of the neuroses was not the “confession” of the 
traumatic memory but its elimination.  Nor did the ethical implications of such 
“modern exorcism” or “psychological surgery” trouble him.16  (107–8)
On this view it is more important therapeutically that the sense the patient makes of his or her 
experience be coherent than truthful.17  The history of a life is as liable to the same literary con-
struction as Hayden White claims that political or social history is—as liable to be narrativized 
  
 112 
15 For Aristotle tragedy arises in a flaw in the hero’s otherwise noble character represent-
ing a fracture in his or her rational and moral capacity that invariably undermines the social order 
(48).
16 She is here summarizing ideas that appear in Janet’s Névroses et idées fixes and 
Psychological Healing: A Historical and Clinical Study.
17 Herman condemns Janet in that he “sometimes attempted in his work with hysterical 
patients to erase traumatic memories or even to alter their contents with the aid of hypnosis.” 
This violates her conception of “[t]he fundamental premise of the psychotherapeutic work,” 
which, she asserts, “is a belief in the restorative power of truth-telling” (181).  In commenting 
upon these statements, Leys observes that “[f]or Herman and for the modern recovery movement 
generally, even if the victim of trauma could be cured without obtaining historical insight into the 
origins of her distress, such a cure would not be morally acceptable” (109, emphasis original). 
For the trauma of childhood sexual abuse in which she specializes, Herman argues that truth-
telling is necessary for social healing.  Her argument is similar to that which animated truth com-
missions in Guatemala and South Africa.
according to a standard set of plots that, I suggest, derive principally from the ideological 
repertoire of one’s culture.  This view of trauma therapy is consonant with the notion that sub-
jectivity itself is largely a fiction imposed upon experience to impart meaning to it.
The imposition of form upon experience is a function of the subjectivity that dis-
tinguishes humans among animals.  Georges Bataille says that “in our eyes, the animal is in the 
world like water in water,” a poetic expression of a suspected lack of subjectivity that manifests 
itself in a sense of the world’s immanence (Theory 24).  “It is only within the limits of the 
human,” he insists, “that the transcendence of things in relation to consciousness (or of con-
sciousness in relation to things) is manifested” (23–24).  This insight suggests that it is only 
among humans, on the one hand, that a sense of consciousness exists as something apart from 
and over against everything else, and it is only among humans (and perhaps some other 
primates), on the other hand, that a special sense of structure exists that maintains the difference. 
This sense has allowed humans, otherwise incapable of surviving in “Nature, red in tooth and 
claw,” to domesticate it by imposing forms upon it within which to take shelter and survive.
In elaborating his theory of archetypal meaning, Northrop Frye writes about the forms 
that “categories of reality […] assume under the work of human civilization” in a way that 
emphasizes this point.  “The form imposed by human work and desire,” he tells us,
on the vegetable world […] is that of the garden, the farm, the grove, or the park. 
The human form of the animal world is a world of domesticated animals, of 
which the sheep has a traditional priority in both Classical and Christian meta-
phor.  The human form of the mineral world, the form into which human work 
transforms stone, is the city.  (141, emphasis original)
Similarly, in terms of the psychology of consciousness I am now discussing, the narratives we 
continually elaborate about our own lives are, ideally, personal works of civilization.  Like the 
gardens, farms, groves, parks, and cities of which Frye writes, they are structures or forms we 
construct and impose upon the flux of nature, forms in which we aim to take shelter and to live 
securely.  Much of this structure consists of implicit memories, i.e., those experiences, as we 
have seen, that Janet posits are automatically assimilated into an ever-evolving, flexible network 
of memory (110 above).  Part of this network is also a framework within which we conceptualize 
our lives unfolding, a framework comprising assumptions, beliefs, and expectations, among other 
things, which, like the memories from which it derives, are frequently implicit in the narratives 
that constitute our personal histories.  Much of this framework is inculcated ideologically.
Janet’s concept of dissociated memory arising from an inability to integrate experience 
into “existing cognitive schemes” of a “personal narrative” (van der Kolk, Weisarth and van der 
Hart 52) implies that consciousness ideally involves a coherent psychic organization that 
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determines the sense we make of things.  That ability to make sense of things symbolically, 
which I speculate developed from the capacity to locate oneself as a subject within a structure, is 
a corollary of the loss of immanence.  The recognition of a transcendent world introduces 
humans into a world of experience—a world that other animals do not suffer, a world against 
which humans require a defensive shelter if they are to survive.  In elaborating his existentialist 
psychology, Ernest Becker refers to Rudolph Otto’s capacity “to get descriptively at man’s natu-
ral feeling of inferiority in the face of the massive transcendence of creation.”  Otto, he points 
out, “talked of the terror of the world, the feeling of overwhelming awe, wonder, and fear in he 
face of creation—the miracle of it, the mysterium tremendum et fascinosum of each single thing, 
of the fact that there are things at all” (49).18  It is this terror of the transcendent world, Becker 
insists, against which humans require protection.  Other animals do not: living immanently—
non-self-consciously—in the world as they do, they do not sense transcendence.19  Moreover, 
Becker points out,
nature has protected the lower animals by endowing them with instincts.  An 
instinct is a programmed perception.  It is very simple.  Animals are not moved by 
what they cannot react to.  They live in a tiny world, a sliver of reality, one neuro-
chemical program that keeps them walking behind their noses and shuts out 
everything else.  But look at man, the impossible creature!  Here nature seems to 
have thrown caution to the winds along with the programmed instincts.  She cre-
ated an animal who has no defence against full perception of the external world, 
an animal completely open to experience.  Not only in front of his nose, in his 
umwelt, but in many other .  He can relate not only to animals, but in some ways 
to all other species.  He can contemplate not only what is edible for him, but 
everything that grows.  He not only lives in this moment, but expands his inner 
self to yesterday, his curiosity to centuries ago, his fears to five billion years from 
now when the sun will cool, his hopes to an eternity from now.  He lives not only 
on a tiny territory, nor even on an entire planet, but in a galaxy, in a universe, and 
in dimensions beyond visible universes.  It is appalling, the burden that man bears, 
the experiential burden. (50–51, emphasis original)  
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18 Becker is summarizing material in Otto’s The Idea of the Holy.
19 I am well aware of the feminist critique that writing privileging the experience of trans-
cendence is masculine gendered.  For this very reason, Becker’s text illuminates the psychic 
dynamics of a patriarchal text such as Amos.
The loss of immanence mirrors a shift in the sources of information upon which humans depend 
for survival.  “[H]uman behavior,” Clifford Geertz observes, “is inherently extremely plastic. 
Not strictly but only very broadly controlled by genetic programs or models—intrinsic sources of 
information—such behavior must,” he concludes, “if it is to have any effective form at all, be 
controlled to a significant extent by extrinsic ones” (63, emphasis added).  But the shift to a 
greater reliance upon extrinsic information that goes hand in hand with a sense of the world as 
transcendent has the power, as Becker details, to overwhelm us.  What Frye calls the works of 
civilization—among which I include the narrative structures we construct about our own lives—
are necessary, therefore, to carve out secure habitations in which to live by reducing the 
immensity Becker describes to a manageable scale.
My first thought in attempting to connect the foregoing ruminations to Janet’s concept of 
trauma is that traumatic experiences are those that threaten to fracture the civilizing frameworks 
in which we live.  Thinking of traumatic experiences in terms of threat is consonant with think-
ing of those frameworks in terms of defence, the necessity for which Becker suggests by charac-
terizing the human animal in the state of nature as defenceless “against full perception of the 
external world.”  Moreover, characterizing trauma as a threat requiring a corresponding defence 
is the most dramatically appealing way of schematizing its force.  On second thought, however, 
this way of putting things cannot accurately represent Janet’s view, at least in terms of emphasis. 
For Janet, the problem that trauma poses very much requires a cognitive resolution that requires 
putting experience into a proper temporal sequence.  Traumatic experience is dissociatively 
walled off not so much because it poses a threat but because it makes no sense in terms of the 
cognitive schemes that comprise the content of consciousness.20
As a psychologist of consciousness, it follows that Janet attempts to understand trauma in 
terms of cognitive dissonance.  But I suspect that some of this focus upon consciousness is 
axiomatic: it seems to reflect a valuing of self-conscious wholeness understood as an ideal goal 
for human nature.  Therapy aimed at achieving a temporally coherent narrative of one’s 
memories may reflect a subscription to some notion of entelechy, i.e., to a teleological concept of 
human nature whereby we continually attempt to realize a potential for wholeness.  Herman’s 
statement that “[m]ost theorists […] speculate that the repetitive reliving of the traumatic experi-
ence must represent a spontaneous, unsuccessful attempt at healing” (41) implies that we are 
psychically programmed to heal ourselves—to overcome our traumatic wounds perhaps by anal-
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20 Early in his career Freud distinguished between hypnoid and defence hysteria as if the 
former were not a form of defence.  Later he came to suspect that dissociated consciousness is 
also a form of defence.  
ogy to the physiology of bodily healing.  Of what such psychic healing consists, of course, can 
only be determined normatively.
Because humans are thinking animals, I do not doubt Paul Ricoeur’s assertion that “con-
ceptual clarification […] has therapeutic value” (Living 8).  Such clarification, however, need not 
result from deliberatively rational processes.  Janet’s notion that the structure of consciousness 
comprises automatically assimilated memories underscores the assumption that this structure 
itself is the complex fabrication of a mechanism of which we can hardly be aware.  The many 
elements of that structure absorbed ideologically are not subjected to critical scrutiny in that pro-
cess.21  Indeed, the automaticity of the normal assimilation of experience into memory is remark-
ably similar to that characterizing the ideological formation of political subjects discussed in the 
previous chapter.
At this point, I turn from Janet’s elaboration of trauma in terms of a psychology of con-
sciousness to consider Freud’s elaboration of a theory of instinct as the basis for his ongoing 
speculations about the nature of trauma. 
5. Freud and the Turn from Consciousness to Instinct
Observing that “Freud has gone out of fashion,” Ian Hacking comments that, as a corol-
lary to this, some historians of psychoanalysis who would bury him once and for all try “to ignore 
the fact that Freud transformed Western consciousness more surely than the atomic bomb or the 
welfare state.”  Among the “more fundamental aspects of his work” that “we often ignore,” he 
argues, is that “[h]e cemented the idea of psychic trauma” (76).  Cement is an odd word to 
employ to characterize the consequences of Freud’s work on trauma, for his ideas on the subject 
never, it seems, held together with much consistency.  Leys insists that “it cannot be emphasized 
too strongly that […] Freud’s writings of the 1920s and 1930s remained fraught with doubt and 
vacillation.  In particular, everything he wrote about the ego’s defences in the traumatic neuroses 
of war was marked by hesitation and contradiction” (25).
It is not, however, Freud’s work on trauma that accounts for his revolutionary impact 
upon modern thought.  That impact, rather, arises from the manifold ramifications of a lifelong 
investigation articulated upon the premise that human beings, regardless of their current state of 
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21 Clifford Geertz, for one, observes that “[w]here science is the diagnostic, the critical, 
dimension of culture, ideology is the justificatory, the apologetic, one—it refers ‘to that part of 
culture which is actively concerned with the establishment and defence of patterns of belief and 
value’” (71).  Geertz is quoting Lloyd A. Fallers, “Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism” 
(677–8).
evolution, are still animals.  His early notoriety arose from the scandalous implications of that 
work: that humans (and, more particularly, children) are subject to the same creaturely impulses 
that characterize animality and make it a term of contempt.  When Bataille distinguishes the 
human from the animal in terms of the capacity to perceive the world’s transcendence, he is part-
icipating in the age-old philosophical undertaking of idealizing humans as subjects of conscious-
ness, which is indispensable to idealizing them further as subjects of will.  To Janet and his fol-
lowers, the wound of trauma impairs the will.  “In his use of language,” Herman states, “Janet 
implicitly recognized that helplessness constitutes the essential insult of trauma, and that restitu-
tion requires the restoration of a sense of efficacy and power” (21), in short, the restitution of 
conscious mastery over one’s life.
In conceptualizing human beings as animals, Freud tends to collapse distinctions valoriz-
ing humans in terms of the quality of consciousness.  “Psycho-analytic speculation,” he insists, 
“takes as its point of departure the impression, derived from examining unconscious processes, 
that consciousness may be, not the most universal attribute of mental processes, but only a partic-
ular function of them” (BTPP 24).  A more universal attribute of mental processes is the force of 
instinct, a force so universal that, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud ascribes the origin of 
life itself to the awakening of instinct.  It is remarkable the extent to which this book speculates 
upon the hypothetical “living organism in its most simplified possible form as an undifferentiated 
vesicle of a substance that is susceptible to stimulation” (26).  Freud is here searching for the 
basic principles that separate the living from the non-living, principles of life rather than con-
sciousness that characterize one-celled organisms as well as humans.
In what he admits to being an “often far-fetched speculation” (24), Freud searches for 
those principles in terms of the response to stimulation.  Conceptualizing the “undifferentiated 
vesicle” representing “the living organism in its most simplified possible form,” he speculates 
that “the surface turned towards the external world will from its very situation be differentiated 
and will serve as an organ for receiving stimuli.”  “It would be easy to suppose,” he continues, 
that as a result of the ceaseless impact of external stimuli on the surface of the 
vesicle, its substance to a certain depth may have become permanently modified, 
so that excitatory processes run a different course in it from what they run in the 
deeper layers.  A crust would thus be formed which would at last have been so 
thoroughly “baked through” by stimulation that it would present the most 
favourable possible conditions for the reception of stimuli and become incapable 
of any further modification.
Eventually, the elements of this “‘baked-through’” crust “would have become capable of giving 
rise to consciousness” (26).  Characterizing consciousness arising from a physical crust is a 
  
 117 
curious procedure.  Nevertheless, it suggests that topographically consciousness itself evolved as 
part of a protective shield.
One significance of this line of thought in a discussion of trauma is that it demonstrates 
Freud thinking about the processes that gave rise to life itself—and the consciousness that 
eventually arose in animal life—as traumatic events.  In a vision similar to Becker’s, he imagines 
his “little fragment of living substance” exposed to an external world that threatens to overpower 
and destroy it (Becker, 114 above).  He sees it “suspended in the middle of an external world 
charged with the most powerful energies[,]” one in which “it would be killed by the stimulation 
emanating from these [energies] if it were not provided with a protective shield against stimuli” 
(BTPP 27).  “Protection against stimuli,” he insists, “is an almost more important function for 
the living organism than reception of stimuli” (27, emphasis original).  Here we have a concept 
of a living thing as a entity (an inside) that requires, as a condition of its existence, a defence 
against a force or forces (an outside) that threaten to destroy it.  This necessity accords with the 
concept that humans require shelter in which to live, but Freud extends his thinking on the sub-
ject to all forms of life.  After a long speculation upon the evolutionary development of his primi-
tive organism’s defences, Freud arrives at his most basic definition of trauma: “We describe as 
‘traumatic’ any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the pro-
tective shield” (29).
The universal tendency of living things to defend themselves against the unpleasure of 
excessive stimulation illustrates the operation of the pleasure principle as if it were a natural law. 
“In the theory of psycho-analysis,” Freud states in the opening sentences of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, “we have no hesitation in assuming that the course taken by mental events is automati-
cally regulated by the pleasure principle.”  He immediately summarizes what he means by this: 
“We believe that the course of those events is invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable ten-
sion, and that it takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that 
tension—that is, with an avoidance of unpleasure or a production of pleasure” (7).  The equation 
tension = unpleasure is axiomatic in Freud’s work.  In consequence, from the economic point of 
view of his metapsychology, he consistently sees mental processes as dedicated to binding the 
free psychic energy that he conceives as the source of unpleasurable excitation in order to reduce 
it to quietude.  “We have decided,” he concludes, “to relate pleasure and unpleasure to the 
quantity of excitation that is present in the mind but is not in any way ‘bound’; and to relate them 
in such a manner that unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and 
pleasure to a diminution” (7–8, emphasis original).
At the risk of oversimplifying Freud’s concept of instincts,22 their most basic function is 
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automatically to regulate the psychic mechanism to keep its overall level of excitation as con-
stantly low as possible.  They do this by developing a pressure counter to that exerted by 
unbound psychic energy, in order to effect a result analogous to that of a discharge in a steam or 
hydraulic system, a result achieved in Freud’s system, as just noted, by the binding of energy. 
Laplanche and Pontalis point out that the “idea that the instincts are to be defined essentially by 
the pressure that they exert dates from the beginnings of Freud’s theoretical thought” (330).
6. Repression versus Dissociation
Not long after Freud and Breuer collaborated in 1893 on “On the Psychical Mechanism of 
Hysterical Phenomena: A Preliminary Communication,” Freud dissociated himself from the con-
cept of dissociation.  Already by 1895, when Breuer’s and Freud’s Studies on Hysteria appeared, 
Freud makes it clear that dissociation was Breuer’s idea.  Although he concedes that “[i]t was 
hypnoid hysteria23 which was the first of all to enter our field of study” (285), he declares that “I 
have never in my own experience met with a genuine hypnoid hysteria.  Any that I took in hand 
has turned into a defence hysteria” (286).  In each of his own cases, he states, he “was able to 
show afterwards that the so-called hypnoid state owed its separation to the fact that in it a psychi-




22 Freud uses two terms—Instinkt and Trieb—that, as Laplanche indicates, “in common 
[German] usage […] have more or less the same meaning.”  Both are frequently translated into 
English and French as instinct.  But Laplanche insists that Freud “exploit[s]” the “objective 
duplicity” of the terms “to introduce a slight difference of meaning, which is occasionally barely 
perceptible, but will at times be accentuated to the point of constituting a veritable opposition” 
(Life 9).  To distinguish the two, Laplanche translates Instinkt by instinct and Triep by pulsion, 
which his own translators render into English as instinct and drive respectively.  According to 
Laplanche and Pontalis, Freud uses Instinkt (instinct) “in the classical sense” to speak, for 
instance, of the responses of “animals confronted by danger” (Language 214).  In Life and Death 
in Psychoanalysis, Laplanche states that Freud typically but not consistently uses Triep (drive) to 
refer to instincts as they are modified and operative in humans.  In his discussion of anaclisis, 
Laplanche argues that drives are derived from instincts in early childhood through metonymic 
associations (15–18, 74, 86–87).  In this study I follow these distinctions: instinct refers to a phe-
nomenon applicable to animals generally and drive to one applicable to humans specifically. 
Quoted material does not always follow suit, thereby reflecting the terminological imprecision of 
Freud and his translators and interpreters.
23 Hypnoid hysteria refers to the symptoms arising from dissociated memories.  The hyp-
noid state is that in which traumatic memories are encapsulated (see 109 above).
cludes, “I am unable to suppress a suspicion that somewhere or other the roots of hypnoid and 
defence hysteria come together, and that there the primary factor is defence.  But I can say noth-
ing about this” (286, emphasis added).  Contrary to this final admission, he would spend the rest 
of his life elaborating the largely unconscious mechanisms of defence that aim “at the reduction 
and elimination of any change liable to threaten the integrity and stability of the bio-
psychological individual” (Laplanche and Pontalis 103).
A problem that Freud had with Breuer's concept of dissociation is that in it “[n]o psychi-
cal force has […] been required in order to keep it [the pathogenic idea] apart from the ego and 
no resistance need be aroused if we introduce it into the ego with the help of mental activity dur-
ing somnambulism [hypnosis]” (Breuer and Freud, “Studies” 285).  The theory of dissociation 
fits neither the dynamic nor economic perspective of Freud’s metapsychology.  In attempting to 
describe dissociation, van der Kolk and van der Hart state that it “reflects a horizontally layered 
model of the mind: when a subject does not remember a trauma, its ‘memory’ is contained in an 
alternate stream of consciousness, which may be subconscious or dominate consciousness, e.g., 
during the traumatic re-enactments” (438).24  Although it is not clear how a subconscious psychic 
region is to be conceived as an alternate stream of consciousness, the main idea here seems to 
involve parallel regions between which the mind flickers back and forth as if there were some 
insulation failure between the two.  Clearly, such flickering cannot be analyzed according to 
Freud's dynamic approach, which accounts for mental phenomena in terms of conflicts marking 
the vicissitudes of instinct.  Nor can it be analyzed economically in terms of “the circulation and 
distribution of an [instinctual] energy […] that can be quantified, i.e., that is capable of increase, 
decrease and equivalence” (Laplanche and Pontalis 127).
The idea of a psychic force that Freud misses in Breuer's—and, by extension, Janet’s—
concept of dissociation fits better with the idea of repression, which, in contrast to the horizontal 
structure of dissociation, “reflects a vertically layered model of the mind: what is repressed is 
pushed downward, into the unconscious.  The subject no longer has access to it.  Only symbolic, 
indirect indications would point to its assumed existence” (van der Kolk and van der Hart 437–
38).  Van der Kolk and van der Hart conclude that “[a]ttempts to relate both models [of dissocia-
tion and repression] to each other have, so far, been rather unsuccessful […].  One failure is that 




24 The authors are summarizing ideas they attribute to Janet's “Historie d'une idée fixe” 
contained in his Névroses et idées fixes.
Although I agree with what van der Kolk and his associates say in contrasting dissocia-
tion and repression, it begs the question of why researchers would seek to relate them.  Properly 
understood, repression is also a response to cognitive dissonance.  “Strictly speaking,” Laplanche 
and Pontalis state, repression is “an operation whereby the subject attempts to repel, to confine to 
the unconscious, representations (thoughts, images, memories) which are bound to an instinct.25 
Repression occurs when to satisfy an instinct—though likely to be pleasurable in itself—would 
incur the risk of provoking unpleasure because of other requirements” (390, emphasis added). 
Repression so defined is a defence against the threat the idea representing the drive would pose 
by emerging into consciousness.
In Freud’s scheme, therefore, instinct is one type of defence, and repression another. 
Instinct is a defence against excessive stimulation characterizing all life forms, one to be sought 
ultimately on the cellular level.  Repression, on the other hand, is a defence against the satisfac-
tion of a drive.  Operating according to the pleasure principle, it functions when the pleasure of 
satisfying a drive threatens to become unpleasurable “because of other requirements” (Laplanche 
and Pontalis 390).  Those other requirements are those of human culture that assume so promi-
nent a place in the cognitive schemes comprising the content of consciousness.  Humans are sub-
jects of instinct because they are living beings but subjects of repression because they are a par-
ticular type of social being.  Their society does not depend, as it does with ants and bees, upon 
instinct understood classically as patterned “behaviour determined by heredity” (Laplanche and 
Pontalis 214).  It depends, rather, upon the ability to take one’s place within a symbolic order that 
endows existence with meaning.
Freud understands repression as a response to the threat (symbolized in the threat of 
castration) through which society enforces its demands that the gratification of drives conform to 
normative patterns.  Repression is the mechanism through which individuals signal acceptance of 
the power relations of the symbolic order and take their places within it.  The movement of self-
limitation implicit in repression is part of that dynamic through which human beings seek secure 
shelter in a universe that threatens to overwhelm them.  Becker insists that repression is 
absolutely essential if a child, for instance, is to develop the capacity to function in the world, 
what with its wonder and terror.  Living within the framework of culture reduces the terror of an 
otherwise inexplicable cosmos to a framework of symbolic meaning.  For human beings, the pro-
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25 Freud’s stipulates that “[a]n instinct can never become an object of consciousness—
only the idea that represents the instinct can” (“Unconscious” 177).
tective shield that Freud stipulates is a sine qua non for the continued existence of living beings 
extends to include the cognitive schemes of culture as well.26
Dissociation and repression, therefore, are both theories that account for a failure to 
integrate certain experiences (identified as traumatic) into existing patterns of meaning.  Dis-
sociation theory, on the one hand, operates on the principle that traumatic experience makes no 
sense in terms of existing patterns of conscious meaning.  According to van der Kolk and Green-
berg, the difficulty of integrating such experience is exacerbated because it resists symbolization. 
Traumatic memories, they insist, “are encoded in sensorimotor or iconic form and therefore can-
not be easily translated into the symbolic language necessary for linguistic retrieval.”  They con-
clude that “[t]he essence of the trauma experience is that it leaves people in a state of [literally] 
‘unspeakable terror’” (“Retrieval” 193).  Repression, on the other hand, operates because the sub-
ject affected would be all too clear about the meaning of the experience in question were it 
allowed to enter consciousness.  Construed in terms of a threat, that experience is pressed down 
into the unconscious so that the subject may avoid consciously coming to grips with its meaning, 
which, however, continues to be addressed unconsciously through dreamwork and neurotic 
symptoms.
The foregoing discussion treats repression in its strict sense.  As with most things 
Freudian, the concept has an ongoing life and development that renders its more com-plex. 
Laplanche and Pontalis point out that 
[i]n a looser sense, the term “repression” is sometimes used by Freud in a way that 
approximates it to “defence.”  There are two reasons for this: first, the operation 
of repression in [the strict] sense […] constitutes one stage-to say the least-in 
many complex defensive processes (and Freud takes the part for the whole); sec-
ondly, the theoretical model of repression is used by Freud as the prototype of 
other defensive procedures.  (390-91)
In the ensuing discussion of repression as a defence against the terrible knowledge that traumatic 
experience imparts, I use repression in this looser sense used by Freud.
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26 Although Freud recognizes that the social life upon which human survival depends is a 
product of  repression, his clinical practice was dedicated to liberating neurotics from the effects 
of excessive repression.
7. The Dialectics of Trauma
Long ago western thinkers conceptualized that humans occupy a place within the plenum 
of existence or upon a chain of being intermediate between spiritual and animal spheres 
(Lovejoy).  For instance, in his Oration on the Dignity of Man Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) 
has God proclaim to humanity: 
I have put thee in the center of the universe in order for thee to see better what is 
there.  I did not make thee either a heavenly or an earthly creature, either mortal or 
immortal; I created thee so that as thine own sculptor thou makest thine own fea-
tures.  Thou canst degenerate into an animal; but thou canst also be reborn, 
through the free will of thine own spirit, into the image of God.  (qtd. in 
Choron 96)
Freud’s work on trauma reflects a concept of the human condition reminiscent of Pico’s: that of 
an animal also capable of recognizing itself as a subject over against an environment that it trans-
cends or that transcends it.  However, Freud would qualify Pico’s assertion in several ways. 
Over the long run, most of us are likely neither to “degenerate into an animal” or to be “reborn 
[…] into the image of God.”  Most of us, rather, are condemned perpetually to oscillate between 
the two poles Pico’s thought comprehends: an animal pole manifest in instinctive desire and a 
social pole manifest in submission to a demand that animal desire be strictly controlled and 
limited. And the question of sculpting our nature with the freedom of will that Pico attributes to 
us in simply out of the question.27  The best most of us can do is to strike some balance between 
these poles of our psychic existences.  Our condition is perhaps best characterized in terms of a 
dilemma, for the demands these poles represent cannot be reconciled.  In the heat of passion, the 
animal seeks liberation from law and all institutions that aim to regulate its conduct.  But, as sub-
jects (and objects) of culture, humans consistently seek to deny (or repress) the animality (or 
creatureliness) that also informs them.
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27 Although Freud is a materialist who emphasizes human animality, he nevertheless aims 
therapeutically to free people from the grip of neurotic or psychotic symptoms.  It may seem 
incongruous to introduce a quotation from Pico, with his Christian talk of being “reborn…into 
the image of God,” into a discussion of a secular thinker such as Freud, but the tension Pico 
describes mirrors the tension I here summarize in psychoanalytic theory.  Moreover, engaged as 
Pico seems to be in the early modern discourse on free will, his talk of a humanity “reborn…into 
the image of God” may be taken to symbolize a humanity that has achieved a sovereign freedom. 
Pico and Freud differ fundamentally in the framework of their thought, but they share the aspira-
tion that humanity achieve a greater degree of freedom.
Traumatic experience involves both poles of the psyche.  Taking Freud’s general theory 
of the instincts as an investigation of the denominator common to all life forms—i.e., the psychic 
dimension of human animality—we will recall that Freud defines as traumatic “any excitations 
from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective shield.”  Although Freud 
does write of this shield as a lifeless membrane, it is clear that, in humans, the system Cs. that 
lies adjacent to it, the system in which consciousness is contained (BTPP 28), works in protective 
conjunction with this shield.  In respect to what he calls the “ordinary traumatic neuroses” (i.e., 
the “neuroses of peace” such as the railway disasters that first informed his thinking on trauma 
rather than the neuroses that surfaced during the Great War), he observes that “two character-
istics emerge prominently: first, that the chief weight in their causation seems to rest upon the 
factor of surprise, of fright; and secondly, that a wound or injury inflicted simultaneously works 
as a rule against the development of a neurosis.”  In other words, it is not physical trauma that 
produces psychic trauma but the “factor of surprise” (12).  The fright so decisive in rendering a 
railway disaster traumatic arises in the total unpreparedness for the shock the disaster produces. 
Preparedness, which can only exist in the system Cs., is part of the protective shield.  It allows 
us, as it were, psychically to brace ourselves against the oncoming blow, which reduces the over-
all level of excitation this blow produces.  In a curious phrase, Freud states that the fright “is 
caused by lack of any preparedness for anxiety, including lack of hypercathexis28 of the systems 
that would be the first to receive the stimulus” (31).  Anxiety, then, is a necessary part of the 
defence against oncoming disaster.  It signals the psychic system to prepare itself.  Lacking that 
preparedness, the system’s defences are inevitably breached.  “I do not believe,” Freud states, 
“anxiety can produce a traumatic neurosis.  There is something about anxiety,” he says, “that pro-
tects its subject against fright and so against fright-neuroses” (12–13).  “Preparedness for 
anxiety,” he concludes, “and the hypercathexis of the receptive systems constitute the last line of 
defence of the shield against stimuli” (31).
The protective function of anxiety is the key to understanding a puzzling symptom of 
traumatic neurosis: the dreams that “have the characteristic of repeatedly bringing the patient 
back into the situation of his accident, a situation from which he wakes up in another fright” (13). 
That such dreams should occur does not clearly and immediately fit Freud's theory that dreams 
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28 In Freud’s early work, hypercathexis refers to the additional energy attached to an idea 
or perception during the process of conscious attention (Laplanche and Pontalis 191).  Laplanche 
and Pontalis state that, “[f]rom a rather similar perspective, Freud later gives the name of hyper-
cathexis to the preparation for danger which permits the subject to avoid or to check the trauma” 
(192).
are wish fulfillments.  He wrestles with that problem in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  At one 
point, he acknowledges that “it is impossible to classify [traumatic dreams] as wish-fulfilments.” 
But he immediately qualifies this statement in a way that seems to contradict it.  In analysis, at 
least, traumatic dreams are compelled “by the wish […] to conjure up what has been forgotten 
and repressed” (32).  The twists and turns in Freud’s thought—and the provisional nature of his 
writing—make it difficult to appreciate that the question whether traumatic dreams satisfy wishes 
is something of a red herring.29  A question better addressing the puzzle they pose concerns the 
principle according to which dreams operate.  Previously, Freud had believed that dreams, as part 
of the binding process reducing psychic tension, operate according to the pleasure principle.  He 
now came to understand that the dreams of traumatic neurosis operate according to another 
principle—one beyond the pleasure principle.  “They arise,” he says, “in obedience to the com-
pulsion to repeat.”  But he is not prepared to abandon his thesis that the ultimate purpose of 
dreams is to satisfy wishes.  Traumatic dreams fulfill a preparatory task too, one that “must be 
accomplished before the dominance of the pleasure principle can even begin. These dreams,” he 
insists, “are endeavouring to master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety 
whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis” (32).30
The cognitive problems arising from traumatic experience reveal its effect upon the other 
pole of psychic organization we have been discussing—i.e., the psychic dimension of humans as 
subjects (and objects) of culture.  Cathy Caruth writes very provocatively of trauma in terms of 
missed experience (60–63).  According to Caruth, the puzzling aspect of traumatic railway dis-
asters, for instance, is that, other than the shock, nothing tangible really happens: the subject sur-
vives and “walks away apparently unharmed” (6).  I grant that much has been written, particu-
larly in holocaust studies, about the traumatizing factor in the experience of genocide and other 
scenes of mass death as being guilt: the guilt of having survived, incomprehensibly, against all 
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29 Laplanche and Pontalis observe that “[t]he set of Freud’s thinking in the first chapters 
of Beyond the Pleasure Principle does not come down to a simple rejection of the basic 
hypothesis according to which what is sought under the cloak of apparent suffering—as in the 
symptom—is the realisation of desire” (79).
30 Freud does concede that traumatic dreams provide “a view of a function of the mental 
apparatus which, though it does not contradict the pleasure principle, is nevertheless independent 
of it and seems to be more primitive than the purpose of gaining pleasure and avoiding unplea-
sure” (32).  He concludes that “[i]f there is a ‘beyond the pleasure principle’, it is only consistent 
to grant that there was also a time before the purpose of dreams was the fulfilment of wishes. 
This would imply no denial of their later function” (33).
calculable odds.  I suspect, though, however real and painful that guilt may be, that it has little to 
do with rendering such experiences traumatic.
As I stress repeatedly, the problem is cognitive.  Caruth declares that the traumatic acci-
dent, “as it emerges in Freud and is passed on through other trauma narratives, does not simply 
represent the violence of a collision but also conveys the impact of its very incomprehensibility. 
What returns to haunt the victim […] is not only the reality of the violent event but also the 
reality of the way that its violence has not yet been fully known” (6, emphasis added).  That 
which is incomprehensible in trauma is a consequence of the fact that humans are not, as Bataille 
puts it, “in the world like water in water.”  Because we sense ourselves as subjects within an 
environment that transcends us, we are also aware—perhaps uniquely so among living beings—
that we have a corporeal nature.  The protagonist of V. S. Naipaul’s story “One Out of Many” 
sums up his transition from the life of a domestic servant in Bombay to that of a cook in Wash-
ington, D. C., as a movement from immanence to transcendence: “I was once part of the flow, 
never thinking of myself as a presence.  Then I looked in the mirror and decided to be free.  All 
that my freedom has brought me is the knowledge that I have a face and have a body, that I must 
feed this body and clothe this body for a certain number of years.  Then it will be over” (61).  In 
very measured tones, he presents the paradigm for the traumatic.  All that is missing to make his 
realization itself traumatic is the shock.  I argue that the essence of trauma is the incomprehensi-
ble implications of the insight—delivered in a shock against which we cannot prepare to defend 
ourselves—that we also have bodies.
Becker captures the flavour of the traumatic in elaborating upon Erich Fromm’s observa-
tion “that the essence of man is really his paradoxical nature, the fact that he is half animal and 
half symbolic” (Becker 26).31  Becker terms this an existential paradox:
We might call this existential paradox the condition of individuality within 
finitude.  Man has a symbolic identity that brings him sharply out of nature.  He is 
a symbolic self, a creature with a name, a life history.  He is a creator with a mind 
that soars out to speculate about atoms and infinity, who can place himself 
imaginatively at a point in space and contemplate bemusedly his own planet.  This 
immense expansion, this dexterity, this ethereality, this self-consciousness gives 
to man literally the status of a small god in nature, as the Renaissance thinkers 
[such as Pico] knew.
Yet, at the same time, as the Eastern sages also knew, man is a worm and 
food for worms.  This is a paradox: he is out of nature and hopelessly in it; he is 
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31 Quoting Fromm’s The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil (116–17).
dual, up in the stars and yet housed in a heart-pumping, breath-gasping body that 
once belonged to a fish and still carries the gill-marks to prove it.  His body is a 
material fleshy casing that is alien to him in many ways—the strangest and most 
repugnant way being that it aches and bleeds and will decay and die.  Man is 
literally split in two: he has an awareness of his own splendid uniqueness in that 
he sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he goes back into the 
ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to rot and disappear forever.  It is a 
terrifying dilemma to be in and to have to live with. (26, emphasis original)
This vision of ourselves as worm-food with monstrous gill-marks provides a glimpse of the 
human animal outside the symbolic shelter of meaning-making.32  It is what the speaker in T. S. 
Eliot’s “The Dry Salvages” glimpses in “The backward look behind the assurance / Of recorded 
history, the backward half-look / Over the shoulder, towards the primitive terror” (195).  The “as-
surance” that “recorded history” provides arises, once again, in that very meaning-making that 
endows each of us with the dignity of “a creator with a mind that soars.”33  The flash of insight 
investing the glimpse “towards the primitive terror” is a shockwave that momentarily ruptures 
the protective shield of all our cognitive schemes.  That shockwave is what Jacques Lacan calls 
the tuché, “the encounter with the real.  The real,” he states, “is beyond the automaton, the 
return, the coming-back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see ourselves governed by the 
pleasure principle.  The real is that which always lies beyond the automaton, and it is quite 
obvious, throughout Freud’s research, that it is this that is the object of his concern” (53–54, 
emphasis original).34  It is an insight that repression aims to prevent: the chilling realization that 
the symbolizing creature who calls itself “I” is, as Yeats puts it, “fastened to a dying animal” 
(22).  On the cognitive level, that paradoxical insight is the key to the traumatic.
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32 Julia Kristeva records her reaction to our animal nature and functions in Powers of 
Horror: An Essay on Abjection: 
[a] wound with blood and pus, or the sickly, acrid smell of sweat, of decay, does 
not signify death.  In the presence of signified death—a flat encephalograph, for 
instance—I would understand, react, or accept.  No, as in true theatre, without 
makeup or masks, refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in 
order to live.  These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, 
hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death.  There, I am at the border of my 
condition as a living being.  (3, emphasis original)
33 The assurance of recorded history lies in its reduction of experience to meaning by 
imposing some pattern upon it—regardless of the horror that many of its events may evoke.
34 I return to the Lacanian real in Chapter 5.
Becker contends that Freud correctly appreciates the dynamics of the existential human 
dilemma but states them in the wrong terms.  For Freud, the traumatic indicator of our animality 
to be repressed is sex.  For Becker, it is death.  The common denominator of the two is vul-
nerability.  Regardless of what Caruth states in the balance of her study, “[w]hat returns to haunt 
the victim” of trauma—the survivors of vehicular accidents, battlefield concussions, childhood 
abuse, rape, and genocide—is a sense that can no longer be entirely repressed: a sense of vul-
nerability experienced viscerally as a threat to the body.
The ultimate consequence of our vulnerability is death, a factor in human life to which we 
have responded symbolically since the dawn of civilization.  But that symbolization has typically 
been in the service of domesticating death—of removing its sting, as it were—by continuing to 
conceptualize it in terms of living experience, as if it were an “undiscovered country, from whose 
bourn / No traveler returns.”  The traumatic insight is that death has no sting, for it is no country 
and there is no traveler to feel it.  To move from Hamlet to As You Like It, death leaves us “[s]ans 
teeth, sans eyes, sans taste, sans everything,” with the caveat that it leaves us sans us as well, 
without any subjective point from which to experience and express nothingness.  Returning to 
Caruth’s formulation, “what returns to haunt the victim” has less to do, as she suggests it does, 
with “the reality of the violent event.”  As Freud observes, violence that inflicts real, physical 
wounds does not prove to be traumatic.  It has more to do with “the way that [the event’s] 
violence has not yet been fully known,” but it is not precisely that either.  The truth for the sur-
vivor that makes the violence of the almost-but-not-yet-experienced event incomprehensible is 
that it can never be known or symbolized because it portends one’s own death—which, as 
Maurice Blanchot tells us, cannot be represented.  “If it is true,” he says, “that for a certain Freud, 
‘our unconscious cannot conceive of our own mortality’ (is unable to represent mortality to 
itself), then it would seem to follow that dying is unrepresentable, not only because it has no pre-
sent, but also because it has no place, not even in time, the temporality of time” (118).
8. Amos as Literature of Trauma
The contention that the traumatic is unrepresentable clearly challenges my claim that 
Amos can be read as a response to a traumatic event.  Such an insight is hardly amenable to con-
clusive demonstration.  As with much literary criticism, the evidence cannot be marshalled as an 
incontrovertible proof.  It can only be presented in such a way that suggests (always imperfectly) 
how the work at hand can be read as a response to traumatic experience.  I present the evidence 
below in terms of six categories: imagery, intensity of voice, incoherence of the text, production 
of anxiety, threat of exile, and non-representability.
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8.1. In Terms of Imagery
That the various calamities—fire, earthquake, military invasion—pictured in Amos are to 
descend upon Israel is hardly persuasive of anything more than an armchair familiarity with such 
catastrophes.  As Walter Brueggemann observes (62 above), these are conventional topoi that 
signify the ferocity with which Yahweh enforces his “sovereignty over recalcitrant subjects.” 
But the images in Amos have a vivid, explosive quality that suggests direct experience of the dis-
asters they portray.  Amos claims to report divine speech, but the content of that speech is not 
only highly visual but also kinetic and tactile.  “Smite the capitals,” he hears the Lord say, “until 
the thresholds shake, and shatter them on the heads of all the people” (9.1).  “For lo, I will com-
mand, and shake the house of Israel among all the nations as one shakes with a sieve, but no peb-
ble shall fall upon the earth” (9.9).  The shaking of the columns from capitals to thresholds and 
the shaking of the house of Israel as if in a sieve from which no pebble escapes provide detail 
that exceeds a generic cataloguing of conventional disasters, as if in the telling Amos is reliving a 
traumatic experience.
Particular qualities invest Amos’s earthquakes that persuade me they have actually been 
felt rather than imagined.  One is the paralysis produced by the sensation of earthquake, a 
paralysis to which I can testify as a person who spent over a quarter century in a region where 
earthquakes are prevalent.  It is a paralysis akin to that produced by the pitching of ships at sea. 
Lines such as “Flight shall perish from the swift, and the strong shall not retain his strength” 
(2.14) evince the sensation that one has lost the equilibrium necessary to move, a sensation best 
learned (and perhaps only learned) viscerally through experience.
Moreover, if the damage produced by earthquake has any logic to it—which, given the 
laws of physics, it certainly must—it is a logic that defies all human expectation.  The flimsiest 
of structures remain intact while the strongest are atomized.  The most various fragments come to 
settle into patterns that can only be described as grist for the surreal.  “As the shepherd rescues 
from the mouth of the lion two legs, or a piece of an ear,” we are promised in Amos 3.12, “so 
shall the people of Israel who dwell in Sama'ria be rescued, with the corner of a couch and part of 
a bed.”  Such are the visions of those who have survived earthquake and surveyed the bewilder-
ing dispersal of fragments into patterns of new and frightening realities.
The death earthquakes produce becomes inscribed in the memory of survivors as the 
missed but only delayed experience Caruth posits as the essence of the traumatic.  The causes of 
some Amosian disasters cannot be precisely determined.  But the scale of death Amos prophesies 
frequently suggests the densely populated urban settings where earthquakes wreak their greatest 
havoc.  The people of Israel are warned of the imminence of the Day of the Lord.  “‘The songs of 
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the temple shall become wailings in that day,’ says the Lord GOD; ‘the dead bodies shall be 
many; in every place they shall be cast out in silence’” (8.3).  Being the events of a single day, 
this description is not consonant with famine or plague.  Nor does it suggest military invasion: 
the survivors are left in place to search for and cast out the dead.  This grisly work—and the wail-
ings in the temple—suggest direct experience of the physical and psychic shock of earthquake. 
The consequences of the promise that “I will deliver up the city and all that is in it” are equally 
dire.  “[I]f ten men remain in one house,” we are promised, “they shall die” (6.9).  After that 
catastrophe, “a man's kinsman […] shall take him up to bring the bones out of the house” which 
he will then burn (6.10).  Such detail also suggests direct experience.
8.2. In Terms of the Intensity of Voice
Amos is hardly the type of poetry with which one would sit down in the evening, perhaps 
with a Mendelssohn quartet playing in the background and a glass of red wine at hand, to relax 
after a demanding day.  The voice in Amos is frenzied, whipped up to a fever pitch from which it 
never varies.  As one listens to this voice, it is easy to imagine it emanating from a psyche con-
tinually bombarded by stimuli.  In consequence, Amos hammers away as if possessed by a force 
he can in no way control.  As we see in the foregoing section, Amos is driven by the imperative 
mood, which reflects its intensity of voice.  “Smite the capitals,” Yahweh commands.  “[S]hatter 
them on the heads of all the people.”  The imperative mood dominates from the third chapter on. 
In strident, accusatory tones, Amos’s audience is variously commanded to “[p]roclaim to the 
strongholds in Assyria” and to “[a]ssemble yourselves upon the mountains of Sama'ria” (3.9); to 
“[h]ear, and testify against the house of Jacob” (3.13); to “[c]ome to Bethel, and transgress” and 
“to Gilgal [to] multiply transgression” (6.4); to “[p]ass over to Calneh, and see [...] and thence 
[to] go to Hamath the great [and] then [to] go down to Gath of the Philistines” (8.2). 
Even when Amos shifts to the indicative mood, its tone is invariably emphatic.  “I smote 
you with blight and mildew” (4.9), Yahweh declares.  “I slew your young men with the sword” 
(4.10).  The voice never modulates—never finds another gear than high.  Not only is it hyper-
tensive, but its images are hyperbolic.  “I abhor the pride of Jacob,” Yahweh declares, “and hate 
his strongholds; and I will deliver up the city and all that is in it” (8.8).  Everything is maximal: 
Jacob’s pride, Yahweh’s hatred, Israel’s punishment.  There are no gradations, no nuances or 
subtle distinctions.  Those who seek relief in Amos’s world of constant tension are condemned. 
“Woe to those,” the voice declares, “who are at ease in Zion” (6.1).  “Woe to those who lie upon 
beds of ivory, and stretch themselves upon their couches” (6.4).  “[T]hey shall now be the first of 
those to go into exile, and the revelry of those who stretch themselves shall pass away” (6.7).
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It may be that the intensity of the voice speaking in Amos reflects a psychic system braced 
to bind stimulus.  Freud does not consider this possibility in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  He 
considers the heightening of tension only a symptom of neurosis rather than a symptom of 
defence.  I contend that the edgy, nervous, and imperious tone of this voice can be read as an 
index to the continuing effects of trauma.
8.3. In Terms of the Incoherence of the Text
In Chapter 1, using a term of Roland Barthes’s, I observe that “Amos is a writerly text par 
excellence” (22 above).  I state that because Amos’s editors seem to have cut the oracles “out of 
various contexts” and strung them together without “transitional interpretive material,” they have 
thereby created an impression of “a rambling, disjointed Amos incapable of synthesizing his 
thought,” i.e., the impression of a traumatized person.  Because the meaning humans impute to 
experience forms part of the structure upon which they depend for survival, they are perforce 
“meaning-making mammals.”35  The massive stimulus of a traumatic event shatters the existing 
structure of meaning and undermines the ability to create a new one.  The most notorious exam-
ple of Amos’s disjointedness occurs in its final chapter (Chapter 9).  It begins with an image of 
earthquake—Yahweh’s command to “[s]mite the capitals” (9.1, see 129 above)—and continues 
in a tone of unrelieved doom through verse 10, in which Yahweh proclaims: “All the sinners of 
my people shall die by the sword,who say, ‘Evil shall not overtake or meet us.’”  But verse 11 
immediately follows with a vision of an earthly paradise that continues to the end of the book:
11  “In that day I will raise up 
the booth of David that is fallen
and repair its breaches,
and raise up its ruins,
and rebuild it as in the days of 
old;
12  that they may possess the remnant 
of Edom
and all the nations who are called 
by my name,”
says the LORD who does this.
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35 I suspect that I have come across such a term in the work of Umberto Eco, but I cannot 
pinpoint it.  It is currently implanted in my memory in consequence of a lecture by Professor 
Terry Matheson of the English department of the University of Saskatchewan.
13  “Behold, the days are coming,” says 
the LORD,
“when the plowman shall overtake 
the reaper
and the treader of grapes him 
who sows the seed;
the mountains shall drip sweet wine,
and all the hills shall flow with it.
14  I will restore the fortunes of my 
people Israel,
and they shall rebuild the ruined 
cities and inhabit them;
they shall plant vineyards and drink 
their wine,
and they shall make gardens and 
eat their fruit.
15  I will plant them upon their land,
and they shall never again be 
plucked up
out of the land which I have given 
them,” 
says the LORD your God.
This conclusion is notorious.36  It has puzzled commentators from time immemorial.  It comes 
with a shock similar to that of trauma itself, for nothing in the preceding eight and a half chapters 
prepares the reader for it.37  The qualification that immediately precedes it, that only the “sinners 
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36 The shift here is only the most notorious incidence of incoherence in Amos.  The shift 
from 5.14-15, which offers grace should the people become just, to 5:16ff, which promises that 
“[i]n all the squares there shall be wailing,” provides another example of rapid fluctuation 
between hope and despair.
37 The fact that sudden shifts in mood occur in other biblical literature such a psalms does 
not mitigate the observation I here make about Amos.  The psalms themselves are dramatic 
liturgical texts whose parts were read by various persons during celebrations in the Jerusalem 
temple.
of my people” who presume that “Evil shall not overtake or meet us” “shall die by the sword” 
(9.10) is too abrupt to serve as an adequate transition.
Wolff deals with this conclusion by attributing it to a postexilic eschatology of salvation. 
“After the early postexilic period [late 6th to early 5th century],” he claims, “when salvation pro-
phecy came to the fore, it was no longer possible to transmit a prophetic proclamation of judg-
ment as onesidedly harsh as Amos’ without adding a new word of salvation (9:11-15)” (113). 
This implies that Amos as it then stood so traumatically threatened the cognitive schemes of the 
scribes involved that they could not let it stand as they found it.
Wolff’s observation provides a diachronic escape from the controversy engendered by 
Amos’s conclusion, one that will not serve in a synchronic analysis of the finished product.  From 
a Marxist perspective—i.e., from the perspective of class struggle—one might argue that Amos’s 
(and Yahweh’s) anger is only directed against the ruling class and that the idyllic concluding 
vision looks forward to the society that a righteous agricultural remnant will rebuild once its 
exploiters have been expelled.  If the “booth of David” to be repaired and raised up (9.11) refers 
to the temporary shelters in which he lived when he was still a shepherd, that image might refer 
to a period of idealized rural virtue that obtained before his ascension to monarchy.  But this 
reading is not problem free.  David was not the first king.  And the cities that Amos (and Yah-
weh) so thoroughly detest will also be rebuilt.
Over the years Amos has certainly become for me, in Barthes’s term, a more readerly text. 
Interpretation has so reduced the tension of the writerly that my contention that Amos is a writerly 
text is now based largely upon the memory of my first reading.38  What if, however, an interpre-
tive assessment concluded there were no grounds sufficient for integrating Amos’s conclusion 
with the rest of the text?  What if Amos’s conclusion were no more than a disjointed fantasy? 
There would then be some grounds for characterizing Amos as a poetry of madness, a madness 
induced by an experience of trauma.39  It would not be so characterized because it violated any-
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38 The readerly text has been reduced to meaning through interpretation (17 above).
39 By applying modern psychopathological theory to Amos I have medicalized the text, 
medicalization being “the process by which medical assumptions, practices, values, and 
vocabularies penetrate traditional, prescientific attitudes, institutions, and practices” (Micale 77). 
I do not intend to suggest, however, that the term madness is embraced by the modern medical 
establishment.  It reflects, rather, what that establishment would likely consider to be “traditional, 
prescientific attitudes.”  As I state above, I use the term neither pejoratively nor precisely.  I use it 
to convey my impression that the text and characters under consideration are fragmented beyond 
our interpretive capacity to put them together again (21 above).  It is a writerly term, one more 
one’s norms but because it could achieve no internal norm of consistency of its own.  It would 
mean that the framework for meaning-making of the person whose voice we hear is fractured. 
For any person living outside that framework—living, as Lear would have it, as an “unac-
comodated man,” as a “a poor, bare, forked animal” completely unsheltered and therefore vul-
nerable to all experience—the burden of that experience would be truly appalling.
8.4. In Terms of the Production of Anxiety
 The brooding anxiety in Amos is unmistakable.  In two of the most prominent instances, 
the anxiety arises from a sense that there is no safety to be found from a pursuer.  In Chapter 5, 
for instance, at the precise moment when the subject seems to have escaped one threat, another 
that was not anticipated at all prevails:
18  Woe to you who desire the day of 
the LORD!
Why would you have the day of 
the LORD?
It is darkness, and not light;
19       as if a man fled from a lion,
and a bear met him;
or went into the house and leaned 
with his hand against the wall, 
and a serpent bit him.40




appropriate to a study of literature that does not refine the mysterium tremendum et fascinosum 
from experience through a clinical exercise of hyperrationality. 
40 I accept Wolff’s judgment that 5.19 exemplifies village wisdom literature (97).  “The 
subject matter here,” he observes, “is fully in keeping with the realm of a sheep breeder’s experi-
ence” (256).  In the same paragraph he states that “in the Old Testament the serpent is the deadly 
enemy of man,” but such symbolism would not have become apparent until the collected texts of 
the emerging biblical canon began to be studied centuries after Amos’s time.  AmosI would not 
have been familiar with the story of the serpent in the Garden of Eden, which very likely 
originated as literature of the Jerusalem court.  AmosI moved in entirely different circles.  As I 
note above (page 3, fn 9), I am convinced that Amos the text and Amos the man were Israelite 
rather than Judahite.
1  I saw the LORD standing beside 
the altar, and he said: 
“Smite the capitals until the 
thresholds shake,
and shatter them on the heads of 
all the people;
and what are left of them I will slay 
with the sword;
not one of them shall flee away,
not one of them shall escape.
2  “Though they dig into Sheol,
from there shall my hand take 
them;
though they climb up to heaven,
from there I will bring them down.
3  Though they hide themselves on the 
top of Carmel,
from there I will search out and 
take them;
and though they hide from my sight 
at the bottom of the sea,
there I will command the serpent, 
and it shall bite them.
4  And though they go into captivity 
before their enemies,
there I will command the sword, 
and it shall slay them;
and I will set my eyes upon them
for evil and not for good.”
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud theorizes that anxiety signals a threatened organism to 
defend itself against excessive stimulus.  Due to lack of time, the suddenness of a traumatic event 
prevents the anxiety signal from functioning, which in turn prevents the organism from bracing 
itself against the oncoming shock.  Freud does not specify the form effective bracing takes.  He 
simply observes that, “[o]wing to their low cathexis,”41 “the systems that would be the first to 
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receive the stimulus [...] are not in a good position for binding the inflowing amounts of excita-
tion” (31).  However, Freud’s thinking about the defence against trauma in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle is not entirely economic.  If we fail to bind unpleasurable stimulus by bracing against it 
in advance, we attempt to bind it by mastering it after the fact.  The fort/da game Freud’s grand-
son plays to cope with his mother’s absence provides one example of an attempt to master 
unpleasure retrospectively (14–17).  The dreams that sufferers from trauma are compelled to 
repeat provide another (125 above).  This talk of retrospective mastery shifts the discussion to the 
dynamic point of view.  It suggests that the binding the psyche requires can be achieved cogni-
tively by imposing some pattern of meaning upon the traumatic experience that resolves the con-
flicts it engenders.  As I have argued, the cognitive schemes through which we give meaning to 
our lives themselves seem to be structures of defence (122 above).
Amos has an oneiric quality.  Amos’s anxious sense of a man being pursued in 5.18-19 
repeats in 9.1-4, in which it extends to a group.  The repetition imbues this anxiety with the 
relentless quality of traumatic nightmare its sufferer is compelled to repeat.  In a reading of Amos 
as symptomatic of traumatic neurosis, it follows that the interpretations Amos offers are retro-
spective attempts cognitively to master the unpleasurable stimulus of the shock of earthquake 
against which he was inadequately braced.  The tribal ideology that Yahweh protects Israel 
according to a covenant no longer makes sense.  Some new meaning must be given to the Day of 
the Lord, that glorious day when Yahweh brings victory to his people.  “Woe to you who desire 
the day of the LORD!,” Amos now proclaims.  “Why would you have the day of the LORD?  It 
is darkness, and not light” (5.18).  The Day of the Lord will no longer recapitulate the events in 
Egypt, when Yahweh passed over Israel to strike its enemies.  “I will never again pass by them,” 
Yahweh twice declares about Israel (7.8, 8.2).  Henceforth, “I will pass through the midst of 
you,” he announces (5.17), for “[t]he end has come upon my people Israel” (8.2).
Amos’s attempts to find new meaning for the Day of the Lord prove futile in binding the 
unpleasurable stimulus of the traumatic event.  His revised cognitive schemes are insufficient to 
paper over the memory of the wailings on the day of earthquake when dead bodies were cast out 
everywhere.  That memory is now his fate, which he signifies by casting it into the future (8.2). 
Given the intensity of his brooding, it is difficult to believe that the edenic vision plastered onto 




41 Laplanche and Pontalis define cathexis as an “[e]conomic concept: the fact that a 
certain amount of psychical energy is attached to an idea or to a group of ideas, to a part of the 
body, to an object, etc.” (62)
lenge this ending has posed for millennia of commentators has arisen, in part, from something 
they have tacitly recognized but not admitted—that the end of Amos fails to address the 
psychological issues confronting him.  It is an act of desperation, a ruse, a fake—what Eugene 
O’Neill would call a pipe dream.  It is a form of denial, as if we could somehow block coming to 
terms with our afflictions through the sheer positivity of our thought.  The suffering of trauma is 
not tractable to such easy optimism.  If Amos can be read as a representation of traumatic neuro-
sis, it is truer to the nature of trauma to speculate that Amos would be perpetually condemned to 
re-experience it due to an inability to master its stimulus.
8.5. In Terms of the Threat of Exile
To the greater biblical Israelites of Amos’s day, the idea that they could survive as a 
nation without a land was preposterous, the subsequent diaspora history of their descendants 
notwithstanding.  Originally, Yahweh was the god of a specific place: Israel.  He was not the god 
of Moab, for instance, or the god of Edom.  The covenant he struck with Israel depended upon 
his promise of its land, for it was only within that land that he could exercise his powers of pro-
tection.  It is only in Amos perhaps—in the 8th century—that Yahweh’s power begins to be uni-
versalized.  There we come across Yahweh’s claim that he brought other nations into their lands 
as well.  “Did I not,” he asks, “bring up Israel from the land of Egypt, and the Philistines from 
Caphtor and the Syrians from Kir?” (9.7).42  I argue that, psychologically, the land as home sym-
bolizes that region in which, because all of its the references are clearly known, people can most 
easily maintain their bearings. The threat of exile leveled against Judah and Israel in the oracles 
against the nations, therefore, is a threat to expel the people from their frameworks of meaning 
making.  On the symbolic level, a traumatized person may be said to be living in exile.
8.6. In Terms of Non-Representability
The most chilling memorial to the traumatic event in Amos is 6.10, which recounts the 
labour of searching out and disposing of the corpses of those killed, most probably, in earth-
quake:  “And when a man's kinsman, he who burns him, shall take him up to bring the bones out 
of the house, and shall say to him who is in the innermost parts of the house, ‘Is there still any 
one with you?’ he shall say, ‘No’; and he shall say, ‘Hush! We must not mention the name of the 
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42 Yahweh’s universal claim provides another instance of the incoherence of Amos.  In 
judging Israel, Yahweh declares: “You only have I known of all the families of the earth; there-
fore I will punish you for all your iniquities” (3.2).
LORD’.”  These lines create an exemplary scene, as Caruth would have it, for the 
incomprehensibility of trauma in the mind of a survivor.  That incomprehensibility is twofold. 
First, there is the incomprehensibility of survivorship.  “Why have they died,” we can hear one of 
them asking, “while I have been left to burn the bodies?”  Second, there is the 
incomprehensibility of that aspect of the violence that “has not yet been fully known”—indeed, 
cannot be fully known—i.e., that “that which has happened to these will some day happen to me, 
with others left behind in their turn to collect my body and burn it, just as I am doing today.”  The 
incomprehensibility of this turn is shadowed forth by what cannot be mentioned: “the name of 
the LORD.”  For it cannot be thought, without risk to the structure of meaning within which we 
live, that the god in terms of which we articulate that meaning—god our preserver—is also god 
our destroyer.43
9. Conclusion
The principal difficulty in assessing whether a work of literature may be informed by the 
experience of trauma is evaluating the extent to which it struggles against incoherence.  Over the 
years I have been reading Amos, many of the nervous jumps between topics seemingly unrelated 
to one another that impressed my beginner’s mind have lost their edge, a fact I attribute largely to 
my own anxiety to overcome the incoherence such jumps signify.  But I can remember the feel-
ing which that first reading produced, a feeling that the text is riddled with cracks and fissures 
produced by trauma.  Amos can be read as a response to earthquake, the shock of which has shat-
tered Amos’s defences to reveal the ineluctable vulnerability of his animal body (and, as it 
proves, of the social body to which he belongs).  He experiences that revelation so viscerally that 
he cannot repress the unbearable knowledge it contains.  The cognitive scheme that had given 
meaning to his life is now shown to have been no more than a flimsy defensive facade against a 
reality too terrible to bear.  Amos is condemned perpetually to relive his trauma in a futile 
attempt to reimpose coherence upon the structure of meaning that the memory of a fracturing 
physical world now symbolizes.
In the tradition of western philosophy, it has been axiomatic that the unexamined life is 
not worth living.  I admit the appeal of that dictum.  But it can be dangerous if our penetration to 
the heart of the mysterium tremendum et fascinosum of our experience reveals, after all, that no 
such mystery in the form of a meaning to be revealed exists.  Such an unthinkable revelation is 
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43 This construction was suggested to me by Eliot’s line in “The Dry Salvages”: “Time the 
destroyer is time the preserver” (195).
the incomprehensible heart of trauma.  In plays such as the The Iceman Cometh, Eugene O’Neill 
senses that human beings can in nowise accept the truth of this unbeating heart.  We require 
some pipe dream to inform our experience with meaning, even if that meaning is to be found, as 
the name suggests, in an opium pipe or, as the play demonstrates, in the bottom of a bottle. 
Without some such defence, he implies, we are all threatened with insanity.  Choron suggests 
that Nietzsche penetrated to this unbeating heart of trauma.  He quotes from one of Nietzsche’s 
letters to the effect that “It is impossible to live with Truth,” a letter that Choron dates to 1888, 




The Regressive Pull of the Sacred
In this final chapter I employ Frank Kermode’s distinction between fiction and myth as a 
framework to move from the treatment of traumatic neurosis undertaken in Chapter 4 to a discus-
sion of the implications of regressive fixation implicit in the compulsion to repeat trauma.  After 
summarizing Freud’s description of regression, I argue that Amos is regressively fixated upon the 
myth of tribal, premonarchical Israel as having been a golden age of rural virtue of the type 
described by Raymond Williams in his classic study, The Country and The City.  I amplify those 
remarks by using Georges Bataille’s concept of sacred violence, which leads in turn to a discus-
sion of Freud’s notion of the death drive as the account of regression par excellence, one that 
situates Amos’s potential to fuel fantasies and acts of violence within the psychic economics of 
pleasure.
1. Kermode and the Dialectic of Fiction and Reality
In The Sense of an Ending,1 Frank Kermode takes up what he sees as the dialectical rela-
tion between reality and the fictions we elaborate about it.  In making the argument of his fifth 
chapter, “Literary Fiction and Reality” (127–52), Kermode conceptualizes reality as a state of 
radical contingency upon which we impose the various forms he calls fictions.  These fictions 
extend beyond the narrative plots with which White deals to include not only concepts such as 
causation and time but all the superstructural phenomena (law, politics, religion, aesthetics, 
philosophy, and so forth) that Marx conceives as the theatre of “ideological forms in which men 
become conscious of [their conflicts] and fight it out” (82 above).
Analyzing Jean-Paul Sartre’s La nausée, Kermode argues that reality conceived as radical 
contingency cannot be represented fictionally: the very act of representation necessarily imposes 
what Frye calls civilizing forms upon that reality.  Frye discusses how fiction imposes meaning 
upon space, a practice that Kermode resists.  He focuses instead upon how fiction imposes mean-
ing upon time.  It does so by punctuating chronos, the time of eternal succession, to produce 
smaller units, among which is kairos, the type of time that predominates in fiction.  As opposed 
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1 Revisiting this classic in the epilogue to its 2000 edition, published 34 years after the 
original appeared, Kermode states “that I have not found good reason to disown it entirely” 
(181).  Given the tenor of the rest of the epilogue, this observation is certainly much too modest, 
for, with an exception or two, that epilogue is a thoroughgoing defence of his earlier views. 
Little, it seems, had occurred in the intervening years to change his mind substantively on most 
of his original points.
to chronos, which he describes as “‘passing time’ or ‘waiting time,’” kairos is the time of “the 
season, a point in time filled with significance, charged with a meaning derived from its relation 
to the end” (47).
Literary fiction typically focuses upon moments of kairos, points in time impregnated 
with meaning by a sense of impending closure.  But in respect to novels particularly, it must deal 
with chronos as well.  Most narratological primers indicate methods by which novelists link the 
various moments of kairos that fill their narratives.  But such techniques typically impart a 
rhythm to chronos as well.  Reality as endless succession would seem to be as impossible to 
represent as reality as radical contingency, a problem that reaffirms Jacques Lacan’s postulate 
that the real can be neither imagined nor symbolized.  In Lacan’s thought the real is not immedi-
ately accessible to us.  We can only apprehend it modally, by forming the flux of sensation into 
images (the imaginary register) and by relating those images to one another to create a  structure 
of signs, thereby investing those images with significance (the symbolic register).2  The real itself 
remains always just beyond our reach, shrouded in image and symbol.  
As a literary critic, however, Kermode cannot abandon the problem of representing the 
unrepresentable.  He insists that “the humanizing of the world’s contingency,” which he takes to 
be the aim of fiction, “cannot be achieved without a representation of that contingency.”  Given 
the problem of representing that contingency formally, he suggests that it is better done themati-
cally.  “The representation,” he argues, “must be such that it induces the proper sense of horror at 
the utter indifference, the utter shapelessness, and the utter inhumanity of what must be 
humanized.”  It can only be intimated indirectly by images that cause us to shudder—by images 
that evoke a sense of creation unfolding according to an indiscernible purpose of its own, 
unaffected by human projects and irreducible to human logic, scale or proportion.3  For fiction to 
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2 In “Ahab between the Imaginary and the Symbolic: A Study of Subjectivity in 1st 
Kings,” I distinguish Lacan’s psychic registers in terms of C. S. Peirce’s three philosophical cate-
gories.  Firstness, a monadic category corresponding to the Lacanian  real, is a state of inchoate 
flux resistant to discriminations.  Secondness, a dyadic category corresponding to the imaginary, 
is that in which the subject (and its corresponding objects) emerge as distinct images  in response 
to the physical resistance inherent in the immediate apprehension of an other.  Thirdness, a tri-
adic category corresponding to the symbolic, is that in which structure emerges through the 
agency of third terms or symbols—principally those encoded as language—that come to mediate 
between the previously radically-equivalent images populating the imaginary.        
3The Scottish poet Norman MacCaig evokes the real is his image of a “Basking Shark,” a 
“roomsized monster with a matchbox brain” (6) that, being stubbed with an oar, rose “with a 
slounge out of the sea” (2).  “He displaced more than water.  He shoggled me / Centuries back” 
(7–8).
achieve its aim, Kermode insists, this representation of contingency “has to occur simultaneously 
with the as if, the act of form, of humanization, which assuages the horror” (145).  The evocation 
of the horror and the imposition of the form that makes it bearable must be articulated in dialectic 
tension.
Kermode castigates literature that eliminates the dissonance implicit in this dialectic.  He 
approves Sartre’s attack upon the novels of Mauriac on the grounds that “they are dishonestly 
determinate.  The characters in a Christian novel,” he paraphrases Sartre as saying, “ought surely 
to be ‘centres of indeterminacy’ and not the slaves of some fake conscience.  It is by the negation 
of such formalism that we may make literature a liberating force” (141).  He goes on to quote 
Sartre directly: “There is nothing else to spiritualize, nothing else to renew, but this multi-
coloured and concrete world with its weight, its opacity, its zones of generalization, and its 
swarms of anecdotes” (141–42).  The determinateness of which Sartre accuses Mauriac is an 
effect of too rigidly imposing “the as if, the act of form” upon reality, which is a more suggestive 
way of saying that such determinateness is an effect of idealism.4  It is an effect of conceptualiz-
ing the world according to forms that blind one to its concrete, protean, material nature.  For 
Althusser, we will recall, Marx’s rejection of such a formal (idealistic) method led to the 
epistemological break that initiated the science of history.
2. The Kermodian Mythic
For Kermode, fictions that impose too rigid a determinateness upon reality threaten to 
degenerate into myths, which may have and have had dangerous social consequences.  Given the 
critical enrichment of the concept of myth over the years since The Sense of an Ending was first 
published, his treatment of it now seems rather narrow and dated, particularly in his pejorative 
use of the term.5  Nevertheless, I find his distinction between fiction and myth useful in discuss-
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4In “Francp ois Mauriac and Freedom,” Sartre goes so far to attribute it to “the sin of pride. 
Like most of our writers,” Sartre observes, Mauriac
has tried to ignore the fact that the theory of relativity applies in full to the uni-
verse of fiction, that there is no more place for a privileged observer in a real 
novel then in the world of Einstein […].  M. Mauriac has put himself first.  He has 
chosen divine omniscience and omnipotence.  But novels are written by men and 
for men.  In the eyes of God, Who cuts through appearances and goes beyond 
them, this is no novel, not art, for art thrives on appearances.  God is not an artist. 
Neither is M. Mauriac.” (23, emphasis original)
5 Among the “protests against some of [his earlier] arguments” that he reviews in his 
epilogue to the 2000 edition, Kermode especially notes “the one that distinguishes between myth 
and fiction” (190).  In fact, he anticipated the reaction to this distinction that in fact developed. 
ing  Amos, and I quote his summary of it fully cognizant that it limits the meaning of myth in a 
way not adequate to a full understanding of the term.  Following upon a discussion of the fictions 
operative in the construction of Buchenwald, on the one hand, and King Lear, on the other, 
Kermode declares:
We have to distinguish between myths and fictions.  Fictions can degenerate into 
myths whenever they are not consciously held to be fictive.  In this sense anti-
Semitism is a degenerate fiction, a myth; and Lear  is a fiction.  Myth operates 
within the diagrams of ritual, which presupposes total and adequate explanations 
of things as they are and were; it is a sequence of radically unchangeable gestures. 
Fictions are for finding things out, and they change as the needs of sense-making 
change.  Myths are the agents of stability, fictions the agents of change.  Myths 
call for absolute, fictions for conditional assent.  Myths make sense in terms of a 
of time, illud tempus as Eliade calls it; fictions, if successful, make sense of the 
here and now, hoc tempus. (150)
According to this scheme, fictions are tentative approximations of the real that we recognize as 
such.  Their social utility lies in their hypothetical nature.  They promote adaptation by providing 
possible models for making sense of change.  Great fiction never loses contact with its provi-
sional nature: Kermode argues that it maintains its provisionality by dialectically structuring a 
dissonance between what it proposes and the real world it can only approximately represent.  On 
this criterion, his final assessment of La nausée is positive.  Its form, he declares, “is an instruc-
tive dissonance between humanity and contingency; it discovers a new way of establishing a con-
cord between the human mind and things as they are” (150).
Myths, on the other hand, are fictions that have lost contact with their fictiveness.  The 
dissonance between what they assert and “things as they are” has evaporated.  They are decisive 
patterns of explanation that call for absolute assent.  In short, they are fictions that have 
degenerated into truth and which threaten to be acted on as such.  Although westerners tend to 
associate myth with the Greeks, the twentieth century was very particularly and disturbingly an 
age of myth as Kermode defines it. In the 1930s, E. M. Forster appreciated this development in 
terms that anticipate Kermode.  In his essay "What I Believe" (1939), Forster observes that his 
century had become a new age of faith, faith in systems and causes based upon the Kermodian 
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In the original text he observes, “It may be that treating literary fictions as myths sounds good 
just now, but as Marianne Moore so rightly said of poems, ‘these things are important not 
because a / high-sounding interpretation can be put upon them but because they are / useful’” 
(39).
mythic.  Reacting to the mythic thinking that had come to dominate Germany, Italy, the Soviet 
Union, and elsewhere, Forster declares, “I do not believe in Belief” (77).  “I hate the idea of 
causes,” he goes on to say.  Any faith in ideal social systems was repugnant to the view of society 
ingrained in him at “the fag-end of Victorian liberalism” (qtd. in Smith 106).  To adapt a thought 
of Churchill's, systems exalt the rule rather than the man, and the rules were proving to be 
inhuman (Morgan 106).  Forster's distrust of systems, however, goes deeper than this.  It is 
epistemological.  Faith in the systems to which mythic thinking leads “is a stiffening process, a 
sort of mental starch, which ought to be applied as sparingly as possible (Forster, “What” 77). 
The faith in question distorts as it stiffens, producing a dogmatism that, as Frederick Crews 
declares, “shuts out the real complexity of things” (Crews, E. M. Forster 13).  “The human 
mind,” Forster writes in Aspects of the Novel, “is not a dignified organ, and I do not see how we 
can exercise it except through eclecticism” and all the dissonance that implies (212).
Kermode makes several provocative statements that relate myth to time.  As we have 
seen, one such statement is that “[m]yths make sense in terms of a lost order of time, illud tempus 
as Eliade calls it.”  In continuing his discussion of the artistic representation of contingency, he 
quotes Henry James’s observation in the preface to Roderick Hudson: “Really, universally, rela-
tions stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally to draw, by a geometry of 
his own, the circle in which they shall happily appear to do so.”  James goes on to state that the 
artist “is in the perpetual predicament that the continuity of things is the whole matter for him, of 
comedy and tragedy; that this continuity is never broken, and that, to do anything at all, he has at 
once intensely to consult it and intensely to ignore it” (qtd. on 176, emphasis original).  Because 
the art of fiction involves the creation of kairos from chronos, Kermode argues that a particular 
challenge of that art is to represent the “continuity and especially the successiveness of time.”  If 
“we fake to achieve the forms absent from the continuous world,” he continues, “we regress 
towards myth, out of this time and into that time” (176).
Two terms in the concluding statement are especially interesting: fake and regress.  The 
first, which Kermode admits he got from Forster (148), is part and parcel of the novelist’s craft. 
“The novelist cheats,” Kermode argues, “by arranging collocations which, since he is meeting us 
in a context which we both understand as we might understand the nature and the rules of a 
game, we shall not regard as fortuitous, in which we shall discover point and rhythm” (149). 
This faking, however, can become dangerous if we lose sight that it is performed in the context 
of a game.  In that event, the collocations by which fiction proposes the “point and rhythm” of 
reality may not seem fortuitous at all but may, rather, be taken to comprise the very warp and 
woof of that reality.  The fiction degenerates into myth as Kermode defines it by moving from 
hoc tempus to illud tempus, “out of this time and into that time,” a phrase that neatly recapitulates 
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the mechanism of regression.  Although Kermode does use the term regression nor account for it 
psychoanalytically, his concept of the fall of fiction into myth is an example of regression that 
provides an illuminating supplement to Freud’s thought on the subject, to a consideration of 
which I now turn.
3. Regression
“The concept of regression,” Laplanche and Pontalis state, “is a predominantly descrip-
tive one, as Freud himself indicated.”  They admit that their own treatment of regression does 
“not manage to provide the notion […] with a rigorous theoretical basis,” an oblique way of 
indicating that Freud’s does not either (388).  However, in the 1914 revision of The Interpreta-
tion of Dreams, Freud does introduce a tripartite approach to regression.  “Three kinds of regres-
sion,” he declares,
are thus to be distinguished; (a) topographical regression, in the sense of the 
schematic picture [of the psychical apparatus]; (b) temporal regression, in so far 
as what is in question is a harking back to older psychical structures; and (c) for-
mal regression, where primitive methods of expression and representation take the 
place of the usual ones.  All these three kinds of regression are, however, one at 
bottom and occur together as a rule; for what is older in time is more primitive in 
form and in psychical topography lies nearer to the perceptual end. (548, emphasis 
original)
Paul Ricoeur states that formal regression involves “the return of thought to pictorial representa-
tion” (Freud, 105).  Although in his summary of regression just quoted, Freud implies that 
regression does involve pictorial thinking, I argue that this exemplifies topographical rather than 
formal regression.  For Freud suggests the possibility of such pictorial thinking only in terms of 
the mind’s topography: it occurs because it transpires in the “perceptual end” of the psyche.  As 
Laplanche and Pontalis explain, the Freudian topology laid out in The Interpretation of Dreams 
is “an ordered succession of systems” through which the psyche’s economy plays itself out.  “In 
the waking state,” they declare, “these systems are traversed by excitations in a progressive direc-
tion (traveling from perception towards motor activity); during sleep, by contrast, the thoughts, 
finding their access to motor activity barred, regress towards the perceptual system (Pcpt.)” (386, 
emphasis original).  The two ends of the topographical system, therefore, are the perceptual and 
the motor.  Regression is always towards the perceptual.  It occurs as a reflux because the normal 
discharge at the motor end is blocked.  Laplanche and Pontalis go on to observe that 
“[t]opographical regression is especially evident in dreams, where it is carried through com-
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pletely.  It is also found in other, pathological, processes, where it is less inclusive (hallucina-
tion), and even in some normal processes, where it is less thoroughgoing (memory)” (387, 
emphasis original).
Freud’s own summary of formal regression does not specifically mention pictorial repre-
sentation.  Formally, he says, regression is a state “where primitive methods of expression and 
representation take the place of the usual ones.”  Ricoeur has, perhaps, incorrectly linked the 
primitive to the pictorial, a identification that Laplanche and Pontalis, in their assessment, do not 
make.  They state that “[i]n the formal sense, regression means the transition to modes of expres-
sion that are on a lower level as regards complexity, structure and differentiation” (386, emphasis 
original).  Keeping this definition in mind, I argue that the regression that for Kermode character-
izes the degeneration from the fictive to the mythic is more than just a temporal movement from 
hoc tempus to illud tempus.6  It is also a formal movement to a simpler apprehension of experi-
ence that, as Crews would have it, “shuts out the real complexity of things.”  For Marx, formal 
regression so defined inevitably distorts in subjecting the ever-pre-given complexity of the 
material world to Forster’s “mental starch” to produce the simplified and mystifying abstractions 
of the ideal.
4. Regressive Fixation
Laplanche and Pontalis conclude their treatment of regression by stating that it should not 
“be forgotten that the notion of regression is linked to that of fixation, and that this cannot be 
reduced to the implantation of a behavioural pattern.  In so far as fixation is to be understood as 
an ‘inscription,’ regression might be interpreted as the bringing back into play of what has been 
‘inscribed’” (388).  Fixation is also a key concept for comprehending trauma.  Trauma is an 
opening upon the Lacanian real, an intimation of the incomprehensible reality of our own vul-
nerability.  Those affected by trauma become fixated to the traumatic event (BTPP 13) as to an 
unsolvable puzzle to which they are  nevertheless compelled repeatedly to return.
In Chapter 4 I argue that the voice speaking in Amos has the intensity of a person com-
pelled to repeat a trauma, which is perhaps the best known form of regressive fixation with 
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6 Laplanche and Pontalis provide a more expansive treatment of temporal regression than 
Freud does in his summary statement.  They state that “Freud often laid stress on the fact that the 
infantile past—of the individual or even of humanity as a whole—remains forever within us” 
(387, emphasis added).  “He was able,” they continue, “to identify this idea of a reversion to an 
earlier point in the most varied domains: psychopathology, dreams, the history of civilisations, 
biology, etc.”  However, there is nothing in Kermode’s treatment of the mythic that suggests such 
reversion to earlier states of being.  
which Freud deals.  Kermode’s discussion of mythicized fiction in terms of a fixation upon a lost 
order of time suggests that the application of the concept of regression may be extended from the 
study of psychiatry to the study of literature.  Imperfect though such extensions of concepts from 
one field to another may be, they frequently shine a suggestive new light on a subject.  Although 
regressive fixation is hardly a term that Marxist thinkers typically use, Kermode’s remarks sug-
gest the remarkable degree to which the effects of trauma discussed in Chapter 4 mirror the 
idealizing effects of ideology discussed in Chapter 3: both promote fixation to past events.7  In 
addition to being traumatized, Amos is also fixated on a mythicized fiction of Israel, so much so 
that this fixation exemplifies the radically simplified apprehension of experience characterizing 
formal regression.  Although Amos predictably attempts to master his trauma retrospectively in 
terms of this mythicized fiction, I suggest that the regressive fixation manifest in Amos is over-
determined, for it is determined both traumatically and ideologically.  I have dealt at length with 
the traumatic determination in Chapter 4.  Its ideological determination bears more discussion.
In Chapter 3, I summarize Gottwald’s hypothesis that this fiction of Israel, which I call 
the fiction of  Yahweh’s kingship, originated as a political practice of social revolutionaries, who 
adapted a local war god as a marker for the human king they had displaced.  By filling the vac-
uum the elimination of monarchy had created, the fiction of Yahweh’s kingship buttressed the 
people’s determination to persist without a human king.  By Amos’s time, it still seems to have 
served politically as a symbol of social cohesion, particularly among the poor.  Despite that, 
some 300 years after the reinstitution of human monarchy, this fiction must certainly have 
become somewhat less tenable than it had been in the premonarchic period.
“Fictions,” we have seen Kermode observe, “can degenerate into myths whenever they 
are not consciously held to be fictive” (143 above).  Fictions that enshrine political ideals fre-
quently have a function that does not lose touch with their fictiveness, for it is understood by 
those who subscribe to them that the ideals are yet to be realized.  But the belief that premonar-
chic Israel truly was a radically egalitarian society, by confusing an ideal with fact, is a fiction 
that has lost touch with its fictiveness.  It is a fiction that has become a myth, analogous to the 
myth I was taught as an American school child that our founding fathers had developed political 
institutions guaranteeing liberty and justice to all—a myth peculiarly oblivious to the fact that a 
tenth of the population was enslaved at the time those institutions were established.
The idea that a retribalized Israel, if such a realm existed, could have realized the radical 
egalitarianism that Gottwald hypothesizes (and valorizes) is a fiction, one that, I argue, assumes a 
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7 In saying this, I do not deny that ideology can also have a future dimension.  Amos’s 
vision of the future destruction of Israel is, however, rooted in a mythic idealization of the past.
mythic quality in Amos’s mind (and in the minds of the scribes who compiled his book).  It is a 
myth of an idealized “lost order of time” upon which Amos fixates and according to which he 
thinks and acts.  As we have seen, Laplanche and Pontalis state that such regression brings “back 
into play […] what has been ‘inscribed’.”  They do not further specify what they mean by this, 
but the concept of inscription very strongly suggests the inculcation of ideology as Althusser 
describes it, i.e., the ingraining of myths according to which people persistently misapprehend 
their relation “to their real conditions of existence.” 8
I dwell at some length upon Gottwald’s concept of a retribalized Israel three to five hun-
dred years before the advent of Amos not because I am convinced that such a thing actually 
occurred but because I am persuaded that it or something very close to it comprised the by-then-
residual ideology forming the framework of Amos’s protest.  In assessing the effect of ideology, 
what actually occurred is not only beside the point but also, as I argue in Chapter 1, concealed by 
the fictions of historiography.  What counts is what people think happened, which, as Althusser 
insists, is invariably an illusion.  When ideology functions effectively, it creates an illusion of 
power—an illusion that persuades people outside the ruling class that they have a greater stake in 
maintaining the existing social order than a more detached, rational, scientific (read Marxist) 
analysis would reveal.
Because Freud’s treatment of regression is predominantly descriptive rather than 
rigorously theoretical, he provides no motivation for the regressive fixation upon a residual ideol-
ogy I ascribe to Amos.  Regression toward the perceptual is more complex than the simple 
mechanical reflux that my foregoing treatment of Freud’s topographical view of the matter sug-
gests (145 above).  I base my argument upon Lacan’s concept of the mirror stage in human devel-
opment, a stage in which, as its name suggests, the perceptual or imaginary dominates.  It is, 
moreover, a stage in which an illusion of wholeness and power also dominates (“Mirror,” pas-
sim).  Regression, I argue, is motivated by the desire to recapture the sense of this power and the 
coherence that accompanies it—the power that obtains prior to the psyche’s fracture in its 
eventual subjection to that symbolic structure in dominance that, in Marxist terms, comprises the 
social formation.
In making these observations, I am not attempting to elaborate a theory that the ideologi-
cal is an invariable object of regressive fixation.  Based upon my reading of Freud as fleshed out 
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8 I prefer ingrained to inscribed, for the former term better describes the pervasiveness of 
ideological conditioning.
by Lacan, I do argue that regression seeks an illusory power.9  Based upon my reading of Althus-
ser, I also argue that much ideology is effective in that it offers an interpretation of experience 
that promotes a similar illusion.  But the illusion at the heart of each is different.  Regression 
seeks to escape social demand altogether by reverting to the imaginary state obtaining before the 
first such demand was made: the demand that we limit ourselves couched in the Oedipal threat. 
Ideology is nothing if not social: the magic it promises depends upon a sleight of hand that con-
ceals a contradiction inherent in it by which it benefits one class at the expense of another 
without seeming to do so.10
I connect regressive fixation to an ideologically derived content principally to illuminate 
the psychosocial dynamics at play in Amos.  The ideological basis of Amos itself is not clearly 
spelled out in the text.  Nor should we expect it to be.  Quoting Marx’s well-known definition of 
ideology from Capital—“they do not know it, but they are doing it”—Slavoj Žižek points out 
that “ideology implies a kind of basic, constitutive naïveté: the misrecognition of its own presup-
positions” (28, emphasis original, in Z˘iz˘ek and presumably in Marx).  In this, it is homologous to 
a definition Žižek offers for the unconscious, one that he also applies to the entire symbolic 
order: “the form of thought external to the thought itself—in short, some Other Scene external to 
the thought whereby the form of thought is already articulated in advance” (19).  As with the 
unconscious, the ideological—the Other Scene, not in the play itself, according to which the 
action unfolds—can only be deduced indirectly by analysis.
A large part of the anxiety produced by Amos arises from accusations of misconduct for 
which no positive, specific correctives are provided.  “‘Hate evil, and love good, and establish 
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9In Freud’s view, even the compulsion to repeat that characterizes traumatic neurosis 
occurs as an attempt to master the traumatic event.
10 As an example of a contradiction that ideology elides, Slavoj Žižek offers the example 
of the “falsity” of the freedoms that western, capitalistic societies offer its citizens as part of the 
ideology of the good life they offer.  He speaks of freedom as 
a universal notion comprising a number of species (freedom of speech and press, 
freedom of consciousness, freedom of commerce, political freedom, and so on) 
but also, by means of a structural necessity, a specific freedom (that of the worker 
to sell freely his own labour on the market) which subverts this universal notion. 
That is to say, this freedom is the very opposite of effective freedom: by selling 
his labour “freely”, the worker loses his freedom—the real content of this free act 
of sale is the worker’s enslavement to capital.  The crucial point is, of course, that 
it is precisely this paradoxical freedom, the form of its opposite, which closes the 
circle of “bourgeois freedoms.” (22–23)
For the ideology of freedom to be effective, the superficial attractiveness of the concept must 
blind the subject to the deeper paradox that Žižek uncovers. A more current version of the free-
dom Žižek exposes is an American’s freedom to die without health care.
justice in the gate,’” the audience is admonished.  If it does, “‘it may be that the LORD, the God 
of hosts, will be gracious to the remnant of Joseph’” (5.15).  But no prescription of good and evil 
is provided for those who might be inclined to take warning other than a somewhat vague associ-
ation of evil either with economic depredations against the poor or with religious presumption. 
“‘They do not know how to do right,’” Yahweh through Amos declares, “those who store up 
violence and robbery in their strongholds” (3.10).  As a prelude to Amos’s best-known verse 
(Chapter 5), Yahweh goes on to declare that
21 “I hate, I despise your feasts,
and I take no delight in your 
solemn assemblies.
22 Even though you offer me your 
burnt offerings and cereal
offerings, 
I will not accept them,
and the peace offerings of your fatted 
beasts
I will not look upon.
23 Take away from me the noise of 
your songs;
to the melody of your harps I will 
not listen.
24 But let justice roll down like waters,
and righteousness like an 
ever-flowing stream.
What we have here are noble and high-sounding sentiments without a programme defining the 
virtues those accused are encouraged to embrace or specifying how those virtues are to be 
achieved.  Without that programme, Amos can only be referring to what he conceives to have 
been common values—in fact, traditional values—that these accused have abandoned since com-
prising an emerging, ruling class but that their forebears exemplified in some mythic, egalitarian 
past.
5. The Myth of the Golden Age
The fact that Amos appears among the Minor Prophets has dictated that it normally be 
analyzed as a prophetic text.  However, in terms of the psychosocial dynamic I sketch above—
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i.e., in terms of its regressive fixation upon a mythic past—it is illuminating to think of Amos as 
writing about country life evocative of rural discontent of the type surveyed in Raymond Wil-
liams’s now classic study The Country and the City.  In that work, Williams argues that the writ-
ing about country life he surveys has been powerfully shaped by the myth of a golden age, which 
in the classical tradition he traces as far back as the Works and Days of Hesiod in the ninth 
century BCE (14).  He asserts that such a myth is threaded in a distinctive pattern through the 
texts he considers.  The golden age whose loss the writers in question consistently mourn is not 
some vaguely mythic period at the beginning of things.  It is, rather, a time just over the horizon, 
a time still fresh in the memories of living people, a time that preserved some essential and pre-
cious way of life that is just now passing away.  In what he calls “A Problem of Perspective,” 
Williams traces this sense of immediate loss back through the generations of English country 
writing in a seemingly infinite regress that he imagines reaching back to Eden itself (9–12).
On this view, therefore, the mythic need not be something shrouded in the mists of time. 
It can refer to a period just beyond our grasp—to a period that we ourselves seem to have lived 
through, to our childhood, for instance, perhaps to the very dawn of our psychic lives.  This idea 
of the close temporal proximity of the mythic reinforces the argument advanced in Chapter 3 (90 
above) that Amos evinces a residual ideology according to which rural people, as Marx would 
have it, “become conscious of [their conflicts] and fight it out.”
It is clear, however,  that the unhindered ease with which Amos wanders around and ful-
minates against the state reveals something more than the relatively untrammeled lives of 
shepherds.  It also reflects the degree of hegemony that the monarchical state has achieved. 
Representing no threat to the state, malcontents like Amos are tolerated, perhaps to signify that 
the governing authorities take the peoples’ grievances to heart.  It seems clear, however, that the 
group whose ideology Amos shares is losing—or may have already lost—the class war by a 
decisive margin.  In terms of the dialectic Marx took over from Hegel, they represent an older 
dispensation in the process of being superseded.
6. The Ossification of Fiction into Myth and Its Social Consequences
Fixation upon the mythic does not allow for explanatory adaptation to changing condi-
tions.  Because it presupposes “total and adequate explanations of things as they are and were,” 
Kermode argues that the mythic dictates only “a sequence of radically unchangeable gestures” as 
a response to the ever-ramifying permutations of daily experience.  In consequence, it fuels the 
alienation I discuss in Chapter 3, but in a curious way.  There, I characterize Amos as a “profound 
literature of alienation,” one “permeated by a structure of feeling that the poor of Israel are being 
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overwhelmed by a totally incomprehensible system they cannot recognize as a human product” 
(94 above).  However, once the fiction of the kingship of Yahweh became mystified into an 
inexorable expression of Yahweh’s will, the poor of Israel were not likely to recognize it as a 
human product either.  As the fiction ossified into myth, it not only became alienated from the 
people for whom it once served as a principle of cohesion.  It also prevented them from making 
sense of the changes confronting them in terms of any other paradigm.  As greater Biblical Israel 
continued to evolve from a tribal society into a monarchical state, a mythology rooted in 
tribalism became less and less serviceable as an explanatory model for its social relationship. 
Nor was a tribal mythology likely to allow people to comprehend other ideological purposes to 
which the fiction of the kingship of Yahweh may now have been put.  What Amos condemns as 
religious pretension may, indeed, ritually express a theological development he is ideologically 
prevented from understanding, viz., a messianic theology based upon the suzerainty of the king 
now envisioned as Yahweh’s anointed son.  Perhaps what was needed in Amos’s day was for the 
class struggle to be joined on a new symbolic terrain.  By reinforcing ideologically ingrained 
predispositions, mythic fixation shuts down the capacity to strategize such shifts.
The fixation upon the mythic, by harmonizing any dissonance between the fictions upon 
which it is based and the manifold reality those fictions represent, leads to serving up various 
fantasies, which we normally subsume under the rubric of belief, as exhaustive and conclusive 
models of that reality.  One such fantasy is a notion of providence held dear by many American 
conservatives, which holds that the Protestant Christian god chooses laissez-faire capitalism to 
bestow his benevolence upon his chosen people.  This fantasy is based upon the myth that this 
god still regulates the affairs of those who trust in him according to his invisible hand, a concept 
that Adam Smith proposed over two centuries ago in the springtime of modern liberalism 
(today’s neo-liberalism).  The myth of divine providence dictates that the highest ethical impera-
tive for any individual is to pursue his or her own interests.  The individual who does so, Smith 
proclaims, is “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.  Nor 
is it always the worse for society that it was no part of it.  By pursuing his own interest he fre-
quently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it” 
(423).  It follows, then, that any reliance upon human initiatives seen to interfere with this god’s 
will as it unfolds in the operation of free markets (initiatives, for instance, to institute universal 
health care) is condemned as a form of modern Pelagianism that lacks faith in the divinely-
ordained plan for humankind.
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7. A Matter of Principle
The phenomenon of Sarah Palin’s meteoric rise to the Republican vice-presidential 
nomination in the 2008 American elections can be accounted for, at least in part, by her per-
ceived ability, to use a term popularized by pundits on channels such as CNN and MSNBC, to 
galvanize her party’s base.  As she clearly lacks any demonstrable capacity to govern on the 
national level, the galvanization with which she has been credited lies in her recitation of what, in 
Smith’s age, would have been called maxims, which in her case amount to pithy ideological tags 
reminding Americans that God loves their freedom to do whatever they please in the world.  For 
a growing number of the electorate, these maxims comprise an outworn pastiche of ideas that 
have lost the potential to address their needs. They continue to resonate only among that shrink-
ing minority for whom the maintenance of a posture of rugged American individualism suffi-
ciently guarantees the continued beneficial operation of providence. However, many who insist 
that Sarah Palin is out of her depth as a national politician are willing to admit that she is a per-
son of principle, however weirdly assorted and inapplicable to the world’s problems those princi-
ples might now seem.  But, to return to the imagery with which Kermode introduces his distinc-
tion between fiction and myth, Buchenwald itself was built—and staffed—by people of principle, 
principles derived from certain mythic convictions about national destiny.
 Amos is also conceived as a person of principle.  He is admired for his principled denun-
ciation of the economic crimes of the rich against the poor.  But he lacks a principle grounded in 
human interaction—a political principle—to address the problems he describes.  All he can do is 
fantasize an orgy of destruction aimed at the material symbols of the class power that oppresses 
him: the various strongholds in which wealth is hoarded up and the walls that impede his free 
progress through the world.   In our time we have seen such orgies as Amos fantasizes carried out 
by people who, by virtue of their capacity to act, are only slightly less alienated than he—people 
such as Timothy McVeigh and Mohammad Atta.11
Amos’s fantasies do not engage the world’s problems.  His justice is that of Pol Pot, 
which would simply wipe the slate clean and start again at the year zero.  I do not doubt, for all 
that, that Amos is a sacred text.  So much the worse, for its sacrality better qualifies it as bedtime 
reading for suicide-bombers on their last night on earth.  I submit that many who admire Amos 
derive a vicarious sense of power from the earth-shaking, incendiary acts of Yahweh, even 
though those acts threaten to sweep away the oppressed as well as their oppressors.  In this it 
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11 As I point out above (93), alienation functions politically to prevent people from acting 
upon their grievances.  McVeigh and Atta are less alienated than Amos in that they do more than 
fantasize, but they are only slightly less so in that their actions approach pure destructiveness.
confirms Laplanche’s thesis that in Freud’s thought people typically fear castration more than 
death,12 making some quite willing to blow themselves up to achieve, as John Berger states in 
sketching the mentality of the conspirators ready to sacrifice all to assassinate Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, “an independent life in the sky of the centuries” (228).
These considerations bring us back to the strange conclusion of Amos (see 131-32 above). 
In Chapter 4 I comment upon the almost insuperable contradiction of the tone of this passage 
with everything in Amos that precedes it.  That contradiction remains, regardless of how one 
might interpret this conclusion.  One interpretation I do offer is based upon the translators’ con-
strual of the tense as future, which would render the passage prophetic.  This, then, would 
represent a vision of a paradise to come, one established among a righteous remnant once their 
class oppressors were obliterated. Playing upon Gottwald’s thought, this new Eden might 
represent the effects of a reretribalization.  This thought suggests another: that this vision is not 
exclusively proleptic.   What we have, I suggest, tacked on to the very end of Amos, is a vision of 
the golden age myth, the regressive fixation, that animates the entire book.  This is the way it 
was, back in the good old days of simple virtue, when David was still a shepherd in the fields, 
before the complications of monarchy and its unjust power relations seduced him and ruined us 
all.  This is the way that it can be again, the vision entices to believe.  The vision may appear at 
the end, but what Amos dreams of is getting back to the future—or moving forward to the past.
Due to the illusory sense of power arising from regressive fantasies, there is a natural 
tendency, particularly among but not limited to marginalized groups with uncertain futures, to 
idealize their pasts.  In Chapter 3, I speculate upon the idealization by one such group—Jewish 
scribes in a backwash of the Persian empire—manifest in their recasting notable (and perhaps 
legendary) characters in their past as prophets.  An unfortunate corollary of this tendency is the 
belief that the purity of an idealized past can be recaptured only if others whose presence is seen 
to complicate (and contaminate) the lives of the idealizing group can be eliminated.  The nature 
of these others can be construed according to however the idealizers conceive their current 
predicament: these can be socioeconomic others, national others, ethnic others, racial others, reli-
gious others, gendered others, and so forth.  Strategies for eliminating them range from sepa-
ration to outright extermination.  The Jewish Bible is replete with such strategies aimed at secur-
ing and maintaining the purity of Israel.  The Exodus tradition provides one example.  Yahweh 
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12 In Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, Laplanche observes that “the occurrence of ‘death 
anxiety’ or of an originary wish to die will never be located, in analytic psychopathology, in that 
position of ‘irreducible bedrock’ which is attributed par excellence to the castration complex” 
(6).
promises the descendants of Jacob that he will “deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians” 
who oppress them, “and bring them up out of that land to a broad and good land, a land flowing 
with milk and honey” (Ex 3:8).  The catch is, of course, that they must first decimate the 
Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites, Perizzites, Hivites, Jebusites, and other riff-raff who already 
occupy it.
8. Amos and the Sacred
Amos exemplifies the notion of the sacred elaborated by Georges Bataille in Eroticism, in 
which he distinguishes between discontinuous and continuous existence.  Discontinuous exis-
tence is that in which we experience ourselves as discrete individuals.  It is the state in which 
“[e]ach being is distinct from all others.  His birth, his death, the events of his life may have an 
interest for others, but he alone is directly concerned in them.  He is born alone.  He dies alone. 
Between one being and another, there is a gulf, a discontinuity” (12).  In tension with this sense 
of discontinuous existence is a longing for a lost sense of continuity.  “We are discontinuous 
beings,” he insists, 
individuals who perish in isolation in the midst of an incomprehensible adventure, 
but we yearn for our lost continuity.  We find the state of affairs that binds us to 
our random and ephemeral individuality heard to bear.  Along with our tormenting 
desire that this evanescent thing should last, there stands our obsession with a 
primal continuity linking us with everything that is. (15)
 He  characterizes this longing as a nostalgia for the unity in which we existed before appearing 
in this world.  One is reminded here of Plato's theory that our sense of the ideal derives from 
memories of a realm in which our souls existed before birth (“Phaedo” 213).  However, Bataille's 
conception is much more nebulous, for his sense of the continuous refers back to a time before 
any individuation whatever, psychic or physical.
 These senses of discontinuous and continuous existence are binary poles around which 
Bataille's argument is organized.  He associates them with the spheres of the profane and the 
sacred respectively.  The discontinuous/profane pole is that of our quotidian human life.  In the 
last instance, it is structured according to the taboos upon which human culture is founded.  By 
limiting our sexual as well as other activities, taboos inculcate a sense of limitation and discrete-
ness.  Conversely, the continuous/sacred pole—representing, as it does, the longing for lost 
continuity—seeks to transgress the taboos from which our sense of discontinuity arises.  It seeks 
to violate the structures upon which our lives depend.  
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The distinction Bataille makes between the discontinuous/profane and the con-
tinuous/sacred mirrors that which he makes between the transcendent and the immanent dis-
cussed in Chapter 4 (113 above).  In his use of transcendence, however, the term acquires a 
meaning contrary to its typical connotation.  As the principle by which a subject distinguishes 
itself or emerges from a ground, transcendence in Bataille aligns with the pole of the dis-
continuous/ profane.  As the state of presubjective existence in the world—i.e., as water in 
water—immanence aligns to the pole of the continuous/sacred.  To extend this binary opposition 
in good structuralist fashion by one more term, the continuous/sacred/immanent runs along the 
axis of desire also discussed in Chapter 4, whereas the discontinuous/profane/transcendent aligns 
itself with the social demand that we channel our desires in conventionally acceptable ways (123 
above).
Bataille does not define the sacred per se.  After all, his subject is eroticism.  But he deals 
extensively with the sacred in elaborating the erotic.  For him, the erotic impulse seeks release 
from the conventions that normally bind us, conventions founded upon taboo.  This impulse 
manifests itself in many ways.  Some are obvious.  For instance, orgy is commonly thought of as 
erotic because of its blatantly transgressive sexuality.  But Bataille insists that marriage, at least 
at its outset, is erotic as well because it transgresses a “general and universal” taboo on sexual 
activity, which he conceives as “a fundamental rule which demands that we submit, and in com-
mon, to restrictions of one sort or another.” “Particular prohibitions” such as incest are simply 
“aspects” of the general taboo that vary from culture to culture (50).  Other manifestations of the 
erotic impulse include cannibalism, dueling, feuding, hunting, war, sacrifice, and religious 
prostitution.  Each transgresses some taboo, most typically involving sexual activity or the taking 
of life.  Each involves violence in that the taboo in question is violated.  Bataille claims that “the 
domain of eroticism is the domain of violence, of violation” (16).  As the realm par excellence 
unaffected by the limitations impeding mere mortals, the sacred can only be approached eroti-
cally: by violating the limitations that structure the discontinuous/profane world.  In its origins, at 
least, the sacred is connected inextricably to violence.    
Although Bataille does not dwell upon what distinguishes the sacred from the profane, as 
a thinker with Marxist propensities he does differentiate them economically.  Originally, Bataille 
contends, taboos had an economic provenance: “Taboos,” he insists, “are there to make work 
possible; work is productive; during the profane period allotted to work consumption is reduced 
to the minimum consistent with continued production.”  On the other hand, "sacred days […] are 
feast days” during which the “values of the workaday world are inverted.”  “From an economic 
standpoint the reserves accumulated during periods of work are squandered extravagantly at feast 
times” (68).  Bataille's conception of the sacred aligns with his theory of a general economy 
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inspired by Marcel Mauss's work on the potlatch.13  Moreover, his connection of the profane with 
production suggests its potential as a source of alienation.  On the other hand,  the association of 
the sacred with consumption suggests a desire to achieve a primal unity with all that is.
Bataille's connection of the sacred with violence may be difficult to accept in societies 
shaped by a Christian tradition.  He insists that humans have “natural impulses to violence” (69), 
impulses manifesting dangerous desires to be held in check by taboos and the agency, as Althus-
ser would have it, of the ideological state apparatuses among which the institutions of 
Christendom once played so prominent a part. Although Bataille does not say it specifically, to 
the extent that religion functions to create order and to restrain violence, it represents a profana-
tion of the sacred as he elaborates it.
Bataille’s thought on the sacred is consonant with viewing it as a force exercising a 
regressive pull against individuation back to a more primitive state.  In Lacanian terms, regres-
sion may be thought as a movement from the symbolic back to the imaginary or, as Laplanche 
and Pontalis put it, “from a psychical functioning based on thought-identity to one based on per-
ceptual identity” (387).  In its most notorious Freudian formulation—that of the death instinct—
regression exercises a pull right back to the inanimate state.  It does so not in a search for power 
but as a manifestation of the economic function of instinct to keep an organism’s overall level of 
excitation as constantly low as possible.  In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud observes that 
“an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the 
living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, 
it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in 
organic life (36, emphasis original).  If we “pursue to its logical conclusion the hypothesis that all 
instincts tend towards the restoration of an earlier state of things” (37),  “then we shall be com-
pelled to say that “the aim of all life is death” and, looking backwards, that “inanimate things 
existed before living ones” (38, emphasis original).  He concludes this part of his discussion with 
one of the more cryptic statements in the entire body of his work:
The hypothesis of self-preservative instincts, such as we attribute to all living 
beings, stands in marked opposition to the idea that instinctual life as a whole 
serves to bring about death. Seen in this light, the theoretical importance of the 
instincts of self-preservation, of self-assertion and of mastery greatly diminishes. 
They are component instincts whose function it is to assure that the organism shall 
follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to 
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13 For an excellent summary of this theory see Shershow.
inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself. 
(39)
The burden of aggression that the death instinct has been made to bear in the history of 
psychoanalysis cannot be inferred from the rather cautious and tentative introduction Freud pro-
vides the concept in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, a work he somewhat tediously but neces-
sarily defends as highly speculative.  The aggression upon which he would continue to elaborate 
over the balance of his career is only hinted at in the organism’s determination “to follow its own 
path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than 
those which are immanent in the organism itself.”  In Eroticism, Bataille shines a more brilliant 
light upon the violence inherent in the pull of regression, a force that, in his thinking, aims not 
only to smash but, more characteristically, to transgress the structures in and through which 
people seek to justify their productive relationships.  As I have demonstrated, Amos’s epic 
iconoclasm, which takes the entire fabric of his society as a symbol to be smashed, goes hand in 
glove with an equally epic compulsion to denounce, speaking, as he does, in and through the 
voice and character of Yahweh himself.  Freud’s theorization of the death instinct in terms of the 
economics of pleasure, incipient though it may be in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, at least sug-
gests that Amos’s regressive fantasies have a sadistic quality.  Although Amos condemns the 
Ammonites for ripping up pregnant women in Gilead (1.13), this is only a more severe instance 
of the fate he himself fantasizes for those women he calls the “cows of Bashan,” a pastoral area 
of Gilead (Chapter 4):
1 “Hear this word, you cows of 
Bashan,
who are in the mountain of 
Sama’ria,
who oppress the poor, who crush the 
needy,
who say to their husbands, ‘Bring, 
that we may drink!’
2 The Lord GOD has sworn by his 
holiness
that, behold, the days are coming 
upon you,
when they shall take you away with 
hooks,
even the last of you with fishhooks.
3 And you shall go out through the 
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breaches,
every one straight before her;
and you shall be cast forth into 
Harmon,” 
says the LORD.
Amos enjoys this vision.  He attempts to master his own trauma by projecting it onto others, 
thereby converting his suffering to an experience he can also enjoy.
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Conclusion
At the outset of this study I state that Marxist and psychoanalytic critical approaches com-
plement one another well enough that they can be adapted and employed constructively to illumi-
nate forces at work in literature and literary production.  I agree with Paul Ricoeur that Marx and 
Freud are exemplars of a hermeneutics of suspicion—that they suspect things are not as they 
seem and seek to account for reality in terms of dynamic processes that lie concealed.  In Chapter 
5, I have focussed upon Frank Kermode’s concept of the mythic and Georges Bataille’s concept 
of the sacred because they both elucidate the regressive tendencies operating in the book of 
Amos.  These regressive tendencies constitute the clearest point at which my thinking about Amos 
in Marxist and Freudian frameworks converges.
At the beginning of The Tribes of Yahweh, Norman Gottwald summarizes some of the 
challenges facing biblical critics.  “The problem of the sources of our knowledge about early 
Israel,” he states, “is at first glance scarcely conceivable.  Are we not, after all, provided with 
innumerable stories, laws, and poems which crowd the pages of the Hebrew Bible from Genesis 
to Samuel?  Hardly any other people has produced so much material about its beginnings” (4). 
But, he goes on to observe, 
it is equally evident that none of these materials is in unaltered form, although the 
alteration may be so subtle as to escape instant detection.  The traditional 
sequences tend to break into units without certain chronological connection; and 
the more they are examined, the more certain it is that an idealized conception of 
Israel’s unity has been cast back into the earlier traditions, thereby lending them 
all the impression that their subject is a single people, stemming from a single line 
of ancestors and united in a tribal system from the days of their Egyptian bondage. 
(4)
The “conception of Israel’s unity” is not the only idealized feature of the Jewish Bible.  I have 
used Louis Althusser’s theory of ideology to argue that AmosL—Amos as a prophetic spokesper-
son for the poor—is also an idealization.  Such idealizations have spiritualized the biblical com-
pendium as a whole, leading millennia of readers to believe, as Gerhard von Rad puts it, that a 
“complex of religious ideas about God and creation, the person, sin and forgiveness, and so forth 
hover[ed] over the people of Israel like a spiritual cloud” (83 above).  This belief is similar to 
that which I argue is held by Amos himself, viz., that premonarchical, tribal Israel was an idyllic 
land where justice flourished.
Using Kermode’s terminology, I argue that such beliefs are myths that essentialize fic-
tional lost orders of time as foundations for thought and action.  Drawing inspiration from a time 
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and place in which the “Sea of Faith” was believed to be “at the full” (Arnold 762, lines 21-22) 
may have positive social purposes.  By selectively reading the Bible, scholars such as Walter 
Brueggeman produce works such as Hope Within History, in which, the back cover declares, he 
“looks at the biblical text and finds the resources for hope within history, a hope that challenges 
hopelessness and despair.”  If, following Hayden White, we take the history upon which Brueg-
gemann draws to be a form of fiction, texts such as Brueggemann’s may well provide examples 
of how biblical literature humanizes “the world’s contingency,” which Kermode takes to be fic-
tion’s proper aim.  However, as my discussion of the historical imperative in biblical studies in 
Chapter 1 emphasizes, many of the Bible’s most serious readers have lost touch with its fictive-
ness.  Ideologically predisposed as they are to accept the compilation as the word of God, they 
approach even the Book of Job, which patently introduces itself as a fairy tale, as if it were par-
ticularly saturated with logos.  As a result, they are oblivious to the Bible’s many disturbing fea-
tures, which, like “The Purloined Letter” in Poe’s story, are hidden from them, as it were, in plain 
sight.
I have used both Marxist and psychoanalytic theory to elucidate features in Amos that 
struck me as disturbing upon my first reading.  I have argued, for instance, that the consciousness 
within Amos is so profoundly alienated that it can neither conceive nor urge any course of human 
action whatever in response to the injustices it denounces: it can only call down the Lord’s wrath 
upon them.  Moreover, I have argued the merits of reading that consciousness as a case study of 
the effects of trauma—of reading it as being so shattered by a flash of insight into its own vul-
nerability that it can never again invest the world in which it finds itself with coherent meaning. 
All it can do is fantasize mayhem because that world cannot approximate the mythic neverland 
upon which it fixates.  Walter Brueggemann does not refer to Amos in Hope Within History.  He 
does observe, however, that “[t]he Jewish Bible, the Christian Old Testament, is fundamentally a 
literature of hope, yet, at least in Christian circles the Old Testament has such a caricatured 
reputation as a tradition of law, judgment, and wrath” (72).  Reading Amos, I question how 
caricatured the Bible’s reputation for wrath may be.
The musicologist Richard Taruskin writes compellingly about the effect of canon forma-
tion on the recent reception of art commissioned by the Soviet government during the Stalinist 
purges of the late 1930s and the Second World War.1  He takes particular umbrage at the conten-
tion that Sergei Prokofiev and, to a lesser extent, Sergei Eisenstein and Dmitri Shostakovich 
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1 I draw from the following articles in Taruskin’s On Russian Music: “Prokofieff’s 
Return” (233-45), “Great Artists Serving Stalin Like a Dog” (270-76), and “Stalin Lives On in 
the Concert Hall, but Why?” (277-82). 
accepted such commissions under duress but managed to produce work that was “secretly dissi-
dent,” trusting to the particularly sophisticated among their audiences to recognize this (“Great” 
273).  The work of spelling this dissidence out, Taruskin suggests, has spawned an industry 
engaged in posthumously rehabilitating these artists as tortured souls who struggled as best they 
could against their oppressors.  Taruskin declares that, during the period in question, they were 
nothing of the sort.  Prokofiev and Eisenstein accepted commissions to collaborate on films that 
glorified the Stalinist regime such as Alexander Nevsky and Ivan the Terrible because they were 
opportunists: they wanted the money and the social perquisites the work provided.  Taruskin 
argues that Prokofiev was similarly motivated to produce pieces such as “Zdravitsa, a ‘Toast’ to 
the Great Leader and Teacher on his sixtieth birthday in 1939[.]  With revolting hypocrisy,” he 
continues,
it condemns prerevolutionary repressions (“for protest the Tsar killed us, left 
women without husbands”) while exalting as a rawboned, guileless folk hero—
some kind of Jascha Appleseed—the perpetrator of savageries twice as vile.  At 
that very moment old Jascha was wiping his maw after gobbling up eastern 
Poland in a deal with another beloved honcho to the west.  (“Stalin” 278)
Given such circumstances, Taruskin observes that a film such as Ivan the Terrible “painfully 
poses all the hardest questions involving art and its purposes.  The chief one is this: Is it possible 
to forget that this movie and this score, whatever their artistic merits, conveyed as poisonous a 
message as art has ever been asked to monger?” (“Great” 271).
The trick adopted by the rehabilitators is to focus upon the technical aspects of these 
works—to admire Eisenstein’s camera angles or Prokofiev’s modulation, which is “as innovative 
as the work of any of the more obvious modernists of the twentieth century” (“Prokofieff’s” 
237).  But is engagement with art no more than appreciating technical virtuosity while one 
determines to “[h]ang the ‘meaning’”? (“Great” 274).  Taruskin argues that that meaning is also 
important—and that it “arises out of a relationship between the art object and a perceiving sub-
ject, who, I believe, ought to be alive to the world and perceive art, along with everything else, in 
the light of not only esthetic but also of ethical and moral concerns” (“Prokofieff’s” 236).
No one denies that Prokofiev, Eisenstein, and Shostakovich are world-historical artists. 
For this reason alone, we may attempt to persuade ourselves that everything they produced has a 
quotient of edification that we will find if we only search for it diligently enough—even their 
paeans to Stalin.  To a lesser degree, the same might hold true of “Carl Orff’s celebrations of 
Nazi youth culture” or “Respighi’s evocations of the glory that was Mussolini’s Rome” 
(“Prokofieff’s” 237).  However, Taruskin argues that technical merit alone should not guarantee 
a work an entrée into the canon of western art.  Its tendenz in humanizing the world’s con-
tingency should factor in as well.
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In introducing Taruskin’s comments on Soviet art into a discussion of Amos, I do not 
mean to suggest that Amos formally parallels works such as Alexander Nevsky and Ivan the Ter-
rible.  Amos does not, after all, self consciously present itself to the world as a work of art, 
although it does evoke the experience of anxiety and earthquake, for example, with a high degree 
of artistry.  Nevertheless, Taruskin’s observations are highly suggestive.  Because of the biblical 
canon in which Amos appears, it has typically been assumed that diligent application to Amos’s 
text will be repaid by some revelation into divine nature, which has been normally pinpointed in 
the demand to “let justice roll down like waters” (5.24).  On the basis of this, exegetes such as 
Willie Schotroff reconstruct Amos’s ministry to Israel.  This characterization of whatever 
AmosI—the historical kernel upon which the Book of Amos is based—was doing in biblical 
Israel is symptomatic of a blind spot that the ideological conditioning that the Bible is the word 
of God has created.  The god that Amos worships and propitiates, somewhat like Jascha 
Appleseed, is about to gobble up his chosen people in his maw.  The sadistic pleasure Amos 
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